Kupreeva, Inna. 2003. "Qualities and bodies: Alexander against the Stoics." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 25:297-344.

Abstract: "The goal of this paper is to examine the relation between the Stoic notion of quality and Aristotelian form on the basis of some discussions in Alexander of Aphrodisias, the leading Peripatetic of the late second century AD, who expended a considerable effort on criticism of the Stoic system, while recognizing a number of shared goals and principles."
———. 2004. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Mixture and Growth." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 27:297-334.

"The discussion of 1nixture and growth by Alexander of Aphrodisias presents_special interest in this respect, as he uses both topics in order to articulate the key concepts of Aristotelian metaphysics of hylomorphism, such as form and matter of individual substance identity, and continuity through change.

The goal of this paper is to study these concepts as presented by Alexander in his polemic against the Stoic theory of mixture and in his elaboration of Aristotle's analysis of growth. The first part of the paper has to do with mixture. I show that Alexander's criticism of the Stoic theory of total pervasion is based on his idea that ingredient qualities cannot be individuated in a mixture because in a mixed state they lose their specific identities on which their spatio-temporal continuity depends. The second part is devoted to Alexander's account of growth, which elaborates on the Aristotelian thesis of persistence of form by spelling out some ontological constraints on the concept of 'flowing matter' in the account of material continuants. Both discussions have a bearing on the concept of individual substance construed in terms of Aristotelian

hylomorphic theory, and show differences between treatments of the individual in the Stoic and Aristotelian systems." (pp. 297-298)
———. 2004. "Aristotelian dynamics in the 2nd century school debates: Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias on organic powers and movements " In Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries: Volume 1, edited by Adamson, Peter, Baltussen, Han and Stone, Martin William Francis, 71-95. London: London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.

"This paper has to do with the explanation of the nature of organic movements by Galen and Alexander. I shall avoid the controversial subject of direct contacts between the two men,(1) and focus instead on the analysis of some doctrinal parallels in their respective use of Aristotelian background. A particular question to be examined in each case is how the material constitution of living beings and operation of lower living functions is explained.

This question has been recognised as important at all periods of history of ancient philosophy and medicine." (p. 71)

(...)

"The paper falls into three parts. I begin by looking at the relation of the cocepts of organic and inorganic in the explanation of the mechanism of growth as founs in the Aristotelian corpus, and identifying some problems left unresolved by Aristotle that were taken up by later thinkers. In the second part, I review Galen's discussion of the nature of organic powers in On natural faculties, reconstructing some theoretical motives behind his use of Aristotle's theory of elements and mixture as a part of his physiological of doctrine. In the third part, I focus on Alexander's explanation of the mechanism of growth, and discuss the role of his version of the theory of elements in his expostion of the concepts of power and motion in Aristotle' s system of natural philosophy." (p. 72)

(1) For the state of the question, sources and bibliography, see Pines 1961; Marmura and Rescher 1965; Moraux 1973-2001, vol. 2, 362 and n. 6; Todd 1995; most recently Fazzo 2002 109-44.

References

Fazzo 2002 = Fazzo, S. 'Alexandre d'Aphrodise contre Galien: la naissance d'une légende', Philosophie Antique. Problèmes, Renaissances, Usages 2 (2002) 109-44.

Marmura and Rescher 1965 = Marmura, M. E. and Rescher, N. The Refutation by Alexander of Aphrodisias of Galen's Treatise of the Theory of Motion (Islamabad 1965).

Moraux 1973-2001 = Moraux, P. Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, 'Peripatoi' 5, 6, 7/1, 3 vols to date (Berlin 1973, 1984, 2001.

Pines 1961 = S. Pines, ' Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquod moveri: A refutation of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Theory of Motion', Isis 52 (1961) 21-54.

Todd 1995 = Todd, R. B. 'Peripatetic epistemology before Alexander of Aphrodisias: the case of Alexander of Damascus', Eranos 93 (1995) 122-28.
———. 2010. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Form: A Discussion of Marwan Rashed, Essentialisme." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 38:211-249.

