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Bibliography

1. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1951. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Mnemosyne* no. 4:129-159.
 "Most scholars either deny Aristotle's authorship of the first treatise of the *Organon*, or else consider the problem of authorship to be insoluble. I maintain, however, that such judgements are wrong and that the treatise is of genuine Aristotelian authorship, and of considerable importance for our knowledge both of Aristotle's own development, and also that of later Platonism. I shall try to show the authenticity of the treatise in the following study, and shall divide my investigation into the following main divisions:
 A. The view of the ancient commentators concerning the authenticity of *Categories* Chs. 1-9; B. Modern criticism of the authenticity of *Categories* Chs. 1-9; C. The authenticity of *Categories* Chs. 10-15." (p. 129)
 [See also the following note to *Ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics* (Second part), *Vivarium*, November, 1978, p. 85: "Unlike some 30 years ago (see my papers published in *Mnemosyne* 1951), the present author has his serious doubts, now, on the authenticity of the first treatise of the *Organon*" and the review by Kurt von Fritz (1954)].
2. ———. 1952. *The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
 Contents: Bibliography I-III; Introduction 1-7; Chapter I. Aristotle's doctrine of truth 8-35; Chapter II. The distinction of essential and accidental being pp. 31-43; Chapter III. Logical and ontological accident 44-52; Chapter IV. The nature of the categories in the *Metaphysics* 53-66; Chapter V. The doctrine of the categories in the first treatise of the *Organon* 67-75; Chapter VI. The use of the categories in the work of Aristotle 76-88; Appendix. The names of the categories 89-92; Index locorum 93-96.
 "It seems to be the fatal mistake of philology that it always failed to get rid of Kantian influences as to the question of the relation of logic and ontology. Many modern mathematical logicians have shown that the logical and the ontological aspect not only are inseparable but also that in many cases it either lacks good sense or is even impossible to distinguish them. Accordingly, the distinction of logical and ontological truth (especially of propositional truth and term-truth), that of logical and ontological accident and that of logical and ontological categories, has not the same meaning for modern logic as it seems to have for 'traditional' logic (for instance the logic of most Schoolmen).
 I hope to show in this study that the distinction of a logical and an ontological aspect (especially that of logical and ontological categories) can be applied to the Aristotelian doctrine only with the greatest reserve. A sharp distinction carried through rigorously turns out to be unsuitable when being applied to Aristotelian logic. For both aspects are, for Aristotle, not only mutually connected but even interwoven, and this in such a way that the ontological aspect seems to prevail, the logical being only an aspect emerging more or less in Aristotle's generally ontological way of thinking." (pp. 6-7)
3. ———. 1978. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part II. The Multiplication of Being in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Vivarium* no. 16:81-117.
 "3. *The Multiplication of Being in Aristotle's Categories* 3.1. *Introduction*. One of the results of the preceding section may be that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's view the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that only by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied. As a matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his followers of the

Middle Academy on this score would seem to be a different one. The ontological problems of participation were felt as early as in the Platonic dialogues (see our section 2), as well as the logical ones concerning predication (which will be discussed in a later section). Well, the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., introduced explicitly a threefold distinction of the Platonic Form or rather of its status which was (only) implied with Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly more fortunate in ascribing (ibid.) this introduction chiefly to the influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic interpretation. It is true, in stating the basic distinction between *en hypokeimenōi* and *kath' hypokeimenou* Aristotle tried to face the same cluster of fundamental problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of the Forms as taken before or after the *methexis* (cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Categ. 79, 12ff.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most unfaithful one, in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged on the same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in the Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his pupils with a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of participation and logical predication. It was certainly not left quite unsolved in the later dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous solution which could be accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So any of his serious followers, (who were teachers in the School, at the same time) was bound to contrive, at least, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development, Oxford 1949, 308)." (pp. 81-82)

3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the Categories; 3.2.1. The common view: categories = predicates; 3.2.2. The things said 'aneu symplokés'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the Categories; 3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification; 3.2.5. Some obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status of the 'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2. The second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in the items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7. The relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and predicables; 3.3.1. The opposition of category and predicable; 3.3.2. The impact of the opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the differentia; 3.3.4. Conclusion.

4. ———. 1980. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part III. The Categories as Classes of Names." *Vivarium* no. 18:1-62.
 "4. *The Categories as Classes of Names; 4.1. Status quaestionis.* The previous sections contain several hints to the close interrelation between three major issues in Plato's doctrine, viz. the question about the true nature of the Forms and those about participation and predication. Indeed, for the founder of the theory of the Forms, predication was bound to become a problem. Forms are immutable and indivisible; yet other Ideas have to participate in them; they are unique, by themselves and subsistent; yet, when saying 'John is man' (or white), 'Peter is man' (or white), should there be one perfect, eternal, immutable etc. Form of MAN (or WHITE) in the one and another in the other? Or, as I have put it above [1977: 85]: if John, Peter, and William are wise, does this mere fact mean that there must be something which they are all related to *in exactly the same manner*, namely WISDOM itself? And if 'John is wise', 'Peter is wise', and 'William is wise' are all true statements, what exactly is the meaning of the predicate name 'wise'? The former question is concerned with participation, the latter with predication. Well, that the crux of the latter problem is not the separate existence of the Forms (*chôrismos*) clearly appears from the fact that also the author of the *Categories*, who had entirely abandoned all kind of *chôrismos*, could apparently not get rid of a similar problem: if the

categories really are classes of 'things there are' (1 a 20) (i.e. 'real' substances, 'real' natures, and 'real' properties), rather than concepts (i.e. logical attributes), what kind of 'thing' is *meant* by a term *qua* 'category'? So for Aristotle the semantic problem still remained. His distinction between *en hypokeimenôî* and *kath' hypokeimenou* could only hide the original problem. It is often said that these phrases refer to different domains, the metaphysical and the logical one, respectively. We have already found some good reasons to qualify this opposition (see [1978], 84; 88). It seems to be useful now to collect all kind of information from Aristotle's writings, not only the *Categories*, about the proper meaning of the categories. This will be the aim of our sections 4.2-4.7." (pp. 1-2)

4.2. *On some modern interpretations of 'kata symplokên';* 4.3. *Aristotle's use of the categories;* " For this section see also my Utrecht dissertation, *The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy*, Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my former views on several points."; 4.31. *The categories as a classification of reality;* 4. 32. *The categories as a classification of sentence predicates;* 4.33. *The categories as a classification of 'copulative being';* 4.4. *How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories?;* 4.5. *Are the categories the 'highest predicates'?*; 4.6. *The categories taken as names in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. I 4;* 4.7. *An attempt at a reinterpretation of Categories, chs. 1-5;* 4.8. *Aristotle's view on relatives;* 4.9. *Conclusion.*

5. ———. 1988. "'Categorization' as a Key Notion in Ancient and Medieval Semantics." *Vivarium* no. 26:1-18.

"The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for Aristotle the verb '*katêgorein*' does not as such stand for statemental predication, let alone of the well-known 'S is P' type, and (b) 'non-statemental predication' or 'categorization' plays an important role in Ancient and Medieval philosophical procedure.

1. *Katêgorein and katêgoria in Aristotle* Aristotle was the first to use the word 'category' (*katêgoria*) as a technical term in logic and philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean 'highest predicate' and explained in terms of statement-making. From the logical point of view categories are thus considered 'potential predicates'.(*)
(...)

1.3 *Name giving ('categorization') as the key tool in the search for 'true substance'*
What Aristotle actually intends in his metaphysical discussions in the central books of his *Metaphysics* (Z-Th) is to discover the proper candidate for the name 'ousia'. According to Aristotle, the primary kind of 'being' or 'being as such' (*to on hêi on*) can only be found in 'being-ness' (*ousia*; see esp. *Metaph.* 1028b2). Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle is sure to find 'being as such' in the domain of things belonging to the everyday world. Aristotle's most pressing problem is to grasp the things' proper nature *qua* beings. In the search for an answer name-giving plays a decisive role: the solution to the problem consists in finding the most appropriate ('essential') name so as to bring everyday being into the discourse in such a way that precisely its 'beingness' is focussed upon.
(...)

