Aristotle's Categories: A Bibliography (Second Part)

Carson, Scott. 2000. "Aristotle on Existential Import and Non Referring Subjects." Synthese no. 124:343-360.

Abstract: "Much contemporary philosophy of language has shown considerable interest in the relation between our linguistic practice and our metaphysical commitments, and this interest has begun to influence work in the history of philosophy as well.(1) In his Categories and De interpretatione, Aristotle presents an analysis of language that can be read as intended to illustrate an isomorphism between the ontology of the real world and how we talk about that world. Our understanding of language is at least in part dependent upon our understanding of the relationships that exist among the enduring πράγματα that we come across in our daily experience. Part of the foundations underlying Aristotle’s doctrine of categories seems to have been a concern, going back to the Academy, about the problem of false propositions: language is supposed to be a tool for communicating the way things are, and writers in antiquity were often puzzled by the problem of how we are to understand propositions that claim that reality is other than it is.(2) Aristotle’s analysis of propositions raises a particular problem in this regard: if the subject of a proposition does not refer to anything, how can the proposition be useful for talking about a state of the world?

The problem falls into two separate but related parts: propositions whose subjects are singular terms and hence make claims about some particular thing, and propositions whose subjects are general terms and hence make claims about classes. In this paper I will explain Aristotle’s treatment of each kind, focusing in particular on what has widely been perceived as a problem in his treatment of singular terms. My discussion of his treatment of general terms will be more brief, but will show that his treatment of them is consistent with his treatment of singular terms."

(1) An interesting treatment of this topic that illustrates how such concerns intersect with issues in the history of philosophy can be found in Diamond (1996), Introduction II (pp. 13–38). Whittaker (1996) also touches on these themes.

(2) On the treatment by ancient philosophers of the problem of falsehood see Denyer (1991).

References

Denyer, N.: 1991, Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Routledge, London.

Diamond, C.: 1996, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Whittaker, C.: 1996, Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

———. 2003. "Aristotle on Meaning and Reference." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 20:319-337.

"I. Meaning: language and Reality.

This part of the paper is divided into two Sections. Section I examines a three-part relation among objects, thought, and language from the De interpretatione that shows how Aristotle conceived of the nature of mental representation. Section II has to do with a parallel three-part relation from the Categories that shows how this conception of mental representation also grounds a conception of linguistic representation that serves to link the natural and the conventional aspects of psychosemantics in a unique account of meaning." (p. 320)

(...)

I.2 The Categories Scheme [pp. 326-332]

"The formal isomorphism that we have been examining in the De interpretatione lies in a three-place relation among things (pragmata), affections of the soul, and words (either spoken or written). There is a similar three-place relation described in the Categories that will serve to show how Aristotle conceives of the formal isomorphism between language and ontology that will complete our account of his representational scheme. The three-place relation that we find in the Categories is among things (here the phrase used is not ta pragmata, but ta onta, things that are), accounts (logoi) of what those things are, and names (onomata) that stand for those accounts. In this scheme ta onta and onomata play the same roles played by ta pragmata and the words (spoken and written signs) of the De interpretatione scheme. The middle place in the relation - the affections of the soul in the De interpretatione scheme - is held in the Categories scheme by "accounts" of the essences (ousiai) of the things being represented. It is not immediately clear that these "accounts" play the same role as that played by the affections of the soul in the De interpretatione scheme, but in what follows it will be seen that the roles are, indeed, the same. Showing the relation between the two schemes vis-a-vis this central part of the three-part relation will help to make clear how Aristotle conceived of the connection between the natural part of his scheme and the conventional." (p. 327)

Chen, Chung-Hwan. 1957. "On Aristotle's Two Expressions: ϰαθ᾿ὑποϰειμένου λέγεσθαι and ἐν ὑποϰειμένῳ ἐιναι: Their Meaning in Cat. 2, 1a20-b9 and the Extension of This Meaning." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 2:148-159.

"In the second chapter of the Categoriae Aristotle deals chiefly with the division of entities; (I) ϰαθ᾿ὑποϰειμένου λέγεσθαι (II) ἐν ὑποϰειμένῳ ἐιναι serve here as two principles of division. By their combination, both in their affirmative (Ia, IIa) and in their negative (Ib, IIb) forms, entities are divided into four groups: first group characterized by Ia and IIb, for instance, man; second group characterized by Ib and IIa, for instance, a certain grammatical knowledge, a certain whiteness; third group characterized by Ia and IIa, for instance, knowledge; fourth group characterized by Ib and IIb, for instance, a certain man.(1)

The meaning of these two principles is far from being clear; each of them needs some explanation. First of all, let us note at once that the term ὑποϰειμένοv is very equivocal. ὑποϰειμένοv means in (I) the subject of which something is predicated, and in (II) the substrate in which something is present. Thus the two principles are of quite different nature: the one is a logical, and the other a metaphysical principle. Whether a clear distinction between the logical and the metaphysical is really Aristotelian or not, the fact remains that these two principles set up here are meant to be different from each other. Otherwise their combination would not divide entities into four different groups. Hence each of these principles must have a distinct realm in which it has its application." (p. 149)

(1) 1, a 20-b 6.

———. 1960. "Aristotle's Theory of Substance in the Categoriae as the Link between the Socratic-Platonic Dialectic and His Own Theory of Substance in Books Z and H of the Metaphysics." In Aristotelismo padovano e filosofia aristotelica. Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia. Vol. IX, 35-40. Firenze: Sansoni.

"In the Sophist Plato located the ultimate principles of individual things in the μέγιστα γένη. Aristotle is of a different opinion; for him the μάλιστα καθόλου are not ultimate principles. On the contrary, he holds in Books Z and H of the Metaphysics είδος, which is in fact the least universal, to be one of the constitutive principles of individual things. It seems the development of philosophy from Plato to Aristotle in respect of the location of principles is simply a lowering of άρχη from the most universal to the least universal. This may be true in general, but in detail the matter is more complicated. Aristotle’s theory of substance in the central books of the Metaphysics is the final result of a development which takes its start from Plato’s theory of Ideas, or, more backward, from Socrates’ searching for universals. But where does the middle-stage between these two extreme stages lie? If the right way of understanding a development is to follow its process step by step, then what else should we do in the present case than looking for this missing stage? Where does it really lie? It lies in the Categoriae. As a link its fifth chapter, the chapter on substance, connects these two extreme stages. How is it connected with the final stage we showed on another occasion [*]; we have to show here only how it is connected with the Socratic-Platonic dialectic." (p. 35)

[* See Chen, Chung-Hwan, "Aristotle's Concept of Primary Substance in Books Z and H of the Metaphysics", Phronesis 2, 1957, pp. 46-59.]

Chriti, Maria. 2019. "Aristotle’s semiotic triangle in On Interpretation and in the Categories: language and thinking in the frame of logic." In Proceedings of the World Congress Aristotle 2400 years, edited by Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra, 489-495. Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.

Abstract: "In Aristotle’s semantic passage in On Interpretation, the text “with the greatest influence in the history of semantics/semiotics”, scholarship traces the first attempt to formulate a “structuralistic” theory on interpreting mental states by means of linguistic utterance. According to Aristotle’s “semiotic triangle”, conventional spoken sounds represent the data of reality via mental states and the intrinsic connection between mental states and language is declared by the philosopher.

