Moore, George Edward. 1903. "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong." International Journal of Ethics no. 14:115-123.

Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), The philosophy of Brentano, pp. 176-181.

"This is a far better discussion of the most fundamental principles of ethics than any others with which I am acquainted. Brentano himself is fully conscious that he has made a very great advance in the theory of ethics. ‘No one’, he says, ‘has determined the principles of ethics as, on the basis of new analysis, I have found it necessary to determine them’ (p. X); and his confidence both in the originality and in the value of his own work is completely justified. In almost all points in which he differs from any of the great historical systems, he is in the right; and he differs with regard to the most fundamental points of moral philosophy. Of all previous moralists, Sidgwick alone is in any respect superior to him; and Sidgwick was never clearly aware of the wide and important bearings of his discovery in this one respect. Brentano is both clearer and more profound; and he avoids Sidgwick's two fundamental errors. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of his work.

His main proposition is that what we know, when we know that a thing is good in itself, is that the feeling of love towards that thing (or pleasure in that thing) is 'right’ (nchtig). Similarly, that a thing is bad, is merely another way of saying that hatred of that thing would be ‘right’." (p. 176 of the reprint)
Moran, Dermot. 1996. "Brentano's Thesis." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes no. 70:1-27.

"t seems appropriate in an Address to the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association to revisit Franz Brentano's much-quoted and oft-misunderstood account of intentionality, particularly since Brentano himself refers to Aristotle as his source and since intentionality is now a cornerstone of much contemporary philosophy of mind.(1)" (p. 1)

(...)

"Since I believe there is philosophical value in getting things right historically, it is worthwhile returning to Brentano's own conception in its original setting with a view to unpacking its key elements. We shall see that Brentano's version of intentionality is deeply embedded in a complex of broadly Cartesian, internalist and-though one must be very careful-introspectionalist assumptions. He did accept the reality of psychological states and their evident nature, they are as they appear to be, psychology does reveal our mental natural kinds. But, I shall argue, Brentano never held that mental events were ontologically irreducible to the physical; or that materialism was false; or that intentionality related people to propositions. Nor did he claim to have 'discovered' intentionality. For him, intentionality merely served as the most satisfactory criterion (among several other candidates, such as non-spatiality and inwardness) for initially identifying the domain of the mental, indeed a criterion to which, in his view, traditional philosophy (i.e., Aristotle-Aquinas-Descartes) subscribed.

Brentano did claim that all and -less emphatically- only mental states were intentional. He did see intentionality as the best 'mark of the mental', but it is not at all clear, as we shall see, just what is being marked off from what. In particular, his definition of the physical refers only to a certain phenomenal properties of our conscious states, and his understanding of the psychical is precisely that which is grasped reflexively in inner perception." (pp. 2-3)

(1) Brentano refers to Aristotle's De Anima: 'Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence', Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint , ed Oskar Kaus, English ed. Linda L. McAlister, trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister (London: Routledge, 1973; 2nd English Edition with introduction by Peter Simons, 1995), p. 88 note †. [Hereafter PES]. Elsewhere he cites Metaphysics Book 5, ch. 15, 1021a29, which speaks of certain things whose nature includes a reference to something else, see F. Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, trans. R. Chisholm and Elizabeth Schneewind (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 14. [Hereafter RW].(...)
———. 2000. "Heidegger's critique of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intentionality." Inquiry no. 43:39-65.

"Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano's conceptual framework and presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness (phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl's assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in Being and Time (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have endorsed his critique of Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. I argue that Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversing or abandoning his account. Heidegger's criticisms of representationalism merely repeat Husserl's. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl's account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice. In short, Heidegger is more dependent on Husserl than he ever publicly acknowledged."
———. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. New York: Roultdge.

Chapter 1: Franz Brentano: descriptive psychology and intentionality, pp. 23-59.

"In his initial phase of expressing this relation, Brentano emphasised it was possible to be intentionally related to all kinds of objects, imagined, possible, impossible, and so on. Roughly from 1874 to 1904, Brentano frequently expresses intentionality in terms of the intentional inexistence of the object. ‘Inexistence’ (Inexistenz) is, in fact, Brentano’s translation of the Latin term in-esse, the verb meaning ‘to be in’, which was used by the Scholastics to characterise the manner in which an accident is said to be in a substance (e.g. knowledge is in a man), and specifically with regard to epistemology, the manner in which a form is in the mind. By ‘inexistence’ Brentano does seem to intend that the object of an act of consciousness is something immanent in consciousness, whether or not there is also a real object or ‘reality’ (Realität) outside of consciousness."

(...)

"Later, in his 1911 Classification of Mental Phenomena, the revised edition of Book Two of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, reissued at the request of his students, Brentano admitted his use of the phrase ‘intentional inexistence’ (PES 180 n.) had been misunderstood and he would have been better to have avoided it altogether. He says he even considered replacing the term ‘intentional’ with another Scholastic term ‘objective’, but this would have given rise to more misunderstandings by those who did not appreciate the Scholastic meaning of esse objectivum, the manner in which things are ‘objectively’ in the mind.(84)Brentano is referring to the Cartesian distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘objective reality’ in the Third Meditation, where Descartes distinguished the meaning-content (realitas objectiva) which belongs to the idea of God from the ‘formal reality’ (realitas formalis) of the cause of the idea, namely the actual being, God. According to Brentano’s employment of this distinction, when I believe something actively, or when I am actually making an error, the belief or error is formally in me; when I remember believing something or making an error, then that belief or error is objectively in me (The True, 15–16). These distinctions between the ‘presented object’ and the ‘mode of presentation’, the formal and the objective, are efforts by Brentano to accommodate a conceptual distinction which his students were forcing on him, namely the distinction between the content and the object of the act." (pp. 48-49)
———. 2013. "Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present." International Journal of Philosophical Studies no. 21:317-358.

Abstract: "Intentionality (‘directedness’, ‘aboutness’) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, John Searle’s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions of intentionality, including some recent explorations of the history of the concept (paying particular attention to Anselm), and suggest some ways the henomenological approach of Husserl and Heidegger can still offer insights for contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness."
———. 2020. "Brentano’s Concept of Descriptive Psychology." In Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Stadler, Friedrich, 73-100. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "In this paper, I begin by outlining Franz Brentano’s connections with John Henry Newman (on issues of faith) and then explore in detail Brentano’s evolving conception of descriptive psychology from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) to his Descriptive Psychology lectures (1887–1891). Brentano was developing a descriptive, “empirical” science of mental phenomena (in opposition to Wundt’s physiological psychology and to Fechner’s psychophysics), and his focus was on a priori necessary laws that are given directly to intuition. Brentano developed his psychology from Aristotle and from the then contemporary psychology (especially British psychologists, such as Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill, Henry Maudsley, and others). Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology was deeply influenced by Brentano’s descriptive psychology, although, in his mature works, Husserl abandoned all of Brentano’s main distinctions and developed a new intentional analysis that identified consciousness as a self-enclosed domain governed by a priori eidetic laws. In this paper I will explore Brentano’s and Husserl’s conceptions of descriptive psychology but I shall also examine Wilhelm Dilthey’s account of descriptive psychology that was based on ‘motivation’, a concept adopted by Husserl. Husserl’s mature phenomenology advanced far beyond Brentano’s descriptive psychology. But, despite their differences, I shall show that both Brentano and Husserl were committed to a non-reductive sui generis exploration of the ‘life of consciousness’ (Bewusstseinsleben) understood as a dynamic complex of essential features that can be apprehended by reflective analysis."
Morrison, James C. 1971. "Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 31:27-46.