2. *The use of 'praedicare' in Boethius* The Greek phrase *katêgorein ti kata tinos* is usually rendered in Latin as *praedicare aliquid de aliquo*. The Latin formula primarily means 'to say something of something else' (more precisely 'of somebody'). Of course, the most common meaning of the Latin phrase is 'to predicate something of something else in making a statement of the form S = P'. However, the verb *praedicare*, just as its Greek counterpart *katêgorein*, is used more than once merely in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating by means of a certain name', regardless of the syntactic role that name performs in a statement. In such cases *praedicare* stands for the act of calling up something under a certain name (designation), a procedure that we have labelled 'categorization'. (...)

Boethius' use of *praedicare* is quite in line with what is found in other authors. Along with the familiar use of the verb for statemental predication, Boethius also frequently uses *praedicare* in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating something under

a certain name' whereby the use of the designating word in predicate position is, sometimes even explicitly, ruled out." (pp. 1, 4, 9-10)

(*) See L. M. de Rijk, *The Categories as Classes of Names* (= *On Ancient and Medieval Semantics* 3), in: *Vivarium*, 18 (1980), 1-62, esp. 4-7

6. ———. 2002. *Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General Introduction. The Works on Logic*. Leiden: Brill.

"In this book I intend to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle resulted from persistent misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic perceptions of 'predication', and statement-making in general to Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics underlying Aristotle's expositions of his philosophy are culled from the *Organon*. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's semantics are is extremely important for our understanding of his view of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.

In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic function of 'be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations shows that in his analysis statement-making is copula-less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic use of 'be' to be the central one in Greek (*pace* Kahn), on the understanding that in Aristotle *hyparxis* is found not only in the stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).

In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and 'assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that Aristotle's doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are 'appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in the wider context of Aristotle's general strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).

In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find them in the several tracts of the *Organon*, in particular the *Categories*, *De interpretatione* and *Posterior Analytics*. These tracts are dealt with *in extenso*, in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively to suit my purposes." (pp. XV-XVI)

7. Rohr, Michael D. 1978. "Aristotle on the Transitivity of *Being Said of*." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 16:379-385.

Aristotle, in several of his treatises, discusses or makes use of the ontological tie or relation' being said of (and its converse partaking of), whose importance to his thought has been recognized by many scholars. Its pervasiveness guarantees that there will be difficulties in its interpretation. (2) To isolate it as an object of Aristotelian exegesis, I shall tentatively identify it with the sortal tie and so take it as connecting (in Aristotelian terms) each genus to all the species and individuals falling under that genus and each species to all the individuals and subordinate species (if any) falling under that species." (p. 379), two notes omitted)

(2) Some recent attempts at interpreting it may be found in Chung-Hwan Chen, "On Aristotle's Two Expressions," *Phronesis* 2 (1957):148-59; *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 75-90; R. E. Alien, "Substance and Predication in Aristotle's Categories," in *Exegesis and Argument*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (New York:

- Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 362-73; and Russell Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts About Substances," *The Philosophical Review* 84 (1975): 338-73.
8. Ross, William David. 1939. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 36:431-433.
 "Professor Husik (*) has done a service to students of Aristotle by reminding them of his earlier article, which, buried in the decent obscurity of a learned journal, had escaped my attention, as well as that of many other students.
 The authenticity of the *Categories* is well attested by external evidence. The work was accepted as genuine by almost all the ancient scholars (πάντες παρτηρώσι, says Philoponus). A succession of scholars wrote commentaries on it as on a genuine work of Aristotle, from the third century A.D. onwards -- Porphyry, Dexippus, Ammonius, Philoponus, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, not to speak of the later commentators, Elias and David. Its genuineness was, however, probably doubted by some scholars, for several of the commentators devote themselves to refuting arguments against its genuineness -- e.g., Philoponus 12.34-13.5, Simplicius 379.7-380.15, Olympiodorus 22.38-24.20. The arguments which they set themselves to meet-arguments derived from supposed contradictions between the *Categories* and certain works of Aristotle- are invariably weak, and the answers given by the commentators are convincing." (p. 431)
 [* I. Husik, "The Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories*", *Journal of Philosophy*, 1939]
9. ———. 1995. *Aristotle*. London and New York: Routledge.
 Sixth edition. With an introduction by John L. Ackrill (First edition 1923, fifth revised edition 1953); on the *Categories* see pp. 22-26.
 "Ross's book gives a concise and comprehensive account of Aristotle's philosophical works—and no better account exists.
 In this Introduction I will say something about Ross and about his book, and I will then outline some of the ways in which the study of Aristotle has developed in the years since he wrote it." (From the *Introduction* by J. L. Ackrill, p. VII).
 (...)
 "It is highly probable that the doctrine [of categories] began as an attempt to solve certain difficulties about predication which had troubled the Megaric school and other earlier thinkers.(18) Aristotle's object seems to have been to clear up the question by distinguishing the main types of meaning of the words and phrases that can be combined to make a sentence. And in doing this he arrived at the earliest known classification of the main types of entity involved in the structure of reality. Why are they called categories? The ordinary meaning of is 'predicate,' but the first category has for its primary members individual substances, which according to Aristotle's doctrine are never properly predicates but always subjects. It has sometimes, therefore, been thought that primary substances do not fit properly into the doctrine of the categories. But this is not the case. 'Socrates' is, indeed, on Aristotelian principles no proper predicate; but if we ask what Socrates is, the ultimate, i.e. the most general, answer is 'a substance,' just as, if we ask what red is, the ultimate answer is 'a quality.' The categories are a list of the widest predicates which are predicable essentially of the various nameable entities, i.e. which tell us what kinds of entity at bottom they are." (pp. 23-24)
 (18) This view is ably expressed in O. Apelt's: *Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie*. Leipzig, 1891
10. Rossitto, Cristina. 2017. "Aristotle and the "Categories"." In *Categories: Histories and Perspectives*, edited by D'Anna, Giuseppe and Fossati, Lorenzo, 11-34. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
 "In order to conclude, in this short and compendious description of the ategories, contained in the treatise called *Categories*, we tried to highlight just few aspects that may invite to further reflections. The Aristotelian conception of categories is very "rich" by itself, namely into the same Aristotle's background.

This constitutes one of reasons which have decreed its fortune, following on the recovery and resumption, in the philosophical tradition—and not just philosophical —, since ancient times up to now and beyond.

As for Aristotle, it is possible having an idea about what “he should have interiorized that” by only naming two of the copious places in which he uses what is widely known as his doctrine of categories. By electing that we have detached both from the three main perspectives we used before—linguistic, logic and ontological —, and in the strictly philosophical field, precisely theoretical or, as Aristotle would have said, of first philosophy.

It deals with two passages, the first contained into a work of psychology, namely of physics, as Aristotle affirmed at the beginning of *De anima* I, and the second of an ethical work, that is in the *Eudemian Ethics*:

First, surely, it is necessary to establish in which of the genera (ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν) the soul lies and what it is; I say it is this-somewhat and a substance, or quality or quantity or some other of the categories (κατηγοριῶν) which I have distinguished. Further, if the soul belongs to the beings potentially, or is it rather actually. This is not, in fact, something small (*De an.* I 1, 402a 23–27).