The Categories, on the other hand, is considered to be a treatise where the philosopher classifies the data of reality into ten general classes, giving a name to each class. However, does the philosopher apply his own “semiotic triangle” when he suggests names for his categories? The controversial issue of whether the Categories constitute an ontological or a linguistic treatise, i.e., of whether things were first and language followed in Aristotle’s categorization or vice versa, has a long tradition in scholarship.

This paper aims at contributing to the above discussion by investigating whether Aristotle as a name-giver in the Categories applies what he describes as name-giving in On Interpretation: does Aristotle’s semantic theory reveal — at least partly — the way he choses names/terms for his categories? For the specific purpose, two particular aspects of Aristotle’s “semantic triangle” are basic: a) the priority and common character that Aristotle attributes to mental states in comparison to language and b) his concept of ‘convention’ when it comes to human linguistic communication. By using also evidence from Aristotle’s other treatises concerning his name-giving policies, the significance of conceptual affinities in Aristotle’s linguistic use is quite evident and also of vital importance for understanding his logic."

Cleary, John J. 1988. Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Contents: The Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series XI; Preface XIII; Abbreviations XVI; Introduction 1; 1. Platonic Background of the Topics 7; 2. The Senses of Priority in the Categories 21; 3. The Senses of Priority in Metaphysics Delta 33; 4. The Focal Sense of Priority 53; 5. Getting the Priorities Right 64; Conclision 93; Notes 97; Bibliography 122; Index 126-132.

"Aristotelian Commentators from all ages have usually acknowledged the thesis about the multiple senses of 'being' as a basic part of Aristotle's claim to have made significant progress over his philosophical predecessors. In contemporary scholarship, however, what is not adequately recognized is that this is closely related to an equally important thesis about the many senses of 'priority,' which itself is crucial for his break with Platonism. Therefore, in this monograph I intend to explore the significance of this latter thesis for the development of Aristotle's problematic about substance and the related question about the ontological status of mathematical objects. My point of departure will be a curious passage in the Topics,[*] where he appears to accept a schema of priorities that would make mathematical entities more substantial than sensible things. Given his own categorical framework, such an implication represents a reversal of what are taken to be Aristotle's standard views on substance. In order to make sense of this, I will survey his treatment of priority in the Categories, while giving special attention to the criterion for natural priority. Through a comparison with the more expansive treatment of priority in Metaphysics Delta, I will try to show that at least some of the criteria are inherited from Plato. Even though this systematic treatment lists many of the ''ways" of priority shared by his predecessors, it also facilitates Aristotle's basic claim that substance is prior in every important sense." (p. 1, notes omitted)

[*] Book VI, Chapter 4.

Code, Alan. 1985. "On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses About Predication." In How Things Are. Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and Science, edited by Bogen, James and McGuire, James E., 101-131. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"To facilitate the discussion of the TMA [Third Man Argument] and the [Metaphysics] Z6 thesis, I begin by stating briefly how the notion of predication figures into Aristotle's thought. (5)

Taking the two-place relations Being and Having as primitive, we may define essential and accidental predication as follows:

DEF 1: Xis essentially predicable of Y iff Y Is X.

DEF2: Xis accidentally predicable of Y iff Y Has X.

Predication is defined in terms of the disjunction of essential and accidental predication; identity is simply two-way, or reciprocal, essential predication.

A universal is an item that can be truly predicated of something distinct from itself; a particular is an item that cannot be predicated, either essentially or accidentally, of anything distinct from itself; an individual is an item not essentially predicable of anything distinct from itself.

Ontological predication helps us to understand linguistic predication. A universal is essentially predicable of a logical subject X if and only if both the name and the definition of that universal truly apply to X; otherwise, either the universal is not predicable of X, or it is accidentally predicable. One consequence of this, crucial to my assessment of the significance of the TMA is that, since the definition of man applies to particular men, the associated universal is an essential predicate of those particulars. Furthermore, since the definition applies to both the universal man and the particular men, the universal is essentially predicable of itself and those particulars in the same way.

According to Aristotelian doctrine, a particular is a logical subject, or subject for predication, in virtue of the fact that it Is something (definable) essentially. The species under which a particular falls is the definable something that it, the particular, must essentially Be if it is to be anything at all."

(...)

"Some linguistic predicates, such as 'man', signify universals that are essentially predicable of all the particulars of which they are predicable. These terms may be used to classify particulars according to their natural kinds. In the Categories, though not in the middle books of the Metaphysics, particulars are primary substances, the natural kinds that are essentially predicable of them (i.e. their species and genera) are secondary substances, and there are no other substances besides these." (pp. 103-104, some notes omitted)

(5) The ideas sketched in this section are given an extended treatment in my 'Aristotle: Essence and Accident', Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories and Ends, ed. by R. Grandy and R. Warner (Oxford, 1985). The definitions are adapted from unpublished work by H. P. Grice.

———. 1986. "Aristotle: Essence and Accident." In Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, edited by Grandy, Richard E. and Warner, Richard, 411-439. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"In order to make sense of the development of Aristotle's thought on predication and his debt to Plato, it is necessary to see his metaphysical investigations against a shared background of problems, principles, and concepts. It is important to see both the Categories and the middle books of the Metaphysics as rejecting some of, but continuous with, Platonic metaphysics." (p. 411)

"The main task of this paper is to show that the logic of Being and Having is a promising tool for the articulation of some of the basic ideas that Aristotle employs in his efforts to construct a sophisticated and flexible semantics together with a metaphysics of substance. Consequently, in what follows I offer the results of my own attempts to reconstruct Aristotle's understanding of Plato and the subsequent development of his own ideas on essence and accident. When characterizing and contrasting a 'Platonic' position and two Aristotelian positions (roughly, the Cat. and Metaph.), I present textual evidence and argument in order to make the main outline of my interpretation plausible, but still more detailed analysis of individual passages and arguments is required to sustain it. Often my interpretation is simply stated without adequate discussion of the alternatives." (p. 414)

Cohen, Sheldon Marc. 1973. "'Predicable of' in Aristotle's Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 1:69-70.

"If Stonecutter is said of Socrates, so is philosopher, Greek, and troublemaker. What is "said of a thing" is usually understood to specify what that thing is, in the sense of what its essence or nature is.

If that is correct, Socrates will be essentially a philosopher, Greek, troublemaker, and stonecutter; a most unaristotelian conclusion.

We might say that though the definition of a stonecutter is predicable of Socrates, to classify Socrates as a stonecutter is not to classify him in an absolutely fundamental way. But then we need a criterion for whether ø is said of x over and beyond whether the definition of ø may be said of x. Is there such a criterion in the Categories?

I do not think that there is. But I think there is the beginning of such a criterion, in the first section of chapter two." (p. 69)

———. 2008. "Kooky Objects Revisited: Aristotle's Ontology." Metaphilosophy no. 39:3-19.

Abstract: "This is an investigation of Aristotle's conception of accidental compounds (or ''kooky objects,'' as Gareth Matthews has called them) -- entities such as the pale man and the musical man. I begin with Matthews's pioneering work into kooky objects, and argue that they are not so far removed from our ordinary thinking as is commonly supposed. I go on to assess their utility in solving some familiar puzzles involving substitutivity in epistemic contexts, and compare the kooky object approach to more modern approaches involving the notion of referential opacity. I conclude by proposing that Aristotle provides an implicit role for kooky objects in such metaphysical contexts as the Categories and Metaphysics."