"It is the purpose of this essay to attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenological views are very different from and far more developed than Brentano's, and that he even rejects (wholly or in part) many of the latter's most important doctrines.

In order to clarify this problem I propose to discuss Brentano's well known attempt to distinguish mental and physical phenomena in which he introduces the notion of "IntentionaI lnexistence." I will then take up Husserl's views on both the general problem of mental vs. physical phenomena and on the more specific one of Intentionality. No attempt will be made to give a complete account of Husserl's own views on Intentionality, since to do so adequately would imply a discussion of his whole philosophy. Also, I will concentrate almost exclusively on material from the Logische Untersuchungen, since it is here that he makes most explicit and detailed reference to Brentano." (p. 27)
Morscher, Edgar. 1978. "Brentano and His Place in Austrian Philosophy." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 5:1-10.

"The first part of this paper summarizes what I take to be the most important doctrines of Brentano's philosophy. The second part investigates the possible meanings of the term 'Austrian philosophy'. The third part attempts to say something about Brentano's place in Austrian philosophy -- whatever that may be --, while the fourth part focuses on a problem in which I am especially interested. The paper closes with a proposal for what the expression 'Austrian philosophy' could mean."
Mulligan, Kevin. 2004. "Brentano on the mind." In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale. Cambridge University Press.

"After a survey of the main claims and distinctions made by Brentano in his account of the mind, I consider in some detail what he says about what he takes to be the groundfloor and the top floor of the mind – time-consciousness and the emotions. I then set out his accounts of the self. In view of the difficulties involved in navigating amongst Brentano’s texts, changing views, and opinionated editors, I indicate the main developments of Brentano’s views about the mind. In spite of the fact that, in 1889, he seems to have thought that descriptive psychology was almost complete (KRW, p. ix, USE, p. 3), these developments ended only with his death." (p. 69)

Abbreviations

KRW = The Origins of the Knowledge of Righr and Wrong

USE = Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis
———. 2017. "Brentano’s Knowledge, Austrian Verificationisms, and Epistemic Accounts of Truth and Value." The Monist no. 100:88-105.

"What can we know? What is it to know? What roles does knowledge play? Brentano gives answers to each of these questions. The objects of knowledge, Brentano thinks, are of two kinds. I have knowledge of my own mental states and acts and I may have knowledge of noncontingent truths. To know is to judge correctly and with evidence.

Three central roles for knowledge, according to Brentano, are that truth, existence, and value must be understood in epistemic terms.

His answers to the first two questions come near the end of a long and venerable tradition. His answer to the third question marks the beginning of a family of theories which were to play an important role in twentieth-century philosophy. For Brentano’s epistemic account of truth was the first of many Austrian verificationisms about truth and meaning.(1) And his epistemic account of value led to the development of a variety of alternatives to naive realism à la Moore and Scheler about value.

Brentano’s answers to all three questions led to substantial modifications of his framework by some of his students. His answers also provoked a violent rejection of the framework itself by some of his heirs and other philosophers which culminated in the defence of the view that to know is not to judge or to believe with evidence because it is not to judge or believe.

In what follows, I have three goals. First, to expound and understand Brentano’s views about knowledge and his epistemic accounts of truth and value. Secondly, since a hundred years have now passed since Brentano’s death, it seems appropriate to try and show just what roles his epistemology has played over the last hundred years; I shall therefore concentrate on six major developments of his epistemology ranging from substantial modifications and developments to outright rejection, as well as a number of minor developments. Finally, I hope that the panorama of developments I present will help to illuminate the details of Brentano’s own ideas. In §§2–4, I concentrate on Brentano’s account of theoretical knowledge and its developments. Not until §5 do I turn to the details of his account of axiological knowledge and its fate." (pp. 88-89)

(1) Kastil (1934) refers to Brentano’s “gnoseological” conception of truth.

References

Kastil, A. 1934. “Ontologischer und gnoseologischer Wahrheitsbegriff,” in O. Engländer et al., eds. Zur Philosophie der Gegenwart, Prague: Calve, 23–34.
———. 2017. "Incorrect emotions in ancient, austrian & contemporary philosophy." Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger no. 142:491-512.

"Brentano often refers to ancient predecessors of his distinction between correct and incorrect non-intellectual states or acts. In 1907, he ascribes to Meinong the view that it is nonsense to say of anything but judgments that they are correct or “characterised as correct” and says that the view rejected by Meinong is that of “the greatest thinkers of the distant past” and Brentano’s own view.

Unsurprisingly, some of Brentano’s pupils, followers and heirs, such as Kastil and Kraus, devoted a lot of attention to the roles of non-intellectual correctness in Aristotle. (...). In contrast, the enormous secondary literature on intellectual correctness and right reason in ancient philosophy and later seems to have paid little attention to non-intellectual correctness. In what follows, I first look briefly at what Plato and Aristotle say about what I have called non-intellectual correctness. I then consider a series of questions about non-intellectual correctness and outline and evaluate some ancient, Austrian and contemporary answers." (pp. 491-492 notes omitted)
Mulligan, Kevin, and Smith, Barry. 1985. "Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 45:627-644.

"Franz Brentano's 'philosophy of mind' still means, as far as most philosophers are concerned, no more than a peculiarly influential account of intentionality. In fact, in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano has provided an account of mental phenomena which ranks with any to be found in the literature of philosophy. It differs as much from the concept-centered Kantian approaches to 'reason' or 'understanding' as from more recent approaches, centred on the language used to report or to express 'propositional attitudes', in being an ontology of mind, concerned with the description of the entities which are involved in mental experience and of the relations between them.

With the posthumous publication of a series of lectures given in Vienna in 1890-911 we now possess a clear account of the ontology, and of the methods, underlying Brentano's numerous and subtle descriptions of mental phenomena, at least at one highly fruitful stage in his career. What follows is a detailed exposition of this work, together with a brief critical coda." (p. 627)
Münch, Dieter. 1989. "Brentano and Comte." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 36:33-54.

"In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES, 1874) Brentano seeks to lay the foundation of psychology as a science. Surprisingly, he rejects the obvious idea that psychology is the science of the 'mind' or 'soul', and he agrees instead with Lange's claim that we need a "psychology without a soul" (PES I, p. 16; Engl., p. 11)." (p. 33)

(...)

"But why, then, does Brentano not follow Aristotle in stating that there is a soul, and that it is this which is the subject of psychology?

To answer this question I want to show that it is not only Aristotle who is centrally relevant for an understanding of Brentano's Psychology. We have to keep in mind that Brentano here is trying to solve a specific problem, namely to lay the foundation of psychology as a science. The study of Aristotle made Brentano accustomed to a philosophy in a scientific spirit and prepared hirn therefore for an understanding of the contemporary empirical philosophy and especially the so-called 'positive philosophy' as developed by Auguste Comte. It is the influence of this positive philosophy, I want to claim, which makes it understandable why we miss the soul in the published volumes of Brentano's Psychology. For Brentano's theory of psychical phenomena is in fact an answer to the question: how can we deal with psychical phenomena in the framework of positive philosophy?

This will mean that the influence of Comte - in contrast to that of Aristotle (and Descartes) -, concerns not so much the content as the methodology of the theses put forward in the Psychology." (p. 36)
Nathan, N. M. L. 1971. "Brentano's Necessitarianism." Ratio no. 13:44-55.