The good is called in many ways, indeed in as many ways as being (πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν). Being, as has been set out elsewhere, signifies what-is, quality, quantity, when...; and the good occurs in each one of these categories—in substance, intelligence and God (ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεός); in quality, the just (τὸ δίκαιον); in quantity, the moderate (τὸ μέτριον), in the when, the right occasion (ὁ καιρός) (*Eth. Eud.* I 8, 1217b 25–32; Aristotle 1982 [*Eudemian Ethics. Books I, II and VIII.* Transl. and Commentary M. Woods, Oxford: Clarendon Press] : 9–10)." (p. 34)

11. Sanford, Jonathan J. 2004. "Categories and Metaphysics: Aristotle's Science of Being." In *Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays*, edited by Gorman, Michael and Sanford, Jonathan J., 3-20. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
 "The relationship between Aristotle's *Categories* and his *Metaphysics* is a matter of some debate. If one assumes that the *Categories* is fundamentally a metaphysical work, then there appear to be irreconcilable differences between the notion of substance presented in the *Categories* and that presented in *Metaphysics* Z (VII). The *Categories* account of substance does not present matter as a component of hylomorphic substance, nor does it consider substance as a formal cause of unity, both of which are key ideas of *Metaphysics* Z (VII). The *Metaphysics* therefore represents a break with Aristotle's older metaphysical scheme. On the other hand, if one assumes that the *Categories* is fundamentally a logical work that makes no pretence to being a work of metaphysics, then the account of substance and the other categories in the *Categories* is at worst irrelevant to, and at best only obliquely related to, what Aristotle attempts to accomplish in the *Metaphysics*. I think that the truth lies somewhere between these two views. The *Categories* is best understood as both a logical and a metaphysical account. The metaphysics presented in the *Categories* is by no means complete, but Aristotle does not claim that it is. Aristotle does not, in the *Metaphysics*, break with his ideas in the *Categories*, but deepens them and works to fill out his metaphysics. In this essay I consider the relationship between Aristotle's metaphysics and his theory of categories from the perspective of the requirements of science. The *Metaphysics* presents Aristotle's science of being, but, as his logical works show, science depends on categories.
 Thus the *Metaphysics* cannot be understood apart from the works—especially the *Categories*, the *Topics*, and the *Posterior Analytics*—in which Aristotle explains what categories are, how they are used, and what their relationship to science is. There are indeed some difficulties in positing a close relationship between Aristotle's earlier and later works, especially in regard to what gives unity to a science and the importance of being in the sense of potentiality and actuality. Still, these problems are not so great as to constitute a disjunction between Aristotle's earlier and later works. Indeed, Aristotle's attempts to describe being in each of its

four senses in the *Metaphysics* are possible only because of the close relationship between logic and metaphysics, a relationship that he elucidates in his *Categories* and some other earlier works." (pp. 3-4, notes omitted)

12. Scaltsas, Theodore. 1981. "Numerical versus qualitative Identity of Properties in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Philosophia* no. 10-11:328-345.
13. Scheu, Marina M. 1944. *The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas*. Washington: Catholic University of America Presss.
 Contents: List of tables VIII; Preface IX; List of abbreviations XIII; Part I. Categories in Aristotle. I. The history and general nature of the categories 3; II. The logical aspect of the categories in Aristotle 13; III. The metaphysical aspect of the categories in Aristotle 23; Part II. Categories in St. Thomas. IV. The history of the categories from Aristotle to St. Thomas 38; V. General nature of the categories in Thomistic philosophy 46; VI. The nature of substance 64; VII. The nature of accident 77; Summary and conclusion 96; Bibliography 98; Index 102-109.
 ""Knowledge to be of value must be founded on reality. Hence it follows that unless our ideas faithfully reflect reality, our judgments about it will be false. One of the most evident illustrations of this fact is found in the divergent views philosophers have taken with regard to our widest universal concepts, the categories of being. It is, therefore, an important task of metaphysics to inquire into the modes which characterize the being that these concepts represent.
 Aristotle, the first philosopher known to have undertaken this task, presents a classification of categories in his logical treatise entitled *Categories*. Nor does he confine his doctrine to but this one of his works. Numerous references to the categories are found in practically all of his writings, especially in the *Metaphysics*. To St. Thomas Aquinas, however, we owe the development and perfection of the theory of the categories. He, it is true, wrote no authentic logical treatise' on the subject as did Aristotle, but his doctrine of the categories can be culled from his numerous discussions of them throughout his more metaphysical works in particular, especially from the *Quaestiones Disputatae*, the *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, and the *Summa Theologica*.
 It is the purpose of this study, which is to be primarily metaphysical and Thomistic in character, to present the general teaching of St. Thomas on the categories. Our treatment of Aristotle, then, is to give the proper background, since obviously it is the Aristotelian plan that is the point of departure for all Thomistic study of the subject. Without this Aristotelian environment in which St. Thomas worked, his position would be much less clear. In a word, the Thomistic section of this study will reveal that St. Thomas developed and perfected Aristotelian thought.
 The problem of the categories is twofold: logical, in so far as it involves a classification of our generic concepts ; metaphysical, in that it must necessarily regard and classify the objects of those concepts, that is, real beings Therefore, after considering the history and general nature of the categories in the first chapter of the Aristotelian section, we shall examine the logical and metaphysical aspect in the two chapters following. Chapter four will present the historical transition from Aristotle to St. Thomas. Since St. Thomas wrote no logical treatise on the categories, nor any commentary on Aristotle's logical treatment of them, it will be necessary for us to proceed in a somewhat different manner in the Thomistic section of our work. In keeping with the primarily metaphysical trend in St. Thomas' thought, which is particularly evident in his treatment of the categories, we propose to present in the last three chapters respectively the general character of his teaching on the categories and a consideration of the nature of substance and the nature of accidents." (pp. IX-X notes omitted)
14. Scholz, Donald F. 1963. "The Category of Quantity." *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* no. 19:229-256.
 "Because quantity itself is relatively well known to us, an analysis of its genus is not too difficult. This fact alone makes it interesting to us. Further, an examination of

this genus is useful in coming to an understanding of Aristotle's procedure in the *Categories* as a whole.

For these reasons it would seem appropriate to reflect a little upon Aristotle's treatment of quantity in the *Categories*." (p. 229)

(...)

"In reflecting upon the ways in which Aristotle determines the properties of quantity, we can see that he proceeds inductively in all cases, showing the properties of quantity from its species. This might be taken as a sign of what we said at the beginning of our examination of this category, the genus is so general, so potential, that it can be understood only by making reference to something more actual, its species.

We have now completed our treatment of the category of quantity. We have seen how it is made known and we have seen its properties. We have judged Aristotle's method in exposing this doctrine to have been the proper one. Perhaps, by analyzing the other categories in this way, one would be able to obtain a relatively distinct knowledge of all of them. This in itself -would be no small accomplishment." (p. 256)

15. Sedley, David. 2002. "Aristotelian relativities." In *Le style de la pensée. Recueil d'hommages à Jacques Brunschwig*, edited by Canto-Sperber, Monique and Pellegrin, Pierre, 324-352. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Originally published in Italian as: "Relatività aristoteliche", *Dianoia*, 2, 1997 pp. 11-15 (first part) and 1998, 3, 11-23 (second part).

"In chapter 7 of the *Categories*, devoted to the category of relativity (πρός τι), Aristotle starts with a definition of the relative (6a 36-b 8)" (p. 324)

(...)

"At the end of the chapter (8a 13ff.) he raises a worry about whether this definition will allow some substances to be relative, namely those which are themselves the organic parts of larger substances. We must recall that in the *Categories* he has none of his later qualms about allowing some substances to be composed of substances (1). Hence his question: won't those substances which are parts of larger substances be relative, namely to the wholes of which they are parts? The worry is a proper one, because he has already spoken of the parts of substances as falling into both categories: in chapter 5, at 3a 29-32, they were substances, yet in chapter 7, at 6b 36-7 a 22, relatives include «wing», «head» and «rudder»." (p. 325)

(...)

"Aristotle's point is metaphysical, not linguistic. It is important not to be misled into thinking that he is in any way appealing to what can and cannot be said in the Greek language. It is not even obvious that Greek usage would consider an expression like πρὸς τι χεῖρ unacceptable. His observation about primary and secondary substances is rather, I suppose, as follows. If a hand appears to be relative, namely to its owner, it is not in virtue being this particular hand that it is relative, but in virtue of being a hand- that is, not because of its individuality, the hallmark of a primary substance, but because of its species, the hallmark of a secondary substance." (pp. 325-326)

(...)

"I hope that I have made a sufficient case, based on Aristotle's own text, for attributing to him the distinction between what I have called soft and hard relativity. But now let me confess that my reading him this way was inspired by a much more lucid version of the same distinction, attributed by Simplicius to the Stoics. The report comes from his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* (166.15-29) (22)" (p. 339)

(22) SVF [*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*] II 403. The translation here is based on that at LS [A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley (eds.), A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley (eds.), *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Cambridge University Press, 1987] 29B.