Corkum, Phil. 2009. "Aristotle on Nonsubstantial Individuals." Ancient Philosophy no. 29:289-310.

"As a first stab, call a property recurrent if it can be possessed by more than one object, and nonrecurrent if it can be possessed by at most one object. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively and ongoing debate among commentators over the last forty-five years.

One source of textual evidence in the Categories, drawn on in this debate, is Aristotle’s claim that certain properties are inseparable from what they are in.

Here the point of contention is whether this commits Aristotle to holding that these properties are inseparable from individuals, since it is commonly held that a property is nonrecurrent, if it is inseparable from an individual. I argue that this evidence is neutral on the question whether there are nonrecurrent properties in Aristotle. One of my aims here is to disentangle the question of recurrence from local issues of individuality and universality in the Categories. But another aim is to turn from the textual considerations, which have dominated the debate, to broader methodological considerations. It is a shared assumption among all those who look to textual evidence from the Categories, so to decide whether Aristotle believes there are nonrecurrent properties, that in this work Aristotle is engaged in a project where the question of recurrence is relevant. I argue that Aristotle’s concerns in the Categories are disjoint from the question of recurrence, and so this shared assumption is false." (p. 289)

———. 2013. "Aristotle on Predication." European Journal of Philosophy:793-813.

Abstract: "A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize.

A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle’s core semantic notion is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution. For example, the predication ‘All men are mortal’ expresses a true thought, in Aristotle’s view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals."

Crivelli, Paolo. 2017. "Being-Said-Of in Aristotle's Categories." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica:531-556.

Abstract: "The ontology of the Categories relies on several fundamental relations that obtain between beings. One of these is the relation of being-said-of. The most widespread view among commentators is that the relation of being-said-of amounts to essential predication.

After drawing attention to some relatively neglected textual evidence that tells against such an interpretation, I explore a different account of the relation of being-said-of.

On this alternative picture, while the relation of being-said-of is essential predication when it obtains between universals, it coincides with mere predication when it obtains between a universal and an individual. The relation of being-said-of turns out to be closely linked with paronymy: in most (but not all) cases where a property (e.g. generosity) is in an individual, a paronymous universal (e.g. generous) is said of that individual.

Also the alternative picture faces difficulties, however. In conclusion, it remains unclear what position, if any, can be coherently attributed to Aristotle."

Czerkawski, Maciej. 2023. "Aristotelian rhapsody: did Aristotle pick his categories as they came his way?" Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-23.

Published first online.

Abstract: "In the first Critique, Kant raises two objections against Aristotle’s categories.

Kant’s concern, in the first instance, is whether Aristotle generated all categories that there are and if he did not generate any spurious categories.

However, for Kant, this is only a symptom of the second – deeper – flaw in Aristotle’s thinking. According to Kant, Aristotle generated his categories ‘on no common principle.’ This paper develops the two Kantian objections, offers an overview of Brentano’s (1862. Von der Mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg im Brisgau: Herder’sche Verlagshandlung.) reconstruction of Aristotle’s categories (which claims to have addressed them), develops three objections to this reconstruction, and recommends (Trendelenburg, A. 1846. Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Berlin: Verlag von G. Bethge.) as a better – albeit still flawed – Aristotelian reply to Kant."

Dancy, Russell. 1975. "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances." The Philosophical Review no. 84:338-373.

"But here I shall be concerned only indirectly with Aristotle's criticism of Platonism; my primary object is getting clear on Aristotle's way of answering the question "What are the substances?" (p. 338)

(...)

"V. Conclusion. There is a cloud on Aristotle's horizon; we have glanced at it before. It is worth another, very brief, look. Nothing in the Categories tells us how to describe such drastic changes as the death and cremation of Socrates, or Jago's becoming a baboon. We need the notion of matter for that, and if we introduce that as a subject for predicates on a level lower than that of Socrates and Jago, we are in trouble: we shall no longer be able to pick out the primary substances by looking for rock-bottom subjects. And that same trouble may threaten from another direction, only I have been suppressing it. Aristotle talks as if the real subject that underlies white and black (2. 1a27-28, 5. 2a31-34, b1-3, 4a3-4, 8. 4a34-35) and disease and health (10. 12a5-6, 11. 14a1I6) were the body of the man or animal, and as if the real subject that underlies literacy (2. 1a25-26), knowledge (1b1-2), insanity, irascibility (8. 9b33 ff.), justice and injustice (11. 14a17-I8) were the soul of the man or animal. Only once (that I know of) does he make the man himself the underlying subject (compare 10. 12a13-14). But then, which are the primary substances ? What are the interrelationships between matter, form, and the compound? Aristotle owes us something here; elsewhere he tries to pay the debt. I shall leave the question whether his balance is enough to cover his check for another occasion." (pp. 372-373)

———. 1978. "On Some of Aristotle's Second Thoughts About Substances: Matter " The Philosophical Review no. 87:372-413.

"In Metaphysics Z 3, Aristotle tells us (1029a3-4) that by "matter" he means, "for example, the bronze" of which a statue is made, and a few lines later, at a20-2 1, that by "matter" he means "what is not in its own right called either something or so big or any of the other things by which being is determined." But the bronze of which a statue is made is something in its own right, and in the Meteorologica (Γ 6 and elsewhere), Aristotle is prepared to tell us something about what it is in its own right.

The explanation I shall try to provide for this apparent contradiction makes it a reflection of a larger apparent contradiction.

Most of Metaphysics Z 3 is an examination of the claim of "subjects" ("things that underly," [ὑποκείμενα) to be substances (realities, οὐσίαι). It turns out that this claim at best demands clarification and at worst rejection, since people who take subjects to be substances might be forced into saying that matter is the ultimate subject, and so the chief substance - but matter isn't anything in its own right, and isn't knowable in its own right. So such people would be making substances, the ultimate realities, things about which there is no saying what they are. And that is no good. So the claim of subjects to be substances must either be clarified or rejected. But that claim was one Aristotle himself advanced, in the Categories especially, and it was fundamental in his rejection of Platonism. So Aristotle is attacking a view of his own.

What is needed is a sorting out of the various concepts: matter, subject, substance. That is what Z 3 is about, and that is what this paper is about. The job is not done at the end of Z 3: the notion of form remains foggy. So it does in this paper. And the problem does not arise only at the beginning of Z 3: the Organon and the physical works had set it up. So let us first go back to the Categories and the rest of the Organon." (P. 373)

Derrida, Jacques. 1982. "The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy Before Linguistics." In Margins of Philosophy, 175-205. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Translation, with Additional Notes, by Alan Bass of Le supplément de copule. La philosophie devant la linguistique (1972).

Also translated by James S. Creech and Josué Harrani in Georgia Review, 30, 1976, pp. 527-564.

"We know that Benveniste, in "Categories of Thought and Language,"(6) analyzed the limiting constraints which the Greek language imposed upon the system of Aristotelian categories.

Benveniste's propositions are part of a stratified ensemble; nor does he restrict himself to the text which directly states the thesis of the ensemble. We will have to take this into account when the time comes. Moreover, this thesis already has encountered objections of the philosophical type;(7) together the thesis and the objections form a debate which in its development will be invaluable for us.