"Brentano held that there is a sense of 'necessary', on which whatever exists, exists necessarily, i.e. it is necessary that it should come into existence when it does so, and that it should remain in existence as long as it does so."

(...)

"But in what follows I shall presuppose rather than defend theintelligibility of Brentano's claim.

Brentano supports his claim with a variety of arguments, some deSIgned to show that it is infinitely improbable that whatever exists does not exist necessarily, others to show that thc claim that anything that exists does not exist necessarily is self-contradictory; some starting from the temporal character of existing things others from their spatial character.(6)" (pp. 44-45)

(6) For arguments from the spatial character of existing things see Versuch über die Erkenntnis, ed. A. Kastil (Leipzig, 1925), pt. IV, Anhang D, pp. 154-6; Vom Dasein Gottes ed. A. Kastil (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 451-3.

Brentano's earliest arguments for neccssitarianism from the temporal character of existing things were meant to show only that it was infinitely probable that all changing things existed necessarily. Later he tried to show that it was logically necessary that all existmg things whatsoever existed necessarily. (See Kastil's remarks in Versuch, pp. 196-7.) Part IV of the Versuch (pp. 108-57) contains various versions of both kinds of arguments from temporality.

Particularly clear versions of the temporal argument for Brentano's stronger claim can be found in Vom Dasein Gottes, pp. 414-16; 446-8. For other versions of both kinds of arguments from temporality see Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern, 1952), pp. 281-9; Religion und Philosophie, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern, I 956), pp. 12o-6; Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern, 1956), pp. 299-309.(...).
Niel, Luis. 2019/20. "Brentano and Intentionality: or How to Break Immanence from Within." Brentano Studien no. 16:69-98.

Abstract: "The article focuses on Brentano’s conceptions of intentionality as developed throughout the different periods of his thought: first, in his early works on Aristotle and its operating notion of 'intentional’ as something objective in sensations; second, in his ‘intentionality passage’, which, based on a psychological approach, presents an immanentist account (likely Cartesian) of intentionality as a two-term relation between the mind and the immanent (or intentional) object; third, in his late ‘reistic phase’, where, due to the ontological flaws of the psychological approach, a strong ontological commitment to the ‘real thing’ is presented which leads to a new conception of intentionality as a one-term relation (as something ‘relativlich’) or as the directedness of the mind towards real things. I will first argue that Brentano’s early theory supports a form of intentional immanentism, which his later reistic account vainly attempts to break by introducing the ‘real thing’ into the intentional equation; this leads to many unsolved problems and flaws, expressed by the conceptual tension of an unclear differentiation of the concepts of thing, real, existence, and object. I will also argue that his first psychological-descriptive conception, which methodologically leaves aside existent things by inner perception, presents a more consist account of intentionality which, based on the concept of an in-existing object in the mind, breaks its immanence as it understands this object as something different from the mind itself."
Niemeck, Maik. 2020. "Current Accounts of Subjective Character and Brentano’s Concept of Secondary Consciousness." In Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek, 55-71. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "There is widespread agreement among many contemporary philosophers of mind that, in addition to their qualitative character, phenomenally conscious states contain some kind of subjective character. The subjective character of experience is most commonly characterized as a subject’s awareness that it is currently undergoing a specific experience. This idea is nothing new, of course, and something similar has been proposed quite some time ago by Franz Brentano, among others, under the name of “secondary consciousness”. That fact hasn’t remained unnoticed.

Indeed, a number of competing contemporary accounts of subjective character refer to Brentano as an early proponent of their particular view. This article pursues two objectives. First, it argues that the so-called self-mode account of subjective character is, for systematical reasons, superior to self-representational and pre-reflective accounts. Second, the article briefly suggests a novel interpretation of Brentano’s concept of secondary consciousness that sets it in relation to the previously introduced self-mode account and bears some similarities with Thomasson’s adverbial interpretation of Brentano’s concept of secondary consciousness."
Nuñez Erices, Gonzalo. 2019. "Boundaries and Things. A Metaphysical Study of the Brentano-Chisholm Theory." Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy no. 33:15-48.

Abstract: "The fact that boundaries are ontologically dependent entities is agreed by Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm. This article studies both authors as a single metaphysical account about boundaries. The Brentano-Chisholm theory understands that boundaries and the objects to which they belong hold a mutual relationship of ontological dependence: the existence of a boundary depends upon a continuum of higher spatial dimensionality, but also is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of a continuum. Although the view that ordinary material objects and their boundaries (or surfaces) ontologically depend on each other is correct, it does not grasp their asymmetric relationship: while the existence of a surface rigidly depends upon the existence of the very object it belongs to, the existence of a physical object generically depends upon having some surface. In modal terms, both are two kinds of de re ontological dependence that this article tries to distinguish."
Olivier, Massin. 2017. "Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities." In The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 87-96. New York: Routledge.

"The term “sensation” (Empfindung) famously displays an act/object ambiguity. It might be used to refer

1. To our sensing of something: a sensory act (e.g. a hearing);

2. To what we sense: a sensory object (e.g. a sound);

3. To some mental episode of ours having no object distinct from itself. Pain is sometimes said to be such a “subjectively subjective” mental episode, some sensing which is its own sensa.(1)" (p. 87)

(...)

"Sensations have two kinds of features. Some, such as their intentional mode or their temporal features, cannot be explained away by looking at their object. Others, such as their intensity or the difference between senses, are features that sensations inherit from their objects.

Accordingly, this chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects—which include sensory qualities—and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeals to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities." (p. 88)
Olson, Jonas. 2017. "Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid’s." The Monist no. 100:106-119.

Abstract: "This paper explores Franz Brentano’s metaethics by comparing it to Thomas Reid’s.

Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they are both aptly classiﬁed as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and the nature of moral judgment. However, their respective versions of intuitionism are importantly different, in ways that reﬂect more general differences between their respective epistemological views. Sections III and IV of the paper focus more exclusively on Brentano’s metaethics and some of its unorthodox features. These features tie in with notorious difﬁculties for moral realism concerning the nature of moral truth and the relation between moral judgment and motivation to act."
Parsons, Charles. 2004. "Brentano on judgement and truth." In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 168-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In its original form, Brentano’s view of judgment implies that in a sense all judgments are existential judgments or negations of existential judgments. This peculiarity of his view of judgment influenced his thought on truth at an early point and led to a particular line of questioning of the traditional idea of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus, the root of what has come to be called the correspondence theory of truth, already adumbrated in the 1889 lecture that is the opening essay in the compilation Wahrheit und Evidenz. Brentano was not the only or even the most influential philosopher to question the correspondence theory at the time, but his criticisms had distinctive features. In late writings he sketched as a positive view an epistemic conception. The discussion below of Brentano’s views on truth will concentrate on these aspects." (p. 171)
Pasquerella, Lynn. 1985. "Brentano and Organic Unities." In From Bolzano to Wittgenstein, edited by Nyiri, J. C., 128-131. Wien: Holder/Pichier/Tempsky.
———. 1987. "Intensional logic and Brentano’s non-propositional theory of judgment." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 29:117-119.

"The reism Brentano adopted in the later stages of his philosophy led him to reject such entia irrealia as properties, judgmental contents (or states of affairs) and to advocate a non-propositional theory of judgment. While non-propositional theorists may, through certain linguistic maneuvers, eliminate reference and to some extent avoid commitment to propositions, many philosophers believe the nonpropositional theorist cannot escape the use of propositions altogether.