16. Sharma, Ravi K. 1997. "A New Defense of Tropes? On *Categories* 3b10-18." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 17:309-315.

"A long-standing debate among interpreters of the *Categories* concerns the nature of first-order accidents, the entities designated by expressions such as 'the particular white' (το τι λευκόν). Some interpreters maintain that Aristotle takes them to be *universals*, entities that may be *present in* many substances; others, that Aristotle takes them to be *tropes*, each of which is peculiar to a single substance.(1)

In a recent issue of this journal, Daniel T. Devereux offers a new defense of the tropes-reading, one that is not based, as most others have been, on Aristotle's cryptic remark concerning the *present-in* relation at 1a24-25.(2) If Devereux is right, the debate has now been settled in favor of tropes. In this note, I shall maintain that Devereux misreads the passage crucial to his argument and that the proper reading undermines his proposed defense." (p. 309)

(1) I Throughout this discussion, I italicize 'present in' (έν) and 'said of (λέγεται κατά) when those locutions are used technically, for relations between entities.

(2) See Devereux 1992 ['Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's *Categories*', *Ancient Philosophy* 12: 113-131]. The term 'trope' is my choice; Devereux expresses the same idea by speaking of tokens, or particular instances, of types.

17. Shatalov, Keren Wilson. 2020. "Hypokoimenon versus substance." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 74:227-250.

"There is a curious lacuna in scholarship on Aristotle's logic and metaphysics, in that few authors investigate Aristotle's notion of ύποκείμενον, or subject, in its own right, even by confining this investigation to his logical works. Though they tend to agree that it is offered as a criterion for substancehood in *Categories*, discussion of what it is to be a ύποκείμενον is generally offered only in passing. There is a reason for this: Substance seems the more compelling topic, since it is about this that Aristotle is in a disagreement with Plato, and it is in the interest of this disagreement that Aristotle introduces the notion of ύποκείμενον. But if being a ύποκείμενον is so key to Aristotle's exposition of his anti-Platonic view of substance, at least in his logical works, to the extent that we do not understand being a ύποκείμενον we cannot understand what Aristotle is trying to tell us about what it is to be an ούσία, or substance." (p. 227)

(...)

"When comparing the different sciences and considering the way in which they are related, one finds oneself in the perspective of metaphysics, according to which substance is the only, the ultimate, ύποκείμενον. It is according to this perspective, the perspective of metaphysics, that Aristotle is writing in *Categories* when he so closely associates being a subject with being a substance.!" (p. 250)

18. Shields, Christopher. 1999. *Order in Multiplicity. Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Contents: Abbreviations XIII; Introduction 1; Part I: Homonymy as Such. 1. The Varieties of Homonymy 9; 2. The Promises and Problems of Homonymy 43; 3. Homonymy and Signification 75; 4. Core-Dependent Homonymy 103; Part II: Homonymy at Work. 5. The Body 131; 6. Oneness, Sameness, and Referential Opacity 155; 7. The Meaning of Life 176; 8. Goodness 194; 9. The Homonymy of Being 217; Afterword: Homonymy's Promise Reconsidered 268; Bibliography 271; Index of Passages Cited 281; General Index 287-290.

"Aristotle's treatments of the homonymy of core philosophical concepts, including especially being and goodness, are sometimes highly abstract, and they must be understood as arising from the polemical contexts which motivate them.

For these reasons, I consider these topics only after recounting Aristotle's general framework for introducing homonymy. Accordingly, I divide the study into two parts.

In Part I, I consider homonymy as such, mainly by reflecting on the uncontroversial cases upon which Aristotle himself relies when trying to explicate and motivate homonymy. I begin, in Chapter 1, by recounting Aristotle's introduction of homonymy in the *Categories*, settling some exegetical difficulties concerning his general conception of its nature."

(...)

In Part II, I investigate homonymy at work. I do not move through Aristotle's appeals to homonymy seriatim. Rather, I consider a very few cases, selected for their importance, interest, and representative character. In two cases, I urge that some of Aristotle's critics have failed to appreciate the power of homonymy in meeting objections to substantive Aristotelian theories.

(...)

Although I maintain that Aristotle cannot establish the homonymy of being, I do not infer that his commitment to homonymy as such is misguided. On the contrary, I maintain that outside this one application, Aristotle's commitment to homonymy is altogether well motivated; in particular, the method of definition it introduces is of genuine and lasting importance. At the very minimum, I argue, Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis. He has identified a framework which has too often been overlooked by those disenchanted with the prospects for genuine philosophical progress. Accordingly, I end Part II with a concluding afterword in which I appraise in a fully general way homonymy's enduring value." (pp. 3-5)

19. Simons, Peter. 1988. "Aristotle's Concept of State of Affairs." In *Antike Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*, edited by Gigon, Olof and Fischer, Michael W., 97-112. Bern: Peter Lang.

"The concept of state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) is one which is of general interest in philosophy in connection with the theory of truth, but is also of special interest for legal philosophy.(1) Its heyday in philosophy was the late (2) nineteenth century and early twentieth century ; it is therefore tempting to regard the concept in its philosophical employment as a thoroughly modern invention. Nevertheless, a similar concept was known to medieval philosophy(3), and the medievals in question - as was usual then - referred back to the authority of Aristotle in support of their views. I claim that those medievals who ascribed something like a concept of state of affairs to Aristotle were right.(4) Discussing the identity of concepts, especially over a time-span of millennia, is fraught with difficulties, so I shall need first to establish what conditions a concept must satisfy to be a concept of state of affairs. This will occupy § 2. I shall then in § 3 endeavour to show that Aristotle's works employ a concept closely answering these conditions." (p. 97)

(...)

"The evidence from Aristotle

The texts supporting my interpretation come mainly from the logical works "Categories" and "De interpretatione". In particular, I claim that the term *pragma* is used on several occasions with a meaning corresponding closely to that of "state of affairs" as specified above. First, some preliminary remarks on interpreting these texts.

We must be clear from the start that in these works Aristotle's discussion is so compressed and so full of ambiguities that no interpretation can be uncontroversial. In discussing semantic matters, Aristotle uses no specially developed terminology, and he is also sparing in his use of examples. It is no accident that medieval commentators on these writings of Aristotle, which were for a long time the chief source of information on his work, diverged widely in their interpretations. Having now got used to making distinctions and employing more specific semantic concepts than Aristotle, it would be futile for us to expect to find, sitting in his work, a concept of state of affairs which unambiguously coincides with the one specified in the previous section. The best we can expect, even using plausible interpolations and taking interpretative risks, is an anticipatory approximation. But while Aristotle does not have a fully-fledged modern concept of state of affairs, it is surprising, in view of the subsequent history of semantics, how close he comes to one. (pp. 101-102)

20. Stein, Nathanael. 2011. "Aristotle's Causal Pluralism." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 93:121-147.

Abstract: "Central to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology is the claim that 'aitia' – 'cause' – is "said in many ways", i.e., multivocal. Though the importance of

the four causes in Aristotle's system cannot be overstated, the nature of his pluralism about *aitiai* has not been addressed. It is not at all obvious how these modes of causation are related to one another, or why they all deserve a common term. Nor is it clear, in particular, whether the causes are related to one another as species under a single genus, such that there is a univocal definition of 'aitia' which applies to all of them, or whether Aristotle means to assert that the four causes are homonyms. It is argued here that although there are strong reasons to group the four causes together, there are also powerful considerations on the side of homonymy. It is further argued that the four causes are more closely tied to the ontological theory of categories and predication than is often recognized. As a result, we can reconcile the competing demands of unity and plurality by taking one mode of causation, the formal cause, as basic, and accounting for the other modes with reference to it, in the manner of so-called *pros hen* homonyms."