"Marwan Rashed’s new book is the first monograph-length discussion of Aexander’s theory of form. The author is sensitive to the problem of sources. Taking his stand against Zeller’s view of Aexander as a line-by-line commentator without a sustained philosophical agenda of his own, he challenges the very assumption that the commentaries cannot be taken as evidence for Aexander’s original philosophical position. He claims that commentaries often provide more insight into this philosophy than the opuscula and school treatises, where the pressure of pedagogical and expository tasks occasionally leads to simplifications.

In his discussion of the central problem, Rashed makes use of relevant texts taken from all over the Alexandrian corpus, including commentaries and school treatises, authentic works and testimonia, in Greek and in Arabic. Many of these texts are little known and some only recently discovered. One particularly important discovery seems to be that of the Byzantine scholia in MS Paris. Suppl. Gr 643 which, Rashed argues, are excerpted from Alexander’s lost Physics commentary.(10) Rashed appends a number of new annotated translations into Fench, with many valuable textual and exegetical suggestions. However, the main goal of the book is not the study of the texts as such, but of Alexander’s tackling of the tension between the individual substance and substance-form in Aristotle’s metaphysics." (p. 214)

(10) An edition of the fragments is forthcoming as M. Rashed (ed., trans., comm.), Alexandre d’Aphrodise: Commentaire perdu à la ‘Physique’ d’Aristote (livres IV–VIII). Les Scholies byzantines (Berlin, 2010).
———. 2012. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aristotle's 'De anima': What's in a commentary?" Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies no. 55:109-129.

Abstract: "A study of testimonia for Alexander's lost commentary on Aristotle's De anima can shed new light on his interpretation of Aristotle. Two cases are discussed. (1) Alexander reads De anima 3.12 (434b3-8) as applying teleological explanation of soul's powers to the souls of heavenly bodies, which in his own treatise De anima he excludes from the scope of psychology.

Inclusive reading agrees with Alexander's position in other writings and must be his considered view. (2) Philoponus reports a Platonist (probably Numenius') exegesis of De anima 2.2 (413bl 1-13). Alexander's argument against it, with parallels in his other psychological writings, provides evidence that his controversial definition of soul as a power supervenient on elemental mixture is due, in part, to his polemic against Platonist readings of Aristotle's theory of soul and soul's powers."

"This paper is a report on work in progress which will hopefully lead to a collection of testimonia for Alexander's lost commentary on De anima. A reconstruction of this commentary was once contemplated by Paul Moraux, who printed a partial collection of fragments as an appendix to his dissertation based monograph on the intellect. (1) Later on, Moraux outlined some problems and prospects of a more comprehensive study, in an essay published as a section devoted to Alexander's De anima commentary in the posthumous volume III of Aristotelismus bei den Griechen devoted to Alexander, published by J. Wiesner and R. W. Sharples in 2001(2) I would like to address some preliminary questions concerning the scope and tasks of such a study, including, in particular, the questions of the sources available for the reconstruction of this commentary and of the potential interest of such a study for the understanding of Alexander's views on the soul. I shall begin with a brief survey of sources which should make it clear that there is room for both kinds of questions, and then discuss two samples of Alexander's argument in the commentary which hopefully will provide some moderately reassuring answers." (p. 109)

(1) P. Moraux, Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote (Liège; Paris 1942) 205-21.

2 According to J. Wiesner's introduction, the section on De anima dates back to the 1960s (P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias III: Alexander von Aphrodisias, ed. J. G. Wiesner (Berlin 2001) v).
———. 2016. "Aristotelianism in the Second Century AD: Before Alexander of Aphrodisias." In Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, edited by Falcon, Andrea, 138-159. Leiden: Brill.

"The second century AD sees a revival of Aristotelianism. Its culmination is the activity of Alexander of Aphrodisias whose monumental literary legacy provided later commentators with an authoritative school reading of Aristotle.

Presence of Aristotelian ideas is also perceived in the works of philosophers of other schools, such as Stoics, Platonists, and Epicureans, who debate with Peripatetics,(1) and outside school philosophy, in scientific and medical writings such as the works of Galen and Ptolemy, where we find both adaptation and criticism of various Aristotelian doctrines. Peripatetic philosophy is popular with the Roman elite.(2) Its ideas and characters make it to the jokes of urban wits.(3)" (p. 138)

(...)