George Bealer levels such an attack in his book Quality and Concept.(1)" (p. 117)

(...)

"Bealer contends that "on the non-relational non-propositional theory of judgment there is no credible way even to express the above intuitively valid arguments ... ". (2) Thus, Bealer rejects Brentano's approach because, as he sees it, the theory "falters at the earliest possible stage: it collides with logic itself'.(3)

I will show that Bealer is mistaken when he claims that Brentano's non-propositional theory cannot offer an adequate rendering of the first two arguments. While I grant that Brentano cannot provide an adequate translation of the third argument, I do not grant its intuitive validity." (p. 60)

(1) George Bealer, Quality and Concept, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press), 1982, pp. 223-224

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.
———. 1988. "Brentano and the Direct Attribution Theory." Brentano Studien no. 1:189-197.

Abstract: "According to Brentano, what is characteristic of every mental act is the reference to something as an object. The exact nature of an object of our mental acts has, however, been first the subject of steady discussion in Brentano's writings and consecutively gave rise to controversy for contemporary philosophers of mind; e.g. Chisholm, Castañeda. What follows is an elucidation of the relationship between Brentano's final theory of sensation and its interpretation in Chisholm's Direct Attribution theory as a consideration of a recent challenge by Castañeda: that while the Brentanian-Chisholmian account is exemplary in dealing with tacit self-reference at the level of unreflective consciousness, this theory needs to be developed even further to be adequate to those cases of self-reference involved in reflective consciousness."
———. 1989. "Kotarbinski and Brentano on Truth." Topoi Supplement no. 4:98-106.
———. 1993. "Brentano and aesthetic intentions." Brentano Studien no. 4:235-249.

"Introduction. Brentano's philosophy of art, contained primarily in his book, Grundzuge der Ästhetik, is the result of an original theory of intrinsic value that was derived from Brentano's philosophical psychology. In his aesthetics, Brentano endeavored to find an objective ground for the value of aesthetic contemplation through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. The lack of attention Brentano's aesthetics has received is surprising, given that two of the many students Brentano influenced, Husserl (through the development of the phenomenological movement) and Ehrenfels (through the development of Gestalt psychology) have had an extraordinary influence on twentieth century perceptions of art. In this paper I will attempt to redress some of this neglect by outlining Brentano's analysis of aesthetic intentions and the relationship his aesthetics bears to his overall philosophical system." (p. 235)
———. 2002. "Phenomenology and Intentional Acts of Sensing in Brentano." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 40 (Supplement):269-279.

"In his paper “Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano,” Matjaž Potrč endeavors to provide a Brentanian analysis of how it is possible for phenomenal objects to become the contents of intentional acts of sensing.’ Potrč contends that while Brentano stands as an “origins philosopher” at the crossroads of analytic and continental philosophy, subsequent philosophers from both traditions have failed to adequately address the nature of phenomenological experiences. He speculates that their explanatory insufficiency results alternatively from attempts to account for intentionality without phenomenology or from efforts to provide an analysis of phenomenology without intentionality.Potrč seeks to redress this oversight by highlighting the intimate relationship Brentano proposes between intentionality and phenomenology. In the process, he exposes a variety of contemporary metaphysical and epistemological controversies related to intentionality, reference, and phenomenology. Responding to these controversies, Potrč reinforces Brentano’s thesis of the irreducibility of intentionality to the referential and the necessary distinction between what he terms “physical and experiential space.”

Potrčs analysis embodies a broad range of intriguing philosophical questions. Too many, in fact, to be addressed in a single response. The focus of my commentary, therefore, will be to be provide an outline of Brentano’s theory of sensation as background to Potrč's important project and to evaluate and develop his thesis of Brentano as an “origins philosopher”." (p. 269)

References

Potrč, Matjaž. Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano, The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2002) Vol. XL, pp. 231-267.
Pavlik, Jan. 1991. "Brentano's theory of intentionality." Brentano Studien no. 3:63-70.

Abstract: "Brentano's intentional psychology is an attempt at overcoming the Humean tradition characterized by probabilistic empirism, subjectivism and psychologism. Intentional psychology enables restoration of the autonomy of human psyche with reference to natural laws as well as overcoming the reduction of specific subject-object relations to object-object relations realized in associationist psychology. In contrast with speculative approaches of German classical philosophy, Brentano's theory enables empirical, non-metaphysical inquiry of subject-object relations."
Pietersma, Henry. 1978. "Brentano's Concept of the Evident." Analecta Husserliana no. 7:235-244.

Abstract: "It is well known how much E. Husserl’s original project of phenomenology has been inspired by Brentano’s epistemology, which may be characterized as a search for firm foundations. At the foundation of all that we know, or think we know, there must be matters which we know with unshakable certainty. Such a certainty is not merely a characteristic attitude adopted by an epistemic subject who may none the less be in the dark as to what his status is and where he stands in the whole of reality, so that his certainty might quite conceivably be shaken. On the contrary this subject, now that he has dug down to the foundations, need not fear that somewhere an evil genius might still be hiding and frustrate even his very best epistemic efforts. For there is now no longer any darkness or mystery shrouding his place in reality and his capacities to know. Husserl has developed this objective ground for certitude to the point that Brantano himself could no longer understand him."
Płotka, Witold. 2020. "From psychology to phenomenology (and back again): A controversy over the method in the school of Twardowski." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences no. 19:141-167.

Abstract: "This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect.

Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early phenomenology in Poland."
Poli, Roberto. 1993. "The Dispute over Reism: Kotarbinski - Ajdukiewicz - Brentano." In Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"I wish now to propose a possible embedding of the reist theses by drawing on certain elements in the thought of Franz Brentano.

Brentano's philosophical opus falls, as is well known, into two distinct phases. Here I wish to explore the doctrine that he developed during his last years, a doctrine that can properly be defined as reist(18). To do so, I shall use Chisholm's reconstruction of Brentano's position on the problem of substance and accident.(19)

The two main presuppositions of Brentano's reism are the thesis of the primacy of inner perception and the theory of concrete predication.

For Brentano, the primary use of the copula occurs in phenomena of inner perception. Strictly speaking, we can only paradigmatically comprehend the being of things when they are apprehended by inner perception. By contrast, we can understand things that are not apprehended by inner perception only by analogy - by relating them to our experience as thinking beings. In terms of our discussion here, this dimension of Brentano's theory does not seem to be immediately relevant, however fundamental it may be to his ontology. Entirely relevant, instead, is his theory of concrete predication. with its requirement that all the predicates of the language should be transformed into concrete terms. In this sense, one cannot say, for example 'roses are red' but 'roses are red-things'. All the predicates of the language, and in particular all its abstract terms, must undergo a similar translation process. From such a perspective, the traditional position that a judgement attributes properties to things is replaced by one where a judgement connects things with things(20)." (p. 348)

(18) The principal rererence texts are Kategorienlehre, (Hamburg: Neiner, 1969) and Die Abkhehr vom Nichtrealen (Hamburg: Neiner, 1966).

(19) R. Chisholm, "Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident", in Brentano and Meinong Studies, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982).

(20) As Chisholm points out in the essay cited in note 19, this proposal derives rrom the Aristotelean conception of simple judgements, where affirmative judgements combine things and negative judgements separate them. Cf. De interpretatione, 16a11.
———, ed. 1998. The Brentano Puzzle. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225.