21. Stough, Charlotte L. 1972. "Language and Ontology in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 10:261-272.
 "Yet there is an attendant danger in reading the *Categories* freely in the light of later works such as the *Metaphysics*. It is altogether too easy to find in that early text the more sophisticated ideas of a maturer period of Aristotle's philosophical development and hence unwittingly to incorporate into our procedure the assumption, dubious at best, that Aristotle's views remained virtually unchanged throughout his philosophical career. Thus there would seem to be *prima facie* reason for raising some questions of a rather special sort about the body of the *Categories* as such --- about what can be said of Aristotle's notion of categories of being without going beyond that work (or at least the *Organon*) for support. One question in particular deserves attention, because it strikes at the very center of the theory expounded in the *Categories*. Granted that Aristotle attached a privileged status to the category of substance -- a status importantly not enjoyed by the other nine categories -- we want to know what he conceived that special status to be. Our question concerns the relation between substance and the remaining categories. Aristotle had some important things to say on this subject in later works, (1) but how much of that was originally central to the theory of categories cannot be uncovered by his subsequent remarks. Very little can be said about the philosophical significance of the early doctrine of categories until we understand precisely how Aristotle ordered the category of substance in relation to the nine nonsubstantial forms of predication in the *Categories* itself. As might be expected, Aristotle offers no easy answer to this question, but his own words are suggestive in ways that are worth exploring and yet, at the same time, quite easily overlooked." (p. 261)
 (1) For example, *Met.*, Zeta 1 (cf. *Delta* 11); Aristotle's doctrine of *τα πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα* set forth in central sections of the *Metaphysics* may represent his most finished thoughts on this subject.
22. Striker, Gisela. 2011. "A Note on the Ontology of Aristotle's *Categories*, chapter 2." In *Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes*, edited by Morison, Benjam and Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 141-151. New York: Oxford University Press. Abstract: "This paper argues that the four-fold classification of entities in chapter 2 of Aristotle's *Categories*, with its unusual terminology, contains a criticism of Plato's metaphysics, showing that the term 'participation' covers two distinct relations. This criticism prepares the way for the reversal of priorities in chapter 5, in which Aristotle bestows the rank of primary substance on concrete individuals. However, the ontological status of the species of primary substances—universals that are not attributes—remains ambiguous. A possible solution of these difficulties may be found in *Metaphysics* Z.13, with the rejection of universals as substances from Aristotle's ontology."
23. Studtmann, Paul. 2003. "Aristotle's Category of Quality: A Regimented Interpretation." *Apeiron* no. 36:205-227.
 "In Chapter Eight of the *Categories*, Aristotle divides the genus, quality, into four species: (1) habits and dispositions; (2) natural capabilities and incapacities; (3)

affective qualities and affections; and (4) shape." (p. 205)

(,,)

"in this paper, I argue that there is an alternative interpretation to the canonical interpretation, what I will call the regimented interpretation, that can go some way toward removing the dissatisfaction that he and others have had with it. I do not think that such an interpretation can entirely remove all the difficulties with Aristotle's discussion — some peculiarities will remain. Nonetheless, as I hope to show, there is a way to regiment the category that makes it vastly more systematic, and as a result, far more philosophically interesting than the canonical interpretation suggests.

My main argument for the regimented interpretation proceeds in two stages. First, I examine the details of Aristotle's discussion of the first three canonical species and conclude not only that they are subsumed under the single genus of dispositions but also that the genus of dispositions admits of a more or less systematic and symmetrical differentiation.

As a result, the category of quality should be understood as being primarily divided into two species: shape and dispositions. And because the genus of dispositions is systematically differentiated and Aristotle does not differentiate shape at all, any arbitrariness in the category of quality must be located in the division of the genus, quality, into the two species, shapes and dispositions. In the second stage of the argument, I propose a hypothesis about the way Aristotle understands the nature of quality itself, a hypothesis that leads to a very plausible division of quality into shape and dispositions. Hence, the divisions in the category of quality can be understood as flowing systematically from the very nature of the genus being divided." (p. 207)

24. ———. 2004. "Aristotle's Category of Quantity: A Unified Interpretation." *Apeiron* no. 37:69-91.

"Aristotle provides two different treatments of the category of quantity: one in *Categories* V and one in *Metaphysics* V 7. Interestingly (and perhaps not surprisingly) the treatments differ in important respects. In the *Categories*, Aristotle provides two different differentiations of quantity.

According to the first, quantity divides into continuous and discrete quantity; the former then divides into line, surface, body and time, and the latter into number and speech. According to the second, quantity divides into quantities whose parts have a relative position with respect to one another and quantities whose parts do not (*Cat.* 4b20-2). Although the differences between these two differentiations are interesting, for the purposes of this paper I shall focus on the first. For, in the first instance, the differentiations appear to be compatible; and second, by presenting the division into continuous and discrete quantities before the other division, Aristotle, it would seem, gives priority to the former. In this paper, therefore, not only will I assume that the two differentiations do not need philosophical correction to make them compatible but I will also follow Aristotle's lead and take the division into continuous and discrete quantities to be the more fundamental." (p. 69)

25. ———. 2008. *The Foundations of Aristotle's Categorical Scheme*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Contents: Chapter 1: Whence the Categories? 7; Chapter 2: The Body Problem in Aristotle 25; Chapter 3: Form 49; Chapter 4: Prime Matter 79; Chapter 5: Quality 101; Chapter 6: Quantity 125; Chapter 7: Substance 141; Index 173-175.

"Aristotle's categorial scheme had an unparalleled effect not only on his own philosophical system but also on the systems of many of the greatest philosophers in the western tradition.

The set of doctrines in the *Categories*, what I will henceforth call *categorialism*, play, for instance, a central role in Aristotle's discussion of change in the *Physics*, in the science of being qua being in the *Metaphysics* and in the rejection of Platonic ethics in the *Nicomachean Ethics*."

(...)

"Despite its influence, however, categorialism raises two fundamental questions that to this day remain open. The first concerns Aristotle's list of highest kinds." (p. 7)
(...)

"Unlike the first question, the second concerns the way in which categorialism relates to doctrines Aristotle articulates in other works. The question arises as a result of a rather common story that is told about the categories and its apparent deep tensions with hylomorphism." (p. 9)

(...)

"This book contains a series of interrelated chapters that collectively support an interpretation that provides answers to the two great questions concerning Aristotle's categories. According to the interpretation, Aristotle's categorial scheme is derivable from his hylomorphic ontology, which itself is derivable from very general theses about the nature of being." (p. 15)

26. ———. 2012. "Aristotle's Categorial Scheme." In *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, edited by Shields, Christopher, 63-80. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In this chapter I shall discuss a tradition of interpretation that has for the most part been abandoned and shall do so by way of discussing two questions concerning Aristotle's categorialism that are not often treated together. By pointing out just how controversial any approach to Aristotle's *Categories* is bound to be, I hope to forestall any initial strong objections to the admittedly non-standard approach I shall take. And even if I fail to convince the reader of the cogency of the approach by the end of the chapter, I hope that the reader will have benefitted from seeing Aristotle's categorial scheme treated from a heterodoxical perspective. For what it is worth, it is my contention that Aristotle's categorial scheme, as is the case with many works in the history of philosophy, is best illuminated by opposing beams of interpretive light.

The following discussion is framed by two questions concerning Aristotle's categorialism: (1) How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories? and (2) What is the connection between Aristotle's categories and his hylomorphic ontology. These questions are not often treated together, which is not altogether surprising, since each question is extremely difficult to answer in its own right. Hence, treating them together piles difficulty upon difficulty. Moreover, owing to their difficulty scholars have given wildly different answers to each of the questions. So the amount of scholarly disagreement about the issues involved is rather daunting. Nonetheless there is an interpretively and philosophically interesting reason for discussing both questions in a single paper, namely the possibility of interestingly co-ordinated answers to the questions. The possibility stems from a tradition of interpretation that finds its origin in the Middle Ages. Because of its medieval origin, the interpretation is out of step with recent scholarly trends. Nonetheless, I hope at least to show the interest in the interpretation. My goal in this chapter is not to present anything like a definitive case for an interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories* but rather to discuss what I take to be a provocative and interesting interpretation that has the resources to provide systematic and co-ordinated answers to two very large questions concerning Aristotle's categorial scheme. In short, according to the interpretation, Aristotle's list of highest kinds can be derived a priori from his hylomorphic ontology. To understand the import of such a claim, however, first requires a discussion of the two questions I have just mentioned." (pp. 64-65)