First, the thesis: "Now it seems to us—and we shall try to show—that these distinctions are primarily categories of language and that, in fact, Aristotle, reasoning in the absolute, is simply identifying certain fundamental categories of the language m which he thought" (p. 57)." (pp. 179-180)

(...)

"The concept or category of the category systematically comes into play in the history of philosophy and of science (in Aristotle's Organon and Categories) at the point where the opposition of language to thought is impossible, or has only a very derivative sense. Although Aristotle certainly did not reduce thought to language in the sense intended here by Benveniste, he did attempt to take the analysis back to the site of the emergence, that is to the common root, of the language/thought couple. This site is the site of "Being." Aristotle's categories are simultaneously of language and of thought: of language in that they are determined as answers to the question of knowing how Being is said (legetai); but also, how Being is said, how is said what is, in that it is, such as it is: a question of thought, thought itself, the word "thought" which Benveniste uses as if its signification and its history went without saying, in any case never having meant anything outside its relation to Being, its relation to the truth of Being such as it is and in that it is (said)." (p. 182)

(6) In Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary E. Meek (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971). All further references are to this edition.

(7) See Pierre Aubenque, "Aristote et le langage, note annexe sur les catégories d'Aristote. A propos d'un article de M. Benveniste," Annales de Ia faculté des Lettres d'Aix 43 (1965); and J. Vuillemin, De la logique a Ia théologie. Cinq études sur Aristote (Paris: Flammarion, 1967), pp. 75ff.

Devereux, Daniel. 1992. "Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's Categories." Ancient Philosophy no. 12:113-131.

"In chapter 2 of the Categories, Aristotle makes use of two predication relations, being said of a subject and being in a subject, to distinguish four classes of entities. (i) Some things are neither said of nor in a subject: (ii) some are said of but not in any subject; (iii) some are both said of and in a subject; and (iv) some are in but not. said of any subject. There is general agreement about the kinds of entities belonging to in the first class: in the first class are particular substances, e.g., a particular human being or a particular tree; in the second are the species and genera of these particular substances, e.g., Man, Animal, Tree; in the third class are the general kinds or types falling under non-substance categories, e.g. Color as a kind of quality, or Larger Than as a kind of relation. As one successively divides these non-substance kinds into species and sub-species, one arrives at entities such as 'this particular white' or 'this particular knowledge of grammar' which cannot be further subdivided. There has been a spirited debate in recent years over the exact nature of these entities belonging to the fourth class. Is the 'particular white' a specific shade of white that can be shared by a number of things? Or is it a particular instance of such a shade, belonging uniquely to one individual?

Entities in the fourth class have traditionally been regarded as instances or tokens of types, and it has been thought that this view is required by Aristotle's special notion of what it is to be in a subject. Recent opponents of the traditional view have argued that a correct understanding of 'being in a subject' does not support the claim that entities of the fourth class are particular instances of qualities, quantities, etc., and that the weight of the textual evidence in the Categories. supports the view that they can be shared by a number of subjects.

In the following discussion I shall try to show that there are passages in the Categories that clearly imply that type (iv) entities cannot be shared by a number of subjects - passages that have not been exploited by defenders of the traditional view. I will then turn to the question of what Aristotle means by 'being in a subject', and will argue for an interpretation that seems lo make better sense of the relevant texts than other views in the current literature." (p. 113)

———. 1998. "Aristotle's Categories 3B10-21: A Reply to Sharma." Ancient Philosophy no. 18:341-352.

"In an article published several years ago in this journal (Devereux 1992). I argued for a new way of understanding Aristotle's explanation of what he means by the expression 'in a subject' at Categories 1 a24-25. One of my contentions was that although this explanation does not imply that things that are in but not said of a subject are particulars, there are other passages in the Categories that do have this implication: i.e., there are passages besides1 a24-25 that clearly imply that 'first-order accidents' (things in but not said of a subject) are not universals but what are called 'tropes' in the contemporary literature. This latter claim is challenged by Ravi Sharma in a recent note in this journal (Sharma 1997).

Though his arguments have not persuaded me to give up my view, I have learned from Sharma's acute discussion." (p. 341)

References

Devereux, Daniel: "Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's Categories", Ancient Philosophy, 12, 1992, pp. 113-131.

Sharma, Ravi K.: "A New Defense of Tropes? On Categories 3b10-18", Ancient Philosophy, 17, 1997, pp. 309-315.

Di Vincenzo, Silvia. 2024. Aristotle’s Categories in the ArabicTradition. Works of Philosophy and Their Reception: 1-37.

Available on academia.edu

Dobreski, Brian. 2021. "Re-examining Aristotle's Categories as a Knowledge Organization System." Proceedings from North American Symposium on Knowledge Organization no. 8:1-10.

Abstract: "In his Categories, Aristotle details the kinds of being that exist, along with what can be understood and predicated of existing things. Most notably within this work, Aristotle advances a set of ten, top-level categories that can be used to classify all kinds of being. Even today, the influence of the Categories is felt in many domains, particularly in knowledge organization (KO). Here, Aristotle’s Categories bear deep, long-standing connections with works examining categorization, subject analysis, and theory of classification. Though its relation to ontology might seem obvious, connections to KO perspectives on knowledge organization systems (KOSs) and ontological modeling are curiously lacking. The aim of this work is to offer a re-examination of the Categories as a KOS, particularly through the lens of the KO field’s understandings of ontology. Utilizing Zeng’s [*] classification of KOSs as a theoretical framework, this study draws parallels between the first two sections of the Categories and the defining features of ontologies and offers an initial ontological model of this work. The results of this re-examination stand to offer a new view of a fundamental work in the KO canon, draw further connections between past and present perspectives in KO, and further contribute to the theoretical grounding of contemporary KOS research and practice."

[*] Zeng, Marcia L. 2008. “Knowledge Organization Systems (KOS).” Knowledge Organization 35, nos. 2-3: 160-82.

Driscoll, John A. 1979. "The Platonic Ancestry of Primary Substance." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:253-269.

"Chapter Five of the Categories contains the earliest version of Aristotle's theory of substance. In spirit, the chapter is strongly anti-Platonic."

(...)

While attempts have been made to find Academic antecedents for the doctrine of categories as a whole,(4) the properties shared by primary substances and the Receptacle have, as far as I can determine, passed unnoticed in the literature.

(...)

In this paper I will not examine the three-sided relationship between the Receptacle, primary substance, and primary matter. Such an examination would afford an interesting perspective from which to study the development of Aristotle's theory of substance from the Categories to the Metaphysics, but it would raise many difficult issues not easily resolved in a short paper. I will instead simply list the properties shared by the Receptacle and primary substance and discuss one important consequence of the link thereby established between Timaeus 49-52 and Categories V: that the well-known controversy between G. E. L. Owen and Harold Cherniss over the dating of the Timaeus must be decided in favor of Owen, at least with respect to the relative dating of the Timaeus and the Sophist. I propose to show, in other words, that Categories V owes a much greater debt to Plato than is usually thought and that an examination of this debt increases our understanding not only of Anstotle's theory of substance but also of the development of Plato's later philosophy." (pp. 253-254, notes omitted)

———. 1981. "EIΔH in Aristotle's Earlier and Later Theories of Substance." In Studies in Aristotle, edited by O'Meara, Dominic, 129-159. Washington: Catholic University Press.