"The papers collected in this volume arise from the conference "The Brentano Puzzle," organized in Bolzano / Bozen, Italy, on the 14th and 15th of November 1996 by the Central European Institute of Culture.

The conference's aim was to analyse the following puzzle. Even if the width and the depth of Brentano's intellectual legacy are now well known, those asked to list the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century very rarely mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of Brentano's 'invisibility.'

It is obvious that Brentano's invisibility has serious consequences on assessment of his philosophical theory. The reconstruction of Brentano's thought is still flawed and incomplete. Moreover, Brentano's emphasis on oral teaching, and the meagreness of his published work, compared with the enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence, are also of theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano's method of 'doing' philosophy. We know that the distinguishing feature of his philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial answers rather than on the construction of systems. Given these features, it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed for it.

This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed solutions which then reverberated through the entire edifice of his philosophy. This is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural sciences as its model. These factors also account for the different solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought, in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but not a univocity of solutions. It is this aspect that allows one to talk of a school of Brentano among his pupils, to detect a 'family resemblance' among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. Accordingly, his heterodox followers, such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, were more faithful to their master's thought than the orthodox Brentanians like Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand.

One further component of the Brentano puzzle is that a number of Brentano's outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools. Suffice it to mention Husserl's phenomenology, Twardowski's Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong's Graz school. The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano's school (in the broad sense) have come to obscure their common thematic origins. The subsësequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology generated, as a side-effect, the oblivion into which Franz Brentano's thought then fell.

Nevertheless, Brentano and his school display surprising affinities with Frege and the tradition that he inspired. Perhaps the most interesting reconstruction of these connections is that accomplished by a number of works in German by Paul Linke. It was thought that a survey of Linke's thought might prove useful to English readers. For this reason the book also contains the English translation of his 'Gottlob Frege als Philosoph,' published in 1947, with an introduction by Claire Ortiz Hill.

Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of Brentano's and his followers' theses for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are also considered." (Foreword by Roberto Poli)
———. 2000. "Brentano in Italy." Brentano Studien no. 8:233-257.
———. 2004. "Approaching Brentano's Theory of Categories." In Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 285-322. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

"In this paper I shall begin with analysis of the core of Brentano’s ontology, namely his theory of categories." (p. 288)

(...)

"Brentano’s theory of “what exists” can only be properly understood if we recall that, for him, everything that exists is an individual: “And we also say, of things that exist in the strict sense, that they are individuals”(TC, 26 – 1916). We will see in the section devoted to wholes and parts that “individual” does not mean “one”. Brentano rejected the Aristotelian identification between individual and one as the source of numerous errors.

He retained the concept of “individual”, but with the meaning of “determined”. This is a major departure from the mainstream understandding of the concept of an individual. If ‘individual’ means determined, then both collectives and parts can be taken as real individuals. As far as I know, Brentano does not explicitly address the entities referred to by mass terms, but obviously nothing precludes their inclusion in the set of individuals, understood as (fully) determinate reality. On the other hand, what in itself is fully determined can be thought by us without all its determinations." (p. 295)

(...)

"Summing up, one main conclusion is apparent. Brentano used the theory of wholes and parts as the main component of his conceptual framework. This choice runs counter to deeply ingrained beliefs of the mainstream twentieth-century scientific ideology. To provide but one example: a theory of wholes and parts grounds the thesis that wholes govern parts. This entails acknowledging the ontological difference between the relations of part to whole and those going the other way round from the whole to its parts. These relations are not symmetric. Moreover, the latter family of relations may proceed not only from wholes to parts, but from whole to “something else” (e.g. boundaries) as well. All this amounts to paving the way for systems and levels of reality.

It is fair to conclude by saying that Brentano performed an enormous amount of preparatory work, recovering and furthering the best philosophical theories, and lighting many blind allies. It is our task to take a step forward." (p. 320)

References

Franz Brentano. TC. The Theory of Categories, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981.
———. 2012. "Modes and Boundaries." In Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology, edited by Tănăsescu, Ion, 397-418. Bucharest: Zeta Books.

"Brentano’s ontology is sophisticated and difficult to assess.

An obvious problem is the unfinished state of the different versions of his theory of categories (to wit, the three drafts of the theory of category). Perhaps less obvious but no less important are the tensions arising from the continuous dialogue that Brentano develops with Aristotle and his conclusive departure from the theories of the Stagirite. Finally, a major difficulty is the originality and mutual interdependences of the many theories that Brentano developed in the last decades of his life, including the theories of parts and wholes, categories, modes, continua and boundaries.

(...)

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main aspects of the Aristotelian theory of parts and wholes; Section 3 distinguishes things in the proper sense from things in an extended sense; Sections 4 introduces time and space; Section 5 substance and accident. Section 6 discusses boundaries and Section 7 continua. Finally, Section 8 presents Brentano’s theory of parts and wholes and Section 9 his theory of categories." (pp. 397-398)
Potrč, Matjaž. 1993. "Grades of intentionality." Brentano Studien no. 3:71-78.

Abstract: "Intentional inexistence is to be understood via directedness to an internal object which may but needs not exist. As far as the relation to the object exists, it is infallible - contrary to the fallible directedness at an external object. Brentanian intentionality is based on the evidence, and does not allow for degrees. Brentano has been carful to delimit his project of 'Psychognosie' from the physical and from the physiological. The thesis of intentional gradation is discussed, which allows for three degrees. The first form of intentionality involves simple tropisms. The second grade of intentionality is the one of generality, as opposed to specificity an particularity. The third intentional grade would enable directness to the singular.

As human organisms only are able to entertain directness to the singular, brentsnian intentionality would fall under the second kind of directedness, the one involving generality. Supposition that this thesis is right might the lead to the question whether Brentano really described intentionality specific for human organisms. "
———. 2002. "Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano." The Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 40:231-267.

Abstract: "Phenomenology is intrinsically intentional for Brentano. Qualitative conscious experiences are individuated by their phenomenal space. Phenomenal space does not include just an experiential space. Physical phenomenal space is also needed. This invites the kinds of examples concerning the phenomenal that take account of both spaces. Physical space is analyzed because it assures the intentionality of phenomenology.

The thesis concerning intentionality of phenomenology is compared to the overall project of grounding intentionality or directedness at a content or at an object. Besides being directed at an object, an intentional act is also reflexively directed at itself. This reflexive directedness includes qualitative phenomenal experience. As directedness at an object and reflexive directedness of the act at itself become interwoven, there is the intrinsic phenomenology of intentionality. Both intentionality of phenomenology and phenomenology of intentionality present the wholes with mutually pervading and only logically distinguishable parts.

In the above theses, balance is established between phenomenology and intentionality. It is conjectured that this balance was disrupted in both analytical and continental traditions, to which Brentano was a precursor and an origins figure."
Puglisi, Mario. 1924. "Franz Brentano: A Biographical Sketch." The American Journal of Psychology no. 35:414-419.