"The most striking feature of this period, not documented before, is a thorough and detailed knowledge that all the Peripatetic philosophers have of the Aristotelian corpus. Most often dialectical engagement with problems or criticisms happens in the course of interpretation of an Aristotelian text or argument, and search for solution usually mobilizes the full theoretical arsenal of Aristotle’s logic and ontology, whether the problem under discussion belongs to physics, logic, or ethics, to use the Hellenistic classification. The prevalence of Aristotelian method and Aristotelian ontology in all these areas puts Hellenistic agenda in a new perspective.

This is the same approach that is documented much more fully in the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and it is possible to say that it has been formed during the second century AD." (p, 156)

(1) Stoics: Cleomedes, Lectures on Astronomy 1.1.81; Platonists: Atticus frr. 4, 5, 7 Des Places; Epicureans: Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 5 cols. 1.11–3.1.

(2) The people Galen describes as Peripatetics include, apart from Eudemus and Alexander of Damascus, who were teachers, also two consuls (at different times), Flavius Boethus and Severus, and the prefect of the city Sergius Paulus (see On Prognosis [De praecog.] XIV 605–613 and 624–630 K; My Own Books [Lib. Prop.] XIX 11–16 K; Anatomical Procedures [De anat. admin.] II 215–216 K).

(3) E.g. Lucian, Demonax 56.
———. 2018. "Aporia and Exegesis: Alexander of Aphrodisias." In The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Karamanolis, George and Politis, Vasilis, 228-247. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In this essay it is not my goal to discuss aporia as a genre in Alexander’s literary work. Instead I would like to probe into a somewhat different area, that of Alexander’s thinking about the aporia as a part of philosophical method. This is not an easy task, since despite the ubiquity of aporetic contexts in Alexander’s work, there is no single place where we can find the statement of his views on this subject. Is there a specific role for aporia in Aristotle’s scientific methodology, according to Alexander? I will present an answer in the affirmative and try to show, using several important texts, that for Alexander, aporia is a vehicle of dialectical method, and this method itself has an important formative and auxiliary role in sciences – helping to elucidate and clarify key concepts and arguments, respond to objections, and bring out conceptual problems. This approach informs Alexander’s exegesis of Aristotle’s aporiai in Metaphysics Beta. I begin in section one with a survey of Alexander’s Aristotelian background.

In section two, I present Alexander’s view on the methodological function of dialectic. In section three, I show how this function is fulfilled by an aporia in relation to first philosophy." (p, 228, a note omitted)
———. 2023. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Principle of Non-Contradiction: The Argument “from Signification”." In Ancient Greek Dialectic and Its Reception, edited by Mouzala, Melina G., 249-276. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"In this paper, I would like to provide an outline of Alexander’s reading of Aristotle’s argument which will allow us to see how his position stands in the light of contemporary discussions of Aristotle’s argument. After a very brief summary of the main points of Aristotle’s argument in Γ 4 in § 1, Ι discuss (in § 2) Alexander’s interpretation of elenctic demonstration (with special attention to his distinction between the elenchos proper and the more general argument from signification), and in § 3, I try to show that Alexander develops his own version of unrestricted essentialist interpretation of Aristotle’s argument which has some philosophical merits." (pp. 287-288)
Laks, André. 2018. "Destructible Worlds in an Aristotelian Scholion (Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Lost Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Frag. 539 Rashed)." Elenchos no. 39:403-420.

Abstract: "Does Anaxagoras admit that the world is destructible? Aëtius’ doxographical handbook says as much, and so does a doxographical scholion derived from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (Frag. 539 Rashed) according to the transmitted text. However, because of other difficulties occurring in the same scholion, Rashed was led to correct not only this text, thus making it contradict Aëtius’ testimony, but also the entry dedicated to Plato. My article suggests that while Rashed’s corrections are superfluous, the problems that triggered them are of great interest for the history of the doxographical tradition, for the way in which this tradition was used by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simplicius in their commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and, last but not least, for the understanding of the difficulties that ancient interpreters had to confront when they had to make sense of the lines now known as Anaxagoras B12 DK – difficulties that modern interpreters have still to confront."