"My object in this paper is to cast doubt on the view of M. J. Woods (1) and G. E. L. Owen(2) that the species which is a secondary substance in the Categories is elevated to the status of primary substance in Metaphysics Z. Woods and Owen(3) commit themselves to this view in the course of very interesting discussions of the differences separating Aristotle's early Categories theory and his later Metaphysics ΖΗΘ theory of sensible substance.(4) However, serious objections have been raised against both writers on the basis of Aristotle's remarks in chapter 13 of Ζ. My strategy will be to show that these objections can be met and the most important of Woods' and Owen's insights on Aristotle's two theories of sensible substance maintained provided only that their view on the upgrading of Categories species is abandoned.

The εἶδος which is primary substance in Z, I will suggest, is neither the species of the Categories, as Woods and Owen hold, nor the particular form of a particular substance, as Wilfrid Sellars(5) Edward Harter,(6) and Edwin Hartman(7) insist, but a third entity to be described below.(8)" (p. 129, notes abbreviated)

(1) M. J. Woods, "Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13,'' in Aristotle: A Colleclion of Critical Essays, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), pp. 215-38.

(2) E. L. Owen, "The Platonism of Aristotle," Proceedings of the British Academy, 51 (1965): 125- 50, esp. p. 137; reprinted in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, ed. P. F. Strawson (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 147-74. References below are to the British Academy pagination.

(3) My reasons for believing that Owen is committed to the thesis as stated will be given in section 2 below.

(4) I will follow Woods and Owen in assuming that the Categories is an early authentic work of Aristotle and that Books ΖΗΘ of the Metaphysics date from much later in his career.

(5) Wilfrid Sellars, "Substance and Form in Aristotle," Journal of Philosophy, 54 (1957): 688- 99, and "Aristotle's Metaphysics: An Interpretation," in Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1959), pp. 73- 124.

(6) Edward D. Harter, "Aristotle on Primary Ousia," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 57 (1975): 1- 20.

(7) Edwin Hartman, "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence," Philosophical Review, 85 (1976): 545-61; reprinted with revisions as chapter two of Edwin Hartman, Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian lnvestigations (Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 57-87.

(8) See section 3 below, especially note 58. My aim here will not be to disprove the Sellars-Harter-Hartman position (a major undertaking which would require extended discussion of their complex arguments) but only to isolate a defensible alternative to it.

Duerlinger, James. 1970. "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 15:179-203.

"In Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), J. L. Ackrill has performed the notable task of clearly delineating a number of questions and alternative answers to these questions involved in the interpretation of Aristotle's discussions about predication and inherence in the Categories. As a result of Ackrill's excellent translation and penetrating analysis of the text of the Categories, we have arrived at a point at which Aristotle's early distinction between predication and inherence may be discussed with some degree of exactness and clarity. Although I do not agree with everything that Ackrill has said about predication and inherence, my disagreement is grounded in an account of the text which his translation and analysis have helped to make possible. In recent papers G. E. L. Owen ("Inherence," Phronesis, 1965) and J. M. E. Moravcsik ("Predication in Aristotle," Philosophical Review, 1967) have attempted to improve upon Ackrill's account of Aristotle's distinction between predication and inherence.

I shall use Ackrill's commentary and translation as a base from which to launch an investigation of predication and inherence in the Categories, but I shall find it convenient at times to refer to the comments of Owen and Moravcsik. I shall begin with a very rough summary of what I have to say about predication and inherence, and then discuss them in more exact terms." (p. 179)

Duncombe, Matthew. 2015. "Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 60:436-461.

Abstract: "At Categories 7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives (R1), but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives (R2, at 8a31-2) to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s attitude to relatives, since he immediately returns to using R1. I propose a non-extensional reading. R1 and R2 do not specify different sets of relatives, but rather different ways to understand each relative."

———. 2018. "Aristotle’s Categories 7 Adopts Plato’s View of Relativity." In Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Bryan, Jenny, Wardy, Robert and Warren, James, 120-138. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Since the 1960s, scholars have thought that the Categories is an anti- authoritarian work. Aristotle engages with Platonism, rather than straightforwardly rejecting or blindly adopting any element of it. In particular, Owen argued that the Categories evinces an anti- Platonic linguistic theory."

(...)

"On the micro-level of Categories 7, scholars take a similar anti-authoritarian attitude. After defining relatives at 6a36, Aristotle draws out some formal features of them: some relatives have a contrary (6b15– 19); some come in degrees (6b19– 27); all reciprocate with their correlatives (6b28– 7b14); some are simultaneous with their correlative (7b15– 8a12).

Aristotle then raises a worry: some substances are relatives (8a13– 28). A hand is a substance, since a hand is part of a secondary substance, but a hand is also a relative, since a hand is said of something. To address this worry Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives (8a31– 2). He then describes a test for whether a relative falls under the second account (8a35– b21).

(...)

"In part I, I argue Plato and Aristotle share a view of relativity.

First, I give textual evidence that both share the ‘intensional’ view of relatives. Second, Aristotle’s formal features have antecedents in Plato. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Aristotle draws directly on Plato’s view. For relativity, there is neither a shared source nor an intermediate source. In the third part, I show that Aristotle retains the first account of relatives." (pp. 120-122, notes omitted)

———. 2020. Ancient Relativity: Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Sceptics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 5: Relativity in Categories 7, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations, pp. 90-117; Chapter 6: Aristotle on the distinction between substances and relatives, pp. 188-139.

"Chapter 2 begins to argue that Plato has a constitutive view of relativity, with an inference to the best explanation: key formal features of constitutive relativity are exclusivity, reciprocity, aliorelativity, and existential symmetry; Plato’s texts rely on such formal features; so, Plato at least tacitly endorses constitutive relativity. Chapter 3 begins to apply these results to look at constitutive relativity in the context of the separation of Forms and participants in the Parmenides’ critique of the Forms. Chapter 4 continues to examine how constitutive relativity works, this time in the context of Plato’s tripartite psychology. Chapter 5 shows that, although Aristotle is not the earliest thinker to have deep things to say about relativity, he gives a clear statement of constitutive relativity, and works out some of the language and formal features that constitutive relatives have. Chapter 6 shows why Aristotle introduces a nuance into his constitutive view of relativity, although he does not abandon the view. Chapter 7 continues to look at Aristotle’s view of relativity, this time his account in the Metaphysics. Chapter 8, again, concerns relativity and the Forms, but this time looks at relativity and independence, driven by Aristotle’s critique of the Forms, as recorded by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Chapters 9 and 10 argue for the presence of constitutive views of relativity in the Stoics. Chapter 11 looks at Sextus’ brand of Pyrrhonian scepticism, again showing that he assumes a version of the constitutive view of relativity." (pp. 21-22)

Edel, Abraham. 1975. "Aristotle's Categories and the Nature of Categorial Theory." The Review of Metaphysics no. 29:45-65.