"In the preface to one of his posthumous works, recently published,-Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung,-Brentano alludes to his religious crisis; it is the first and only time that he refers to it. "Born of a Catholic family," he writes, "I was led to accept the ecclesiastical life; but later I was obliged to separate myself from the church. My sole reason for taking this step was my wish to serve the higher interests of

mankind; and my mature convictions made me realise that such service would be impossible if I followed the path upon which I had originally entered. For me, research has always been a vital necessity; and from the very first I tried, again and again, to resolve, in a satisfactory way, certain apparent contradictions of reason and what is called supernatural revelation. The failure of every effort to resolve these contradictions gave rise, little by little, to grave doubts regarding the truth of religious dogmas. But religious belief had been presented to me as a sacred duty, whose disregard meant eternal punishment; and a doubt regarding the obligation of belief thus appeared to me as a temptation to evil.... All this struggle was repeated over and over; and I should never have come to a decision if it bad not been for a certain extraordinary event,-the assembling of the Vatican Council to discuss the infallibility of the Pope. Here a doctrine was at issue which I could still doubt without thereby falling into sin, and over against which I therefore was still free from any bondage that might disturb my conscience and prevent an impartial examination of the subject. I studied it, and the result of my study was the firmest possible persuasion of the untenability of that dogma." (p. 416)
Rancurello, Antos C. 1968. A Study of Franz Brentano: His Psychological Standpoint and His Significance in the History of Psychology. New York: Academic Press.

Foreword by Edwin G. Boring.

"In justification of the claim that Brentano “had the rightness of the obvious on his side,” Boring very appropriately called attention to his doctrine that “mind is intentional.” The present study aims to show that this doctrine acquires an even deeper meaning and significance when it is viewed within the context of Brentano’s broader conception of man himself as an intentional being. Brentano was very well aware that in many respects man is “reactive”— the product of hereditary and environmental influences. At the same time, he insisted that, as a “psychically active subject,” man is “pro-active,” self-actualizing, self-enhancing, and self-transcending. The student of psychology will easily see reflected in these descriptive terms the orientation of many leading authors throughout the history of psychology as a science, and especially the orientation of the “third force” movement in American psychology.

Another goal of the present study is to show that many other views of Brentano bearing upon more specific theoretical, methodological, and applied issues in psychology have gained increasing acceptance in the history of this science since the 1880’s and again parallel closely the overall stand of (he “third force” movement. Although the evidence that will be provided in support of these claims is selective rather than comprehensive, it should be sufficient to bring out both the essential elements and the historical significance of Brentano’s standpoint in psychology.

In terms of general organization, the present study comprises three closely interrelated sections. The first section offers a portrait, as against a mere composite picture, of Brentano’s life, personality, and works, and as such paves the way, in the second section, for a synopsis of his orientation on psychological issues. There logically follows, in the third section, a general appraisal of Brentano’s significance in the history of psychology.

An annotated bibliography of Brentano’s writings and of works bearing upon his thought is included in this study both as a supplement to the text proper and as an independent contribution." (pp. XI-XII)
Raspa, Venanzio. 2020. "Brentano on Aristotle’s Categories." In Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek, 185-203. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "Brentano’s dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle) (1862) is examined in the light of the nineteenth-century debate on the Aristotelian categories. After providing an exposition of the conceptions of the main representatives of this debate, Adolf Trendelenburg and Hermann Bonitz, this paper assesses Brentano’s point of view on the meaning and origin of the Aristotelian categories. It shows (i) that Brentano assumes non-Aristotelian elements in his reading of the Aristotelian categories, (ii) that this depends on the fact that he shares Bonitz’s thesis, and (iii) that his reading is incomplete in the light of certain Aristotelian statements about non-being."
Rauch, Leo. 1968. "Brentano’s Psychology and the Problem of Existential Import." Philosophical Studies (Dublin) no. 17:121-131.

Abstract: "Frasn Brentano has often been considered guilty of the‘psychologism’ which Edmund Husserl, his pupil, attacked. The charge is justified in only a limited sense: Brentano is dealing not with intentional acts but rather with intentional objects. His concern is directed, among other things, to certain logical and ontological problems such as those raised by a Meinong, even if Brentano makes use of psychological insight in order to shed light on them."
Richardson, Robert. 1983. "Brentano on intentional inexistence and the distinction between mental and physical phenomena." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 65:250-282.

"Aquila, Chisholm, McAlister, and Srzednicki have made marked strides in furthering our understanding of Brentano. There is no doubt that any interpretation must incorporate their insights. Relying on the work already done in elaborating and defending their respective interpretations of the doctrine of intentional inexistence, or intentionality, we are now in a position to reach a definitive resolution of their differences.

After first providing a fuller statement of the two available alternatives we will proceed to provide a critique of each in turn, isolating their weaknesses as well as their strengths. This will enable us to reach a synthesis capable of explaining intentional inexistence and its place in Brentano's psychology; moreover, we can do it in a way which combines the attractions of both the orthodox and reformed interpretations while shedding the inadequacies of each." (p. 251)
Röck, Tina. 2017. "Brentano’s Methodology as a Path through the Divide: On Combining Phenomenological Descriptions and Logical Analysis." Axiomathes no. 27:475-489.

Abstract: "In this paper, I will describe how Brentano was able to integrate descriptive philosophy and logical analysis fruitfully by pointing out Brentano’s concept of philosophy as a rigorous science. First I will clarify how Brentano attempted to turn philosophy into a rigorous descriptive science by applying scientific methods to philosophical questions. After spelling out the implications of such a descriptive understanding of philosophy, I will contrast this descriptive view of philosophy with a semantic-analytic understanding of philosophy as proposed by Frege. After having thus set the stage I will argue that (1) the current separation of philosophy into the seemingly antithetical strands of (continental) phenomenology and analytic philosophy may be seen as a consequence of how the term ‘rigorous science’ in ‘philosophy as a rigorous science’ is interpreted: Does a rigorous science grasp its object with as much exactitude as possible? Or is a science rigorous when its theories are expressed unambiguously, and their implications are drawn with precision? In the course of this investigation I will also point out (2) how Brentano’s integrative use of descriptive philosophy (a precursor to phenomenology) and analysis can provide a suitable starting point for an equally successful integration of these methods in contemporary philosophy."
Rojszczack, Artur. 2005. From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski. Dordrecht: Springer.

Edited by Jan Wolenski.

Chapter 3. Descriptive psychology: the theory of judgement as the theory of cognition and knowledge: 1. Franz Brentano (I): The Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer 33-41;

Chapter 4. Judgment, psychology, and language: 1. Franz Brentano (II): Linguistic Analysis 57-65;

Chapter 6. Reism: 1. Franz Brentano (III): The Judger as the Truth Bearer 103-106;

Chapter 7. The objectivity of truth: 2. Franz Brentano (IV): Identity and Evidence 116-121.

"Artur left behind an English translation of his PhD dissertation. This work is the culmination of Artur’s thinking on topics already dealt with, both historically and systematically, in his earlier writings, and it reflects his philosophical interests in Austrian philosophy from Bolzano to the present day and in particular in the Polish wing of the Austrian tradition established by Kazimierz Twardowski. The present book is the first monograph in the literature of philosophy entirely devoted to the problem of truth-bearers. It focuses primarily on ontological, rather than on semantic and logical, problems, and perhaps its main virtue lies in its careful and detailed investigation of the issue of whether a physicalist conception of truth-bearers is possible." (From the Preface: In memoriam of Artur Rojszczack, by Barry Smith and Ja Wolesnki, p. XV)
Rojszczak, Artur, and Smith, Barry. 2003. "Theories of Judgment." In The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945, edited by Baldwin, Thomas, 157-173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"It was Franz Brentano who was responsible for the first major break with the combination theory of judgement through the doctrine of intentionality set forth in his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Brentano 1874/1924 [1973: 77–100, esp. 88–9]). Knowledge, for Brentano, is a matter of special types of judgement. The psychological description and classification of judgements in all their modes of occurrence is thus in his eyes a necessary precursor to the theory of knowledge as a branch of philosophy. First, however, it is necessary to find a firm foundation for the science of psychology itself, and this requires a coherent demarcation of the proper object of psychological research. For this we need some unique property which would distinguish mental from other types of phenomena. Hence Brentano’s much-mooted principle of the intentionality of the mental, which states that each and every mental process is of or about something.