References

Rashed, M. 2011. Alexandre d’Aphrodise, commentaire perdu à la Physique d’Aristote (livres IV-VIII): les scholies byzantines: édition, traduction et commentaire, Berlin/Boston, de Gruyter.
Lautner, Péter. 1996. "Ἀναζωγράφημα and related terms in Alexander of Aphrodisias' notion of Phantasia." Scripta Classica Israelica no. 14:33-41.

"Basing his theory of the soul on Aristotle’s theses, Alexander cannot pretend to be unfamiliar with the doctrine of the Stoics who offered a powerful alternative to the Aristotelian version. This holds true particularly of the concept of phantasia, since they made it central to the theory of knowledge, and so forced Alexander to elaborate a notion more detailed and, perhaps, more clear-cut than what we find in Aristotle.(1) No wonder that in doing so he incorporates much of the views of the rival school into his account. Apart from remarks scattered throughout the corpus, Alexander discusses this problem in a relatively long portion of his de Anima, where he follows the line of Aristotle’s de Anima III 3.(2) As my aim is to examine the role and meaning of some special terms, I am going to dwell mainly on this text, although, when necessary, relevant passages elsewhere will also be examined." (p. 33)

(1) Aristotle’s own account is notoriously complex. New Unitarian approaches have been proposed by G. Watson, “Phantasia in Aristotle de Anima III 3”, CQ n.s. 32, 1982, 100-113, and H.J. Horn, “Aristote, Traité de l’âme, III 3, et le concept aristotélicien de phantasia”, Les Etudes Philosophiques 2, 1988, 221-235. As my purpose is not to examine Aristotle’s concept, it is unnecessary to list even the main items of the vast literature.

(2) 66.9-Ί3Α3 Bruns, CAG Suppl. II,Γ A translation of Alexander’s de Anima has been offered in A. Fotinis, The de anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias. A translation and commentary, 1979. His own treatment of phantasia is to be found on pp. 262-274. For an evaluation of his work which I accept, see P. Donini, Le scuole, l’anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino, 1982, 247 n. 50. According to R.B. Todd, “Two displaced passages in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ de Anima",'Eranos 74, 1976, 28-31, 72.5-13 and 73.3-7 have been displaced from its original place in all our manuscripts of the whole treatise. But this fact, I believe, does not alter my point.
———. 2020. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate as a Problem in Epistemology and Moral Psychology." In Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, edited by Brouwer, René and Vimercati, Emmanuele, 152-172. Leiden: Brill.

"The logic and metaphysics behind Alexander’s notion of fate have been much discussed in the literature about ancient views on determinism. By contrast, the ethical and epistemological aspects have received considerably less attention.

In what follows I shall concentrate, first, on the way the various definitions of ἐφ’ἡμῖν, what is “up to us”, culminate in the account of character states involving knowledge, and then, second, on the inner conditions that make free action possible. It will involve a discussion of the appropriate cognitive and conative states alike. My aim is to give a unitarian explanation in the sense that I shall try to show that the accounts we find in the Mantissa and in On the Soul are by no means exclusive of one another. As a consequence, I shall have much less to say about the metaphysical conditions of fate and free action or about the logic behind them." (P. 152)
Long, Anthony A. 1970. "Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato I-XIV)." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 52:247-268.

"There is more similarity than difference between the views of ps,~Plutarch and Calcidius and those of the Stoics. On Alexander the Stoic influence is only a little less strong.

He too has been influenced by the Community of language and doctrine characteristic of the contemporary philosophical climate.

In such circumstances it is not surprising that his and other attacks on determinism are expressed in anonymous terms.