Abstract: "The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to propose a fresh approach to Aristotle's Categories. Second, I want to reflect, in the light of the outcome, on the expectations we can have for categories in metaphysics. No apology is needed for starting with Aristotle. Ever since the Categories was placed at the head of the Corpus, the foundational character of categorial theory has been explicit. That is why a fresh way of looking at the Categories is at the same time a fresh way of looking at Aristotle's metaphysics, and suggests a mode of reckoning with categorial theory generally."

Edelhoff, Ana Laura. 2020. Aristotle on Ontological Priority in the Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Abstract: "The main objective of this Element is to reconstruct Aristotle's view on the nature of ontological priority in the Categories. Over the last three decades, investigations into ontological dependence and priority have become a major concern in contemporary metaphysics. Many see Aristotle as the originator of these discussions and, as a consequence, there is considerable interest in his own account of ontological dependence. In light of the renewed interest in Aristotelian metaphysics, it will be worthwhile - both historically and systematically - to return to Aristotle himself and to see how he conceived of ontological priority (what he calls "priority in substance" (proteron kata ousian) or "priority in nature" (proteron tei phusei), which is to be understood as a form of asymmetric ontological dependence."

Erginel, Mehmet. 2004. "Non-Substantial Individuals in Aristotle's Categories." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 26:185-212.

"Aristotle's Categories (1) classifies entities by using two predication relations, being ‘said of’ a subject and being ‘in’ a subject.(2)

(...)

The traditionally accepted view, which I shall call the ‘traditional view’, is that a non-substantial individual is a property that cannot be shared by (be ‘in’) more than one individual substance; thus, on this view, the individualwhite ‘in’ Socrates cannot also be ‘in’ Plato (or anyone else). This interpretation of the Categories as challenged by Owen, setting of the modern debate.(4)

Owen and Frede(5) have argued that non-substantial individuals are maximally determinate properties, which can be shared by more than one individual substance; on this view, an individual white would be a particular shade of white, which could be ‘in’ both Socrates and Plato. One way of putting the difference is that the latter view does, whereas the former view does not, allow the recurrence of non-substantial individuals.

In this paper I shall defend a version of the latter view, arguing that the non-substantial individuals of the Categories may be ‘in’ several individual substances. I shall proceed by first discussing, and o·ering an interpretation of, 1A24–5, the critical passage that the traditional view originates from. After defending an interpretation of 1A24–5 that allows recurrence, I shall argue, in Section 2, that the interpretation commonly held by proponents of the traditional view is inconsistent with various passages in the Categories. In my third section I shall challenge attempts to find other passages that support the traditional view, and I shall show that the traditional view does not enjoy the purported textual support." (pp. 185-186)

(1) In this paper I mostly rely on, but occasionally differ from, J. L. Ackrill’s translation in Aristotle: Categories and De interpretatione [Categories], translation and notes (Oxford, 1963).

(2) I shall use the terms ‘said of’ and ‘in’ in quotation marks when they are meant in Aristotle’s technical sense. Likewise, it is the technical sense of ‘in’ that is meant when I refer to the ‘x is in y’ relation.

(4) G. E. L. Owen, ‘Inherence’, Phronesis, 10 (1965), 97–105, repr. in id., Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, ed. M. Nussbaum (Ithaca, NY, 1986), 252–8.

(5) M. Frede, ‘Individuals in Aristotle’ [‘Individuals’], in id., Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis, 1987), 49–71.

Findlay, John N. 2007. "Aristotle and Eideticism II." Philosophical Forum no. 37:333-386.

"This article continues our publication of lectures given by J. N. Findlay (1903–87) at Boston University in 1978. The present article concludes Findlay’s discussion of Aristotle, the first part of which was published in The Philosophical Forum, XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter 2005)." (The Editors).

"The Categories, probably an early treatise of Aristotle’s and very individualistic in doctrine, deals with the basic types of predication, substantial and definitory, quantitative, relational, qualitative etc., which leads up, though this is not so clearly stated as elsewhere, to various different genera of entities each of which can be said to have being in a different sense, some primary some derivative in various manners. The issue is complicated by the fact that secondary and derivative entities can have their own series of divergent predications, some substantial and definitory, others quantitative, relational, qualitative etc. There are not only entities parasitic on primary entities in various manners, but entities parasitic on the parasites in a corresponding variety of manners. All this renders the ontology very complex. Though Aristotle approaches many issues through language, what he is dealing with is always conceived of as ontic, not linguistic." (p. 334)

[Follows a description of Categories 1-9, pp. 334-339.]

Fine, Gail. 1983. "Relational Entities." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 65:225-249.

"Aristotle's theory of universals is sometimes thought to differ from Plato's in being nonrelational; it does not hold that Socrates' being a man, or being rational, consists in or involves his standing in some relation to the universal man, or to the universal rationality." (p. 225)

(...)

"Why should a nonrelational account be preferred? Matthews and Cohen suggest that Plato's relational theory is vulnerable to an awkward dilemma: either particulars are "bare particulars", or else they are "mere relational entities" that owe their identity and continued existence to the relations they bear to other things. Aristotle's allegedly nonrelational theory is thought to go between the horns of this dilemma.(5)" (p. 226)

(...)

"I am sympathetic to some features of this general view. I agree that, on some accounts of relationality, Plato has a relational theory of universals. I also agree that Plato, but not Aristotle, separates universals.

I agree too that relational accounts are vulnerable to Matthews and Cohen's dilemma. But I do not agree that Aristotle's theory of universals is nonrelational. Or, at least, the arguments used to commit Plato to a relational account seem to me to commit Aristotle to one as well. Nor do I conclude that Plato's and Aristotle's theories are therefore both hopelessly misguided; for I do not find both horns of the dilemma unattractive. Although I reject bare particulars, I accept relational entities.(6) If it is a consequence of Plato's or Aristotle's theory that particulars are relational entities, that is a desirable consequence.

I ask first what a relational analysis is (I). I then turn to Matthews and Cohen's dilemma (II). In subsequent sections I ask whether Plato and Aristotle are vulnerable to their dilemma and, if so, whether that is an undesirable consequence of their views." (pp. 226-227)

(...)

"It is important to note, first of all, however, that nowhere in the Categories, at least, does Aristotle say that primary substances could exist if nothing else did; perhaps their privileged status does not consist in existential independence from everything else. Certainly that is not the only sort of priority Aristotle recognizes.(48)" (p. 247)

(5) See, e.g., pp. 634f., 643f. Matthews and Cohen also suggest another difficulty with relational accounts or, at least, with Plato's holding one; see p. 633f. It is also often objected that relational accounts are vulnerable to a regress. See, for example, Armstrong I, Part 2, passim; P.P. Strawson; Individuals (London, 1959), esp. pp. 168-181; F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1897), chapter 3.

Plato considers a regress argument, The Third Man Argument, at Parm. 132 ab. I do not discuss the TMA or regress arguments here ; but see my "Aristotle and the More Accurate Arguments, in Language and Logos, edd. M. Nussbaum and M. Schofield (Cambridge, 1982), and my "Owen, Aristotle, and the Third Man", Phronesis 27 (1982), pp. 13-33.

(6) As I shall use the phrase, a relational entity is an entity that possesses at least one essential property relationally. This is to be distinguished from Bradley's doctrine of internal relations, according to which all of a thing's relational properties are essential to it; I do not discuss Bradley's views in this paper. For Bradley, see esp. pp. 16-25.