Brentano distinguishes three basic types of mental or intentional phenomena: presenting, judging, and phenomena of love and hate. Each of these three types of mental phenomenon is determined by its own characteristic intentional relation or intentional directedness. A presentation is any act in which the subject is conscious of some content or object without taking up any position with regard to it. Such an act may be either intuitive or conceptual. That is, we can have an object before our mind either in sensory experience (and in variant forms thereof in imagination), or through concepts – for example when we think of

the concepts of colour or pain in general. Presentations may be either (relatively) simple or (relatively) complex, a distinction inspired by the British empiricists’ doctrine of simple and complex ideas. A simple presentation is for example that of a red sensum; a complex presentation that of an array of differently coloured squares (Brentano 1874/1924 [1973: 79f., 88f.])." (pp. 159-160)

References

Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Leipzig: Duncker and Humboldt. Trans. 1973 A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L. L. McAlister, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London: Routledge.
———. 2003. "Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth." In Philosophy and Logic in Search of the Polish Tradition: Essays in Honour of Jan Wolenski on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday, edited by Hintikka, Jaako, Czarnecki, Tadeusz, Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna, Placek, Tomasz and Rojszczak, Artur, 229-268. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski 's 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages' arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the century, formed part of the background of views that led to standard current accounts of the objectivity of truth! It thus lends support to speculations on the role of Brentano and his heirs in contemporary logical pbilosophy advanced by Jan Woleński in his masterpiece on the Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School of 1989."
Rollinger, Robin D. 1993. "Husserl and Brentano on Imagination." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 75:195-210.

Revised version with the title: Brentano and Husserl on Imagination in: R. D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 29-50.

"4. Conclusion

The differences between Husserl and Brentano on imagination may briefly be summarized as follows. While Brentano is willing to characterize the contents of perceptual presentations as more intense than those of phantasy presentations, Husserl has misgivings about this characterization. Even if the various distinctions which he makes in his theory of presentations are kept in mind, the ascription of more intense contents (sensations) to perceptual presentations inadequately differentiates such presentations from imagining. For however intense the contents of a presentation may be, this presentation cannot be an instance of perceiving, on Husserl’s view, unless a unique form of apprehension is present. Nor does it appear to him that the concept of intensity applies to all contents without difficulty. Moreover, Brentano’s claim that phantasy presentations are improper ones which merely approximate proper presentations is subject to further doubt from Husserl. As long as “proper presentations” is a term that refers to intuitive presentations, he regards both phantasy presentations and perceptual presentations as proper. Finally, while Brentano characterizes the presentation of temporally extended objects such as melodies and motions in terms of phantasy presentation and attributes a further impropriety (i.e. modification) to presentation of this kind, Husserl rejects such a characterization and adheres to the view that temporally objects can actually be perceived and that the “primary memory” involved in such perception in no way involves modification." (pp. 48-49)
———. 2004. "Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl." In Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 233-262.

"3. Brentano

The notion of judgment is already present early in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint [1874]. In his attempt to identify a criterion for distinguishing between physical phenomena (such as tones and colors) and psychical ones, the first suggestion he considers is that the latter are “presentations as well as those phenomena for which presentations are the foundations”.(1) “As we use the word ‘present’”, he elaborates, “‘being presented’ is the same appearing’“.(2) While physical phenomena certainly appear and are thus presented, they are certainly neither acts ofpresentations nor phenomena which have such acts as their foundation.

Judgments and certain other phenomena, however, are identified as phenomena founded on presentations. “Nothing can be judged, nor can anything be desired, hoped, or feared unless it is presented”.(3) The thesis that a judgment is based on a presentation remains a principle throughout Brentano theory of judgment." (p. 242 of the reprint)

1 Brentano (1874), p. 104.

2 Brentano (1874), p. 106.

3 Brentano (1874), p. 104.
———. 2004. "Brentano and Husserl." In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 255-276. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In the present chapter the relationship between Brentano and Husserl will be discussed as follows. Brentano’s philosophical orientation will be exposited only insofar as this was familiar to Husserl.

This is not to say that only Brentano’s views during the period from 1884 to 1886 will be taken into account here. Husserl was indeed an enthusiastic collector of notes from Brentano’s lectures. Moreover, Husserl took special interest in his mentor’s “psychognostic investigations,” as Brentano indicates in a letter to Husserl (circa May 1891).(4) Developments that occur in Brentano’s thought in the later 1890s and especially his reism of the last couple of decades of his life, however, fall outside Husserl’s sphere of familiarity." (p. 255)

(4) Husserl, Briefwechsel I, p. 6.
———. 2005. "Meinong and Brentano." Meinong Studies no. 1:159-197.

Revised version with the title "Brentano and Meinong" in R. D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2008, pp. 157-187

Summary: "Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe, began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though Meinong's philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called "assumptions". Thus he opposed Brentano's classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called "descriptive phenomenology"), which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science."
———. 2006. "Brentano's Logic and Marty's Early Philosophy of Language." Brentano Studien no. 12:77-98.
———. 2008. "Brentano’s Psychology and Logic and the Basis of Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations." The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication no. 4:1-23.

"1. Introduction

It is widely known that Kasimir Twardowski was a student of Franz Brentano. In view of the fact that Brentano generally had great impact through his lectures, especially during his Vienna period (1874-1895),(2) and consequently became one of the towering figures of Austrian philosophy,(3) it is a matter of no small interest to determine how he influenced Twardowski. There are, however, difficulties in examining the relationship of Twardowski to his teacher, as there are in the case of the relationships between Brentano and his students generally. The main obstacle to this endeavor lies in the fact that Brentano published very little during his lifetime. Moreover, what has been published posthumously is far from adequate in terms of both the quantity of texts and the quality of editing. For this reason it is highly desirable to discuss Brentano in relation to his students by drawing upon his hitherto unpublished manuscripts. This is the strategy that I will pursue in the following analysis of Brentano and Twardowski on the topic of presentations (Vorstellungen)." (p.1, some notes omitted)

(2) For a list of lecture courses that Brentano gave in Vienna, see Werle (1989), pp. 157-162.

(3) Brentano Y 4/13: “In Austria nothing had been accomplished in the domain of philosophy in earlier times. Things have become different in recent times. [In Österreich wurde in früherer Zeit auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie nichts geleistet. In neuerer Zeit ist das anders geworden]”.
———. 2012. "Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint: its Background and Conception." In Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology, edited by Tănăsescu, Ion, 261-309. Bucharest: Zeta Books.

"Scholarly and philosophical literature on Brentano is of course hampered by a restriction to published and often poorly edited materials. Here I shall attempt to provide the means for circumventing the danger just mentioned and thus for gaining an appreciation for the Psychology as it was originally planned in its entirety. This appreciation may, to be sure, be primarily philological in nature at this stage of Brentano scholarship. It can, however, be the basis for further explorations which may in the future be more properly philosophical. Before we philosophize with Brentano, we must trouble ourselves with what he actually wrote, especially what he wrote in unpublished manuscripts." (p. 263, a note omitted)

(...)