Are we then to conclude that Alexander is not attacking 'the Stoics' ? The answer must, I fear, be equivocal. He attacks 'those who say that all things are determined', and he does so by focussing attention on certain Stoic theses. But unless we assume, what is improbable, a more extreme form of Stoic determinism than that known to us s Chrysippus' doctrine, Alexander cannot be said to direct the Defato s a whole against Stoicism Many of the views he attacks will have been held by Stoics, but Alexander does not attempt a systematic presentation and critique of Stoic determinism." (p. 268 a note omitted)
———. 1975. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 190.26 ff." The Classical Quarterly no. 25:158-159.
Madigan, Arthur. 1987. "Alexander of Aphrodisias: the Book of Ethical Problems." In Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Teil II: Principat. Band 36.2: Philosophie, Platonismus [Forts.], Aristotelismus), edited by Haase, Wolfgang and Temporini, Hildegard, 1260-1279. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"The book of Alexander's ethical problems has been edited by I. Bruns.(1)

(...)

Given that the book has received comparatively little study, and given the aims of ANRW, it seems best to present an analytical acount of its contents, as an invitation to and an instrument of future research, which would include a study of Alexander's terminology and of the background (Peripatetic, Stoic, other) of each of the problems, and eventually yield a full commentary. While the book is far from being an epitome of Peripatetic doctrine in the manner of Arius Didymus, its treatments of virtue and of pleasure are fairly detailed, its treatments of responsibility and of the objects of choice somewhat less so. As widely separated texts treat of the same or allied themes, and as there is no need to suppose that the order found in our texts comes from Alexander, I will group the problems under these main headings." (pp. 1260-1261, two notes omitted)

(1) Supplementum Aristotelicum II 2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), 117-63.
———. 1994. "Alexander on Aristotle's species and genera as principles." In Aristotle in Late Antiquity, edited by Schrenk, Lawrence P., 76-91. Washington (D. C.): The Catholic University of America Press.

"It is commonly held, and correctly held, that the arguments of Metaphysics 3 are in large part dialectical,that is, that they proceed from premises that are plausible or agreed upon, but not known to be true. And it is notorious that the arguments of Metaphysics 3 come to contradictory conclusions. So one might say, Why look here for Alexander's views on the status of genera and species as principles? My answer is, I want to turn the difficulty into an opportunity. When Alexander handles dialectical material, he tries, at times, to sort out the wheat from the chaff, the sound from the unsound. He does not always limit himself to explaining the arguments on their own terms and within their dialectical assumptions.

On the contrary, he often gives signs of which assumptions he regards as merely dialectical, and which he regards as more than merely dialectical.

To observe Alexander's handling of these largely dialectical arguments will show us something about his philosophical gut instincts." (pp. 76-77)
Mansfeld, Jaap. 1988. "Diaphonia, the argument of Alexander De fato chs. 1-2." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 33:181-207.

"In the present paper, I wish to argue that the prologue [to De fato] consists of chs. 1-2 and that the exposition of the Aristotelian view only begins at ch. 3. Chs. 1-2 provide a continuous and coherent argument which serves to introduce and justify Alexander's undertaking as a whole. We should not confuse the exordium, containing the dedication of the monograph to the emperors which indeed does not go beyond ch. 14 (and is recalled in the final chapter, or epilogue), with the introduction in the proper sense of the word, which consists of both exordium and status quaestionis. (pp. 180-181)
———. 1989. "An echo of middle platonist theology in Alexander De fato, ch. 34." Vigilae Chrstianae no. 42:86-91.

"I assume that Alexander, a learned person and a subtle polemist, thoroughly familiar with the main philosophical issues and debate of his own time and had read the relevant literature.(12) In the passage from Fat. ch. 35 quoted above, he obviously exploits the Middle Platonist distinction between the via negationis and the via analogiae in his polemics against the (Stoic) determinists." (p. 89)

(12) For this familiarity with Neopyrrhonist methods see my paper Diaphonia: The Argument of Alexander De Fato Chs. 1-2, Phronesis 33 (1988), 182 ff.
McGinnis, Jon. 2006. "Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 51:140-161.