(48) For some discussions of priority, see Cat., chapter 12; Met. Δ, chapter 11; Ζ 1.

Referenecs

D.M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 volumes (Cambridge, 1978),

G.B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, "The One and the Many", Review of Metaphysics 21 (1968), pp. 630-655.

Finn, Collin. 1974. "The Concept of Substance in the Categories and the Physics." Danish Yearbook of Philosophy no. 11:72-119.

"The subject of the present paper is the Aristotelian concept of substance as treated in the Categories and in the Physics. Its form is determined by the faet that the contents and the definition of this concept depend on the wider philosophical context, in which Aristotle discusses it. From this it follows that, in the first place, it is not possible to give a single, summarized account of this concept which would cut across the two mentioned works.

It is necessary to divide the discussion, taking the concept of substance in the Categories and the concept of substance in the Physics each by itself, even though naturally there is a considerable common core in this concept as treated in the two works. In the second place, it follows from the mentioned connection that the concept of substance, like the other central notions in Aristotle's philosophy, cannot be discussed in isolation from the context, the philosophical relationship, in which it appears. This necessitates treating these contexts at least briefly, in other words, reviewing the further philosophical lines of thought in the works which I have taken as my point of departure. I intend also to discuss various problems of detail in these works, not all of which are problems within the doctrine of substance.

To throw light on the concept of substance is, however, the goal towards which the discussion is constantly aimed." (p. 72)

Franklin, James. 2014. "Quantity and Number." In Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics, edited by Novotný, Daniel D. and Novák, Lukáš, 221-244. New York: Routledge.

"Quantity is the first category that Aristotle lists after substance. More than any other category, it has an extraordinary epistemological clarity. “2 + 2 = 4” is the paradigm of objective and irrefutable knowledge, and “2 million + 2 million = 4 million” is not far behind in certainty, despite its distance from immediate perception. Indeed, certainties about quantity extend to the infinite—for example, we know that the counting numbers do not run out. Nor does this certainty come at the expense of application to reality. If we put two rabbits and two rabbits in a box and later find five rabbits in there, it is our absolute certainty that 2 + 2 = 4 that allows us to infer that the rabbits must have bred.

Continuous quantities are no less open to perfection of knowledge: The quantity π, the ratio of the circumference of any circle to its diameter, is calculable to any degree of precision that computers can cope with (currently claimed to be ten trillion decimal places). The mathematics of quantity delivers certainty about reality, to the envy of other disciplines, including philosophy.

Despite its clarity, quantity is subject to some philosophical subtleties and unresolved puzzles. Let us start with two crucial distinctions that organize the types of quantity: extensive (or divisible) versus intensive quantity and continuous versus discrete quantity." (p. 221)

Fraser, Kyle. 2003. "Seriality and Demonstration in Aristotle's Ontology." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 25:131-158.

"Abstract: "In Aristotle’s ontological framework, non-substances are defined as those entities that exist in virtue of inhering in a substrate On account of their essential dependency on the category of substance the non-substances are held to be definable only in a secondary and derivative way, which Aristotle designates at Metaphysics as definition ‘by addition’ Each non-substance contains, as part of its explanatory definition, the name or definition of the substance kind in which it essentially inheres, just as male and female must be defined as properties of animals, snubness as a property of noses, or colour as a property of surfaces. The non-substances are not only accidentally dependent on the category of substance; their derivative status is built into their essential being. Thus, for example, while pallor is per se independent of Callias or Socrates, or any individual who just happens to be pale, it is essentially dependent on ‘surface’ and must be defined by the inclusion of ‘surface’ in its explanatory account (1029616-17). Leaving aside the per accidens entanglements of the non-substances, we discover that every nonsubstance is essentially the predicate of some substance kind, and thus can be said to have an ‘essence’ only in a derivative way."

Frede, Michael. 1981. "Categories in Aristotle." In Studies in Aristotle, edited by O'Meara, Dominic, 1-25. Washington: The Catholic University Press.

Reprinted in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, pp. 29-48.

"But one reason why he [Aristotle] actually makes so surprisingly little use of the categories in the Topics seems to be exactly this, that he does not have a clear view of the logical properties which might serve to distinguish the categories from each other in a systematic fashion.

Nor does it seem that Aristotle arrives at his list of categories by grammatical considerations as has been proposed again recently by Benveniste. It is true that Aristotle thinks that certain grammatical forms tend to go with certain categories; the active form of verbs, e.g., naturally goes with the category of doing and the passive with the category of suffering. But he also is aware of the fact that grammatical form in this respect can be quite misleading, and he thinks that a large number of fallacies are due to this.

It will, of course, be suggested that Aristotle arrives at his list of categories neither by logical nor by grammatical considerations, but by an ontological inquiry.

It will be suggested that Aristotle first established a list of ultimate classes of what there is by an ontological inquiry into what there is and then just assumed corresponding categories. On this view Aristotle, e.g., first determined that there is an ultimate class of entities consisting of all qualities and then introduced a category of quality which is characterized by the fact that the item predicated belongs to the antecedently determined class of qualities. Now, though this matter would require quite a bit of detailed argument, it seems to me that things are exactly the other way round. When Aristotle in the treatise Categories tries to give a general characterization of qualities, he relies on the fact that we already know what it is to say of something what it is like. Qualities are just those items which we attribute to something when we say what it is like; quantities are just those items which we refer to if we say of something of what amount it is, and so forth." (pp. 47-48)

———. 1987. "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories." In Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 11-28. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

English translation of: Titel, Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift, (1983).

"The Categories, ascribed to Aristotle, has played a unique role in our tradition.

(...)

Already in late antiquity, however, doubts were raised about its authenticity,(1) though we know of no ancient scholar who, on the basis of such doubts, declared the treatise to be spurious."

(...)

"The question of authenticity, however, turns out to be crucially linked to the question of unity. Given that it seems highly questionable whether the Postpraedicamenta were originally part of the treatise or were appended by a later editor,(12) it might seem as if the question regarding the authenticity of the treatise needs to be asked as two questions, viz., questions regarding the authenticity of the first and second part individually. Many authors have indeed taken this for granted and have thus assumed that the first part was authentic, the second either probably or certainly not.(13)"

(...)

"Therefore, in what follows, I will pay particular attention to the question of unity. The dangerous tendency to consider this treatise almost exclusively with reference to the first part and thus to jeopardize the status of the second part is, of course, reinforced considerably by the title. Hence, I will also discuss the title in connection with the question of unity." (pp. 11-12)

(...)

"Thus, it is by no means the case that the incompatibility of the two theories of substance forces us to reject the Categories as spurious. On the contrary, it seems as if the theory of the Categories ought, rather, to be seen as a stage in a long development that proceeds from the forms of Plato's middle dialogues to the substantial forms of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

Thus, we have met the objection against the authenticity of the Categories that has survived the longest; and so we can, indeed, follow the tradition and attribute the treatise to Aristotle. However, we have also seen that we have reason not to follow the tradition blindly in its understanding of the treatise. Unlike the tradition, which sought to gloss over the differences between the Categories and the Metaphysics, we ought to take care not to project the universals of the Categories into the ontology of the Metaphysics." (p. 28)

(1) Olymp., Prol. 22, 38ff.; Schol. 33a 28ff.; Brandis.