"Conclusion

Brentano’s Psychology was thus meant to be a work which was to meet both of Aristotle’s requirements for an inquiry into the soul. It was to be both exact and concerned with important and remarkable objects. The published part exhibits great exactness in the treatment of seemingly rather small issues, such as the unconscious consciousness, the classification of psychical phenomena, and the unity of consciousness. From this basis, however, Brentano had plans to proceed – in a strictly scientific fashion – to a treatment of a most important and remarkable issue, namely immortality. Along the way, the applications of psychology to the practical branches of philosophy, at least logic and ethics, were to receive attention. At the same time concepts from metaphysics were to come into play as well. His abandonment of this ambitious project was by no means motivated by a loss of his earlier convictions or a growing indifference to the issues (large or small) as conceived of in his original plan, but rather by a deeply felt need to revise his views concerning both the method as well as the subject matter of psychology.

If we understand “psychology from an empirical standpoint” as an ongoing project rather than merely the title of a work consisting of the published volume and even including the projected second one (in outline or in draft), this title may be taken as applicable to almost all of Brentano’s philosophical efforts from start to finish. While his conception of psychology underwent revision, he retained the conviction that psychology was the core of philosophy and therefore destined to prove the most interesting and most important truths. From a practical point of view, it is to give us the means for treating the good, the true, and the beautiful as the highest human goals. From a theoretical point of view, it encompasses within its range of topics: freedom, immortality, and even the existence of God. The truths about such matters were in essence to remain constant in spite of all revisions and reformulations. They are indeed the motivation that lies behind Brentano’s statement that psychology is the science of the future.(116) Until the unpublished materials pertaining to this statement are examined, Brentano’s significance in the history of psychology and philosophy cannot be properly assessed." (p.303-304)

(116) Brentano (1874), p. 32.
———. 2020. Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures: Analysis and Materials. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"The first part of the present volume is an analysis of Franz Brentano’s lectures on logic, primarily on the basis of the notes contained under the signature EL 80 (among his manuscripts as these are preserved in the Houghton Library at Harvard University). Brentano repeatedly used and revised these notes, at first in Würzburg (as early as 1870) and then in Vienna (probably as late as 1877 or later), though they were superceded by another, very different set of notes on logic (EL 72), some of which he used for the winter semester 1878/79, but with considerable revisions and additions for 1884/85 and for an (unannounced) continuation into the summer semester 1885. While EL 80 provides us with an alternative term-logic of his own making, the latter notes are much more remote from what we ordinarily call “logic” in either traditional or contemporary terminology. The former include such staples of logic as a treatment of both deductive and inductive inference. (Brentano’s views on induction and the closely related theory of probability are topics that would better receive treatment in a separate study and are accordingly not subjected to analysis in the present volume.)

The second part of the present volume includes a German edition and English translation of notes that Franz Hillebrand took from Brentano’s lectures on logic in 1884/85, though not from the summer semester 1885. I shall give further details regarding Hillebrand’s notes below. Belonging also to the second part of the present volume is an English translation of Hillebrand’s Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse, in which he elaborates on Brentano’s syllogistic logic in connection with the theory of judgment, as he also defends this logic against contemporaneous rivals regarding the same issues.

This short work by Hillebrand involves elaborations on some points that are not made focal in the first part of the present volume and vice-versa." (Preface, p. VII)
———. 2021. "Brentano and von Ehrenfels on Emotion, Desire, and Absolute Value: An Extreme Contrast in Austrian Phenomenology." In The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 312-327. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.

"Conclusion.

Thus we find in Austrian phenomenology a most outstanding contrast in ethics: Brentano’s view that desire and emotion belong to a single class, love and hate, which includes acts of consciousness which can be characterized as correct (or incorrect), and von Ehrenfels’ view that only emotions belong to the class designated by “love” and “hate”, which arise through dispositional desires, and that neither acts of this kind nor the desires that naturally go with them absolutely guarantee values. This is of course not the only important contrast among the Austrian phenomenologists with respect to value theory and ethics, for Alexius Meinong, Edmund Husserl, and Anton Marty also have something to say on this matter. However, all of these three ultimately shared in Brentano’s cognitivist position, whereas von Ehrenfels (at least in his great ethical work of the nineteenth century) does not. Moreover, they complicate the picture by objectifying value, whereas Brentano and von Ehrenfels stay on the psychological plane in their ethical inquiries. The extreme contrast that results from them is well worth noting, for extreme contrasts are often quite helpful as a starting point for investigations. Hopefully the one I have elaborated on here will provide a renewed starting point for further research on this extremely important topic." (pp. 325-326)
Runggaldier, Edmund. 1989. "On the Scholastic or Aristotelian roots of 'Intentionality' in Brentano." Topoi no. 8:97-103.

Abstract: "The early Brentano identifies intentionality with “intentional inexistence”, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of ‘being’ (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano."
Russo, Antonio. 2014. "Franz Brentano and Cornelio Fabro: A Forgotten Chapter of the Brentanian Reception." Axiomathes no. 24:157-165.

Abstract: "In celebration of the centenary of the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fabro’s birth (1911–1995), this paper investigates the essential theoretical traits that undergird the framework of Fabro’s 1941 texts, by comparing them with Franz Brentano’s (1838–1817) project of renewing Thomism through a new understanding of Aristotle. The secondary literature concerning the comparison of both these authors is almost nonexistent. Our goal is to clarify some of the central issues regarding the relation between Fabro and Brentano through direct textual analysis of unpublished letters exchanged between Fabro and Agostino Gemelli about Brentano and his pupil Carl Stumpf."
Rutte, Heiner. 1986. "On the Problem of Inner Perception." Topoi no. 6:19-23.

"The assumption that there are processes of 'inner perception' is something which comes quite naturally to the epistemologist: consciousness not only consists in intentional acts referring to or directed upon an object, it is not only consciousness of certain contents or objects, but it also consists in a consciousness of these acts themselves -- there is no consciousness which could be ignorant of its acts."

(...)

"In his 'Psychologic vom empirischen Standpunkt', Brentano provides us with a thorough discussion of the problem of this regress, coming to the unequivocal conclusion: there are no specific acts (= activities) of inner perception; rather, inner perception resembles a permanent accompanying phenomenon (Brentano here invokes Aristotle: "Das Wissen und die Empfindung und die Meinung und das Nachdenken scheinen immer auf etwas anderes zu gehen, auf sich selbst aber nebenbei"). (2) Inner perception is a secondary consciousness of something; hence, a primary consciousness of something always has to be presupposed. When somebody hears a sound, this sound will be a primary object for him, and he himself, as somebody hearing the sound, will be a secondary object for himself; that is, he perceives himself as hearing a sound. This does not mean for Brentano that we are dealing with two acts; rather, we are confronted with one act having two "things" for its object: the sound (as the primary object) and the act of hearing itself (as the secondary object).

These two aspects of the act cannot be separated, not even in thought: there can be no secondary consciousness without primary consciousness.(3)" (p. 19)

(2) Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Bd. I (ed. Oskar Kraus), Philosophische Bibliothek Band 192 (Hamburg 1973), p. 185.

(3) Cf. op. cit., p. 180.

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