27. Surdu, Alexandru. 2006. *Aristotelian Theory of Prejudicative Forms*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Contents: Vorwort des Herausgebers IX; Foreword XI; List of Signs XV; Part I. Hermeneutic Investigations 1; 1. Interpretation of the First Two Chapters of Aristotle's *Categoriae* 3; 2. Interpretation of the Third Chapter of Aristotle's *Categoriae* 19; 3. Interpretation of the Fifth Chapter of Aristotle's *Categoriae* 25; 4. The Problem of Prejudicative Relations in other Aristotelian Works 33; 5. Commentaries and Interpretations 61; 6. Specificity of Prejudicative Relations 105;

Part II. Logical Significance of Prejudicative Relations 125; 1. A Short Characterization 127; 2. Introducing the Symbolic Notation 129; 3. Classical-Traditional Analysis of Prejudicative Relations 133; 4. Logical-Mathematical Significance of Prejudicative Relations 167; Part III. General Philosophical Conclusions 209; 1. A Short Characterization 211; 2. Subsistence, Existence, and Being 213; 3. The Five Voices, Essence, and Quiddity 217; 4. The Problem of the Universal (General) 221; 5. Intellect, Reason, and Rational Intellect 223-228.

"The starting point of the present paper was the symbolic interpretation - of a logical-mathematical type - of the first chapters of Aristotle's work *Categoriae* - work which is usually not taken into account by the modems. Beginning with the first attempts I was surprised to notice that the mentioned texts are lending themselves -more than any other text - to a logical-mathematical formalisation, the difference being that they show, besides the currently interpretable forms, other ones that are not to be found either within symbolic logic, or within the classical-traditional one. We named them "prejudicative forms", since they have a certain resemblance with the classical judgements, but precede them, without being judgements in their own right, that is affirmations or negations.

The prejudicative forms represent an unstudied field, so far. Their affinity with symbolic forms grants them a prejudicative character and complete these last ones in many respects, which leads to the conclusion that, although the symbolic logic is the most recent logic, its field is anterior - from a logical point of view - to the classical field. And certainly Aristotle and some ancient commentators of the *Organon* had this intuition.

By means of the entities they focus on, the prejudicative forms -the individual, the singular, the species, the genus and the supreme genus - contribute to the solving of some of the generally philosophical issues which are still debatable on, as the problem of universal, which also appeared in relation with Aristotle's logic and was pointed out by Porphyrius Malchus in his famous *Isagoge*.

Coming back to Aristotle, one can indeed wonder whether it was possible for him to accomplish so many things in the field of logic and, moreover, to foresee - explicitly or not - problems which find a reasonable explanation just nowadays. One should not forget that subtle scholars preceded Aristotle, and that the problems of logic were so to say "floating" in the atmosphere of Greek philosophy. Moreover, once discovered, the field of logic could have been unrestrictedly covered, as these were no hindrances. Aristotle did cover it. Faced with a savage and hardly coverable field, he was often forced to clear it. Today, these soundings are astonishing, since the field is crossed by large railways and rapidly covered. Nevertheless, there are some moments when nobody can say "Dig here!"

Aristotle did not finish, but he gave a lot of suggestions, and, if we do not think in a different way, but we think something else, his logic will still be a precious source of hints and information." (Foreword, pp. XII-XIII)

28. Tarán, Leonardo. 1978. "Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy." *Hermes. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie* no. 106:73-99. Reprinted in: Leonardo Tarán, *Collected Papers 1962-1999*, Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 421-454.

"Modern scholarship since the middle of the last century has generally accepted it as an established fact that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification of words or names (ὀνόματα) in relation to the concepts they express and that he gave definitions of *homonyma* and *synonyma* only in reference to words and their meanings; that is to say that for him *homonyma* and *synonyma* are properties of linguistic terms and not of things, whereas for Aristotle, especially in the first chapter of the *Categories*, they are properties of things." (p. 421)

(...)

"He [Jonathan Barnes, "Homonymy in Aristotle and Speusippus," *Classical Quarterly*, N.S. 21 (1971), pp. 65-80] contends, in the first place, that Speusippus's conception of *homonyma* and *synonyma* is essentially the same as that of Aristotle, the slight differences between their respective definitions of each being trivial, and,

secondly, that even though in a few places Aristotle does use *homonyma* and *synonyma* as properties of linguistic terms, this is due to the fact that Aristotle's use of these words is not as rigid as the *Categories* would lead one to believe; he could not have been influenced by Speusippus because the latter conceived homonymy and synonymy as properties of things and, in any case, if influence of one on the other be assumed, it could as well have been Aristotle that influenced Speusippus. Though I believe that his two main contentions are mistaken, I am here mainly concerned with the first part of Barnes' thesis; for, if he were right in believing that for Speusippus *homonyma* and *synonyma* are properties of things and not of names or linguistic terms, then Hambruch's [*] notion that Speusippus did influence Aristotle when the latter uses *synonymon* as a property of names would be wrong, even though Barnes himself were mistaken in his analysis of the Aristotelian passages he reviews in the second part of his paper. Whereas, on the other hand, if Speusippus's classification is really of ὀνόματά, then, since Barnes himself admits that Aristotle does sometimes use *homonyma* and *synonyma* as properties of names, the influence of Speusippus on Aristotle is at least possible; and it becomes plausible and probable, regardless of the relative chronology of their respective works, when it is seen, as I shall try to show, that in some cases Aristotle is in fact cracking doctrines which presuppose a use of *homonyma* and *synonyma* such as can be ascribed to Speusippus or is using *synonymon* in the Speusippean sense, different from Aristotle's own notion of synonymous words." (pp. 422-423)

(...)

"Our only source for Speusippus's classification of names is the three texts that Lang has assembled as frags. 32a, 32b, and 32c, (7) three passages from Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*."

[*] E. Hambruch, *Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristotelischen Topik* (1904).

References

Margherita Isnardi Parente, *Speusippo: Frammenti; Edizione, traduzione e commento*, Naples: Bibliopolis 1980 (Greek text and Italian translation; see Fragments 13, 14, 15).

Paul Lang, *De Speusippi academici scriptis accedunt fragmenta*, Bonn 1911; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965.

29. Titcomb, Margaret Rae. 2015. "Aristotle's Category Construction and the Why Behind It." *Akadimia Filosofia* no. 1:9-15.
Abstract: "Aristotle's *Categoriae*, or the *Categories*, is a comprehensive classification system for every object of human understanding that can be either a subject or a predicate of a proposition. There are ten categories: Substance, Quantity, Qualification, Relative/Relation, Place, Time, Position, State (Condition), Action, and Affection. The first part of this paper will explain each of the categories in the order in which they are presented in the chapters of *Categoriae*. The second half of the paper will discuss the guilty in the approach Aristotle uses to both construct and find meaning in these categories. Fr. Joseph Owens examines the use of metaphysical, logical and grammatical ways in which Aristotle presents the categories. Owens observes the benefits and disadvantages of Aristotle's mixed approach, and questions the usefulness of the system as a whole. This paper will argue that Aristotle successfully uses all three approaches, sometimes separately and sometimes in combination, to create a thorough process for systematizing all objects of human cognition."
30. Thorp, John. 1974. "Aristotle's Use of Categories. An Easing of the Oddness in "Metaphysica" Δ 7." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:238-256.
"We are accustomed to think that when Aristotle introduces a list of categories into an argument he is effecting a *division* of the matter into ten separate kinds or predicates or senses. For example, at *de anima* 410 a 23 when he is wondering what sort of thing the soul is, he gives a list of the categories to show what sorts of things there are and goes on to ask of each sort whether the soul belongs to it."

The list of categories divides up all that is into ten departments for easier handling. Again in the *Categoriae* he divides up predicates into ten sorts by a list of categories, and goes on in the rest of the book to give the peculiar logical and grammatical features of the sorts - although the treatment of the later sorts is not extant. Here the list of categories serves almost as a table of contents, dividing up the matter for piecemeal treatment. Let us call this use of a list of categories to divide the matter into ten departments "use (a)". No doubt this is the most prevalent use in Aristotle: a philosopher of analytic temperament like the Master is always dividing things up." (pp. 244-245)

(...)