(12) 12. See J. G. Buhle, Aristotelis Opera, vol. I, 1791, 436; Ch. A. Brandis in: Abh. Berlin 1833, 268ff.; E. Zeller, Philos. d. Gr., II 24, 1921, 67 n. 1; Th. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, IV, 514; Uberweg-Praechter, 379; D. Ross, Aristotle, 10; L. M. De Rijk, The Authenticity, in: Mnemos. 4 (1951), 159; I. During, R E Suppl. XI, s.v. Aristoteles, 205, 61; J. L. Ackrill, 70; V. Sainati, Storia, 151ff. Some ancient authors took this line (Olymp., In cat. 133, 14), especially Andronicus (Simpl., In cat. 379, 8ff.).

(13) E.g., J. G. Buhle, 436; E. Zeller, II 24, 1921, 67; H. Maier, Die Syllogistik, II 2, 292 n.

We hear of this view being taken by some in antiquity (Ammon., In cat. 14, 18ff.; Olymp., In cat. 133, 14ff.). Whether Andronicus was among these, as is often claimed, is doubtful; at any rate, we never hear that he argued against the authenticity of the Postpraedicamenta; we would assume, if this had been the case, that he would be referred to by name when their authenticity was being discussed.

———. 1987. "Individuals in Aristotle." In Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 49-71. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

English translation of: "Individuen bei Aristoteles", Antike und Abendland, 24, 1978, pp. 16-39.

"By way of introduction, I offer a few remarks to give an overview of the subject of this paper. Aristotle assumes that, in addition to objects, there are properties of objects. This assumption is rather stronger than one might think, since it turns out that statements about properties are not just reducible to statements about objects; on the contrary, the truth of at least some statements about objects is to be explained by assuming that there are properties."

(...)

"Besides this division of things into objects and properties, Aristotle, in the Categories, makes use of the distinction between general and particular, between individuals and universals. Although Aristotle does not, in this treatise, use any term like 'universal' (katholou), he does speak of 'individuals', and he contrasts these with their kinds. These two divisions, into objects and properties, on the one hand, and into particular and general, on the other, do not turn out to be the same. For Aristotle counts as general not only properties but also the kinds, into which objects fall, i.e., the genera, species, and differentiae of substances; and these are to be differentiated strictly from properties."

(...)

"At this point, three difficulties arise. First of all, how is it possible to speak of individuals in the case of properties; second, how can there be a single notion of being an individual that can be applied to objects as well as properties; and third, what sorts of objects are these general objects, the genera and species, supposed to be? These difficulties, especially the first two, will be our concern in the first part of this paper, which deal with the Categories." (pp. 49-50)

Fritz, Kurt von. 1954. "Review of: The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy by L. M. De Rijk." The Philosophical Review no. 63:600-605.

"The author of this book tries once more to solve the difficult problem of the meaning of Aristotle's theory of categories or, more specifically, the question of whether the categories are a system of grammatical, of logical, or of ontological distinctions. He rejects from the outset the explanation of the categories as grammatical distinctions though he does admit-which is very important-that Aristotle in his metaphysical and logical analyses is, generally speaking, guided by the structure of his native tongue. Concerning the two other main explanations which have been offered, he points out in his introduction that "the later distinction between the logical and the ontological aspect qua a conscious opposition which is carried through rigorously" should not be applied to ancient thought, i.e., to that of Aristotle, and expresses the opinion that "the seeming difficulty of interpretation disappears" if this distinction is not made. He tries to show that the solutions offered by his predecessors are all wrong or insufficient because they did not follow this principle of interpretation.

The author then elaborates his theory in six chapters and an appendix. The first three chapters deal with various aspects of the relation between logic and ontology in Aristotle's philosophy, namely: Aristotle's doctrine of truth, the distinction between "essential and accidental being" (κατ' αυτό and κατά συμβεβηκός), logical and ontological accident. The second series of three chapters deals with the problem of the categories directly, first the categories in the Metaphysics, then the categories in the special treatise devoted to that subject, the first treatise of the Organon, and finally the use which Aristotle makes of the categories in his philosophy in general. The appendix deals with the various expressions by which Aristotle designates the categories, with their origin and their relation to the logical and the ontological aspects of the categories. Each chapter, as well as the appendix, concludes with a convenient summary of the theses which the author has tried to prove." (pp. 600-601)

———. 1958. "Once More ϰαθ᾿ ὑποϰειμένου and ἐν ὑποϰειμένῳ." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 3:72-73.

"On p. 148 ff. of the second volume of Phronesis Mr. Chung-Hwan Chen has published an article on the above subject taking his starting point from a review of a book by the Dutch scholar L. M. De Rijk which I had published some time ago in The Philosophical Review, vol. 53 (1954), p. 600 ff., but without knowledge of the book reviewed itself. As a consequence some special points have remained in the dark; and since this is in no way Mr. Chung-Hwan Cheng's fault, who was unable to obtain a copy of the book reviewed, but to a large part my own fault and to a certain extent perhaps the fault of Mr. De Rijk, I would appear to be under some obligation to clear up the question." (p. 72)

(...)

"It is one of the main contentions of Mr. De Rijk in the book which I reviewed that it is wrong to make a sharp distinction between the ontological and the logical aspect of Aristotle's theory of the categories because the ontological aspect is always the essential one and the logical only its reflection. In contrast to this I had contended that Aristotle's theory has an ontological, a logical, and to some extent a grammatical aspect; and that to understand its philosophical meaning, as well as the difficulties with which Aristotle had to struggle in its elaboration fully, it is necessary to distinguish sharply between them." (p. 73)

Furth, Montgomery. 1988. Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Preface XI; §0. A short discourse on method 1; I. Cross- and Intra-Categorial Predication in the Categories 9; II. Substance in the Metaphysics: A First Approximation 49; III. The Zoological Universe 67; Bibliography 285; Index 291-300.

"My aim in what follows is to explain and to motivate a theory of essence, existence and individuation that I think is to be found in the later and more advanced of the extant writings of Aristotle. The view to be explored has several features that are noteworthy from a scientific as well as a philosophical standpoint: it centers especially, though not exclusively, on a concept of what an individual material object is - a concept that has both intrinsic interest and (if some suggestions I shall advance as to its provenance and motivation are accepted) a historical significance that has not always been accurately appreciated." (p. 1)

(...)

"largely dispense with questions like what differentiates the various nonsubstantial categories from one another, the rationale (if there be one) for comprehending into a single category the monstrous motley horde yclept Quality, the justification (which seems to me quite hopeless) for a category, co-ordinate with the others, of Time, and other such. It will be seen that numerous particular points will emerge along the way in the course of the general discussion of Inherence. But enough has even now been fixed to allow statement of three general truths about the relationship between the tetrachotomy of "things that are" and the total categorial scheme. None of them is explicitly stated in the work, but all of them are in practice observed with great fidelity, and their controlling place in the theory will become more evident in what follows (were one to essay the project, conceivably worthwhile, of axiomatizing the theory, they would be plausible candidates for axioms):

(i) said-of is always intra-categorial, and conversely,

(ii) inherence is always cross-categorial, and conversely,

(iii) substances and only substances can be subjects of inherence." (p. 14)

Aristotle's Categories. Annotated bibliography of the studies in English: C - F

Contents of this Section

Aristotle's Categories

Bibliography