"Conclusion

The orthodox view of the mesh of four uses with ten senses - that only per se being has ten senses - can now be revised. There are five uses of εἶναι, not four, and only the fifth, the existential use (not mentioned in A 7) is divided into ten senses according to the categories.

Per se being is semantically unvarying. (p. 256)

31. Ushida, Noriko. 2003. "Before the *Topics*? Isaak Husik and Aristotle's *Categories* revisited." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:113-134.
"I. Husik, in arguing for the authenticity of the *Categories* (in: *Philosophical Review* 13, 1904, pp. 514-528), substantially overstated the case for the similarity of that treatise to the *Topics*. The two works differ greatly in their treatment of the theory of substance (*Cat.* 5, 3 B 10-21; *SE* 22, 178 B 38ff.)."
32. van Polanen Petel, H. P., and Reed, K. 2021. "How to Derive Aristotle's Categories from First Principles." *Axiomathes* no. 41:1-35.
First online: 5 September 2021.
Abstract: "We propose a model of cognition grounded in ancient Greek philosophy which encompasses Aristotle's categories. Taking for First Principles the brute facts of the mental actions of separation, aggregation and ordering, we derive Aristotle's categories as follows. First, Separation lets us see single entities, giving the simple concept of an individual. Next, Aggregation lets us see instances of some kind, giving the basic concept of a particular. Then, Ordering lets us see both wholes-with-parts as well as parts-of-some-whole, giving the subtle concept of a relational or Gestalt. The basic and the subtle concept give us the major and minor categories. The categories constitute a top-level ontology and describe universal usage so that any other category necessarily describes particular or domain usage."
33. Verdenius, Willem Jacob. 1948. "Two Notes on the *Categories* of Aristotle " *Mnemosyne* no. 4:109-110.
"Cat. 6 a, 19-22: Aristotle does not say: "A thing which is two cubits long does not possess its length to a higher degree than a thing of three cubits possesses its length of three cubits", but: "One thing cannot be two cubits long to a higher degree than another". That means: a thing of a certain length does not possess this length to a higher degree than things which are longer or shorter, for these things do not have this length at all. The same applies to numbers: "three is not three to a higher degree than five is three, nor is five five to a higher degree than three is five", i.e. a number does, or does not, possess a certain amount. This meaning is clearly expressed by the traditional text." (p. 109)
(...)
"Cat. 8 a, 31-32: Aristotle wants to say that the use of a wide definition should not induce us to suppose that the possession of a relation makes a thing essentially relative in the sense that its existence can only be explained in terms of a relation to another thing."(p. 110)
34. Ward, Julie K. 2007. *Aristotle on Homonymy: Dialectic and Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Abbreviations IX; Introduction 1; 1. Aristotle's theory of homonymy in *Categories* 1 and its precursors 9; 2. Homonymy in the *Topics* 43; 3. Systematic homonymy 77; 4. The homonymy of *Being* 103; 5. *Physis*,

Philia, and homonymy 137; 6. Homonymy and science 168; Afterword 201; Bibliography 207; Index of passages 215; General index 219-220.

"The present book had its origin in many puzzles I encountered about *pros hen* predication." (p. VII)

(...)

"This work examines homonymy, a topic that lies within Aristotle's theories of language and predication. In Aristotle's work, the idea of homonymy is paired with that of synonymy, and in fundamental ways, rests upon it. To English speakers, homonymy is known as a grammatical category referring to the case in which the same word has different meanings, and synonymy, the case in which different words have the same meaning. In contrast, Aristotle finds homonymy and synonymy to be concerned not merely with words, but also, and primarily, with things. As he explains in *Cat.* 1, synonymy refers to the situation in which two or more things have the same name, or term, and the same defining character (cf. *Cat.* 1a6-7)." (p. 1)

(...)

"The present book on homonymy seeks to augment recent discussions, particularly aspects of Irwin's and Shields' work, by furthering the investigation in some areas and initiating study in others. In brief summary, the present chapters fall into three areas: (1) Aristotle's account of homonymy in *Cat.* 1 and its possible precursors, (2) the utility of homonymy for refining premises in scientific arguments, and (3) the application of homonymy to specific concepts." (p. 3)

35. Wardy, Robert. 2000. *Aristotle in China. Language, Categories and Translation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Preface page IX; 1. The China syndrome: language, logical form, translation 1; 2. Aristotelian whispers 69; Epilogue 150; Glossary of technical terms 153; References 161; Index 166-170."
"Aristotle in China is about the relation between language and thought. That is, of course, a topic of absurdly ambitious scope: it is only slightly less absurd to say that it concerns the particular question of the relation between language and philosophical thought, or even the relation between the Chinese language and Chinese logic. Perhaps readers will concede at the outset that my decision to explore these huge issues through reading Aristotle's *Categories* in Chinese is mere wilful circuitousness, rather than outright absurdity; and I trust that, if they persevere, they will discover that indirection has its compensations.
Chapter 1 introduces, defines and dissects varieties of linguistic relativism, with specific reference to the China question. Chapter 2 is entirely devoted to a reading of the (*ming li t'an*), 'The Investigation of the Theory of Names', a seventeenth century translation of Aristotle's *Categories* into Chinese; indeed, one of my goals is to reanimate an ancient tradition, both Chinese and Western, by producing a sort of metacommentary.
In principle, philosophers could read chapter 1 and dispense with chapter 2; and Sinologists could study chapter 2 and avoid philosophy: but of course my intention is to address philosophers, classicists, Sinologists, linguists, anthropologists and devotees of missionary studies throughout." (p. IX)
36. Warnock, Mary. 1950. "A Note on Aristotle: *Categories* 6 a 15." *Mind* no. 59:552-554.
"In *Categories* 6a 11 Aristotle says that though it is a characteristic of quantities that they cannot have opposites, it looks as if they could in the case of spatial measurements. This led him to make a general remark on the notion of opposition, namely that when people talk of opposites they are using a spatial metaphor; that they mean by "opposites" those things which, in the same class, are separated by *the greatest possible distance* from each other. There are two things to notice here. First that Aristotle aims to distinguish, at least roughly, between kinds of terms, by asking whether or not they have opposites. Secondly, that, while he talks about a spatial metaphor, his only attempt to elucidate this metaphor is by translating it into another spatial metaphor, that of "greatest distance between"." (p. 552)

37. Wedin, Michael. 1979. "'Said of' and 'predicated of' in the *Categories*." *Philosophical Research Archives* no. 5:23-34.
 Abstract: "Anyone with more than casual interest in Aristotle's *Categories* knows the convention that "predicated of" ["κατηγορεῖται"] marks a general relation of predication while "said of" ["λέγεται"] is reserved for essential predication. By "convention" I simply mean to underscore that the view in question ranks as the conventional or received interpretation. Ackrill, for example, follows the received view in holding that only items within the same category (not arbitrarily, of course) can stand in the being-said-of relation and, thus, that only secondary substances can be said of primary substances. Despite its long received status the convention has never received a fully comprehensive examination and defense. In fact such an account is needed because, while enjoying considerable textual support, certain passages of the *Categories* appear to clash with the convention. My aim in this paper is, first, to develop and defend the standard interpretation, as I shall call it. Since the standard interpretation has lately been challenged in a closely argued article by Russell Dancy, my defense will proceed partly with an eye to his criticisms. Having met these, I go on to raise some difficulties with the rather unorthodox reading Dancy gives the *Categories*. The crucial point here turns out to be what Aristotle understands by a paronym."
38. ———. 1993. "Non-Substantial Individuals." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 38:137-165.
 Abstract: "The rock bottom items of the *Categories* are individuals. Those neither present-in nor said-of a subject are unproblematic. They are primary substances such as Socrates and Secretariat. But the exact nature of those that are present-in but not said-of a subject is a matter of lively debate. Roughly, two schools of thought dominate discussion. For some, type-III individuals, as I call them, are nonrecurrent accident particulars; for others, they are fully determinate accident properties. I begin with Ackrill's version of nonrecurrence, the progenitor of the modern debate, and then turn to Owen's attack, which established what may be called the new orthodoxy. (1) After assaying Owen's arguments, I consider a kindred but improved version due to Frede. Finally, I argue for a revised version of the standard nonrecurrence view."
 (1) Owen, G. E. L. 1965. "Inherence." *Phronesis* 10, 97-105.
39. ———. 1997. "The Strategy of Aristotle's *Categories*." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 79:1-26.
 "The *Categories* begins without fanfare. Missing is the promotional pitch customary in Aristotle's works, and even the obligatory announcement of subject matter is absent. Instead, we are given definitions of three technical notions: homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy. That is all the first chapter contains. In particular, there is no hint as to why Aristotle begins with these notions or how they fit into the *Categories* as a whole. In fact, by most accounts it is not clear that much would be lost were the first fifteen lines simply omitted. Indeed, chapter two's discussion of τὰ οὐτά or things that are is arguably a more natural starting place for what follows. For this reason, perhaps, most scholarship has focused on the three *onymies* themselves to the neglect of their wider role in the *Categories*. Some scholars would go so far as to maintain that the first four chapters are little more than a random assemblage of scraps. I shall argue, on the contrary, that the three *onymies* are part of a carefully drawn strategy that underwrites the unity of the first five chapters of the *Categories*. In particular, I propose that they are grouping principles, introduced to isolate the one relation that is able to provide the foundation for the system of categories, namely, synonymy." (p. 1, notes omitted)
40. ———. 2000. *Aristotle's Theory of Substance. The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta*. New York: Oxford University Press.
 "This book offers a compatibilist account of the relation between the *Categories* and *Metaphysics Z*. The basic idea is a simple one. The incompatibilist is worried, for example, about the fact that each of these treatises makes a different proposal about

the identity of primary substances. According to the first, primary substances are substance individuals—items such as Socrates, Secretariat, and Madame Curie. To avoid unwieldy tags, such as “*Categories*-primary-substances,” I shall call these items c-substances. According to the second treatise, primary substances are the forms of c-substances. Because these proposals are deemed incompatible, so are the theories containing them, and likewise for the treatises themselves. However, this line of reasoning, a staple of incompatibilism, assumes that Aristotle meant the theories to occupy the same explanatory space. This seems to me to be false. The theory of *Metaphysics Z* is meant, rather, to explain central features of the standing theory of the *Categories* and so, in effect, it presupposes the essential truth of the early theory. This is the basic idea.” (pp. 2-3)

41. Weidemann, Hermann. 1980. "In Defence of Aristotle's Theory of Predication." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 25:76-87.
 "One of the most characteristic features of Aristotle's theory of predication is the fact that he divides, as G. E. L. Owen puts it, all the predicates of any individual into two groups: those which hold good essentially or *per se* of their subject, as *man* does of Socrates; and those which merely happen to be true of their subject, as *white* does of Socrates.(1)
 (...)
 The first part of present paper is intended to show that Aristotle's argument in 1007a20-33 relies on a way of distinguishing between essential and accidental predications which does not commit him at all to the alleged confusion of the former with statements of identity that has been ascribed to him not only by Kirwan, but also, as it seems, by Owen, to whom the second part of the present paper is intended to be a rejoinder." (p. 76)
 (1) G. E. L. Owen, "The Platonism of Aristotle," in: P. F. Strawson (ed.), *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action*, London/Oxford/New York 1968, pp. 147-74 (originally printed in the Proceedings of the British Academy, 1965); p. 160.
42. Wheeler, Mark Richard. 1999. "The Possibility of Recurrent Individuals in Aristotle's *Organon*." *Gregorianum* no. 80:539-551.
 "In 1965, G.E.L. Owen's article "Inherence" sparked a contemporary debate concerning whether or not the nonsubstantial individuals posited by Aristotle in the *Organon* are universals.(1) Owen's antagonists claim that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent particulars. Owen's defenders claim that nonsubstantial individuals can recur and, hence, are universals.
 In this paper, I present an analysis of Owen's position in "Inherence", arguing that Owen commits Aristotle to the possibility of recurrent nonsubstantial individuals which are one in number. The implications of Owen's position for Aristotle's theory of primary substance in the *Organon* are considered. I demonstrate that the modal status of recurring individuals cannot be determined by Aristotle's explication of being present in a subject at 1a24 of the *Categories*. I then argue that, according to the sameness conditions laid down by Aristotle in the *Topics*, it is impossible for something which is one in number to recur and, hence, that it is impossible both for substantial individuals and for nonsubstantial individuals to be universals." (pp. 539-540, notes omitted)
 (1) See, for examples of the early debate in the journal literature, Ackrill [1963], Owen [1965], Matthews and Cohen [1968], Allen [1969]. See Frede [1978], Devereux [1992], and Wedin [1993] for examples of how the debate has developed since.
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 Ackrill, J.L. (1963). *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, translation and notes by Ackrill, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 Allen, R.E. (1969). "Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories," *Phronesis*, 14, pp. 31-39.
 Devereux, Daniel T. (1992). "Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's Categories," *Ancient Philosophy* 12, pp. 113-131.

- Frede Michael. (1978). "Individuen bei Aristoteles," in *Antike und Abendland*, Walter De Gruyter & Co. Translated as "Individuals in Aristotle" in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* by Michael Frede (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
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- Wedin, Michael V. (1993). "Nonsubstantial Individuals," *Phronesis* 38, pp. 137-165.
43. ———. 2001. "κατηγορία in the *Topics* and the *Categories*." *Journal of Neoplatonic Studies* no. 8:37-60.
 "The term *kategoria* in Aristotle's *Topics* and *Categories* denotes predicates. Hence the categories are best understood as classifying predicates and not predications. The equivocal use of the term in *Top.* 1, 9 is related to its use in signifying either linguistic or non-linguistic entities, and not because it can be used to mean *predication*."
44. Zingano, Marco. 2024. "Aristotle's Categories: Ontology Without Hylomorphism." In *New Essays on Aristotle's Organon*, edited by Mesquita, António Pedro and Santos, Ricardo, 35-49. New York: Routledge.
 "In examining Aristotle's *Categories*, I will mainly focus on attempting to understand what Aristotle means to do with the list of categories he provides us with in Chapter 4 of this treatise, some of which he goes on to examine in detail.(1) This is a classical topic and a hotly debated one since antiquity as well. My goal is limited, for I only want to see whether the text as it now stands can give us clues about this issue when we pay attention to its formal structure and put aside – even if only momentarily – other works, especially his *Metaphysics*, in which hylomorphism is the key notion on which to ground the categories. Hylomorphism is absent from the *Categories*, and I will try to read this treatise neither as announcing it nor as being conceived under its shadow. Whether or not such an enterprise pays off depends on how far we are willing to read the *Categories* free from Aristotle's favoured and most celebrated view of matter and form as the principles of what there is.
 My proposal is thus to read the *Categories* free from any shadow of hylomorphism. Avoiding hylomorphism requires one not only to abandon the search for the concepts of matter and form, or their antecedents, but also, and more importantly, not to seek for a causal link between primary substances and the secondary substances or the other categories. Hylomorphism, in effect, is doctrine in which form is the cause of this piece of matter being the determinate object it is. In the *Categories*, in contrast, Aristotle is keen on emphasising his grounding thesis as he reiterates six times in Chapter 5 that individuals or primary substances are the basic ontological items because everything else is either said of them (secondary substances) or inhere in them (all the other categories) but eschews from engaging in any causal explanation of his dependency doctrine. He does speak of soul and body in the *Categories* but does not take them as pieces of an explanatory scheme of what a thing is, nor is he interested in examining the nature of soul or its relation to the body. When writing the *Categories*, Aristotle is, or so I will argue, innocent of hylomorphism; and I would like to see how successful such an enterprise can be, and to which extent." (p. 35)
 (1) I take for granted the unity and authenticity of the *Categories*. For an illuminating study on this issue, see Michael Frede's paper (1987), originally published in 1983 and, more recently, Bodéüs (2001).
- References
 Bodéüs, Richard, trans. 2001. *Catégories*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
 Frede, Michael. 1987. "The Title, Unity and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories". In *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, 11–28. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