Abstract: "Aristotle's account of place in terms of an innermost limit of a containing body was to generate serious discussion and controvery among Aristotle's later commentators, especially when it was applied to the cosmos as a whole. The problem was that since there is nothing outside of the cosmos that could contain it, the cosmos apparently could not have a place according to Aristotle's definition; however, if the cosmos does not have a place, then it is not clear that it could move, but it was thought to move, namely, in its daily revolution, which was viewed as a kind of natural locomotion and so required the cosmos to have a place. The study briefly outlines Aristotle's account of place and then considers its fate, particularly with respect to the cosmos and its motion, at the hands of later commentators. To this end, it begins with Theophrastus' puzzles concerning Aristotle's account of place, and how later Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and others, attempted to address these problems in what can only be described as ad hoc ways. It then considers Philoponus' exploitation of these problems as a means to replace Aristotle's account of place with his own account of place understood in terms of extension. The study concludes with the Arabic Neoplatonizing Aristotelian Avicenna and his novel introduction of a new category of motion, namely, motion in the category of position. Briefly, Avicenna denies that the cosmos has a place, and so claims that it moves not with respect to place, but with respect to position."
Mikeš, Vladimír 2023. "De mixtione III–IV: the Stoics on Blending—Arguments, Proofs, Examples." In Studies on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Mixture and Growth, edited by Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz and de Haas, Frans A.J., 58-82. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "Chapters III–IV of De mixtione represent a new beginning of the treatise where the Stoics, the main target of Alexander’s critical assessment of preceding theories of blending, are presented in a more systematic manner than in the first chapters. Closer reading reveals that the context of the Stoic theory which Alexander is reporting is most probably the ontological query into the unity of the cosmos on its different levels in which the challenge is to distinguish blendings from other types of unified objects.

This can be done thanks to corresponding common notions, although these notions cannot stand for a firm and detailed grasp of the unified objects in question but are rather the means to make one acknowledge the existence of blending as a special kind of unity (between fusion and juxtaposition). The existence of this kind of unity is then supported by examples of analogical processes in which a result is achieved by the

mutual interaction of two bodies upon each other or their mutual help. The conclusion should be that the Stoics’ effort to present a special kind of unity was part of their general account of the unity of the world which however did not include a claim about the blending of the first principles (insofar as cosmic pneuma is not such a principle)."
Militello, Chiara. 2023. "The paschein and pathê of the Earth and Living Beings in Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Meteorologica 1.14)." Peitho. Examina Antiqua no. 24:185-200.

Abstract: "In his 2013 monograph on Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica [*], Malcolm Wilson has shown both that Aristotle conceived of meteorological phenomena as analogous to the bodily processes of animals, and that for the Stagirite the sublunar world should not be seen as a single body, but rather as composed of many different individuals. However, Wilson did not articulate the relationship between these two theories—that is, he did not answer the following question: how is it possible for the Earth to behave like an animal if it is not a single body? This paper argues that the answer to this question lies in the Aristotelian statement about the different paschein of the Earth and animals. In fact, in the chapter of Meteorology dedicated to climatic changes (1.14), Aristotle, after comparing such changes to the maturing and ageing of living organisms, states that ‘only, in the case of the bodies of plants and animals being affected does not occur in each part separately, but it is necessary for the being to mature and decay all at once, whereas in the case of the Earth this occurs in each part separately, due to cooling and warming’ (351a.28-31). In his commentary, Alexander of Aphrodisias reiterates that the difference between the changes of the Earth and those of living organisms concern the way in which these different subjects undergo affections (pathê). The concept of paschein/pathos is thus fundamental to understanding how Aristotle conceives of biological analogies, which play a key role in his meteorology: as the affections of maturing and corruption show, parallels with organic processes can be found in meteorological phenomena, but always at the level of the individual parts of the Earth. Although the sublunary world can be understood in organic terms, this world is not a ‘cosmic animal’, but rather a multiplicity of ‘regional animals’. To corroborate this thesis, this paper addresses several related questions, including: the mechanics of environmental changes according to Aristotle; the differences between the regions of the Earth; the lexicon used in Meteorology to refer to the transformations of the Earth; the personal notes that Alexander adds to Aristotle’s discussion. Finally, the first modern translation of the relevant section of Alexander’s commentary is also provided here."

[*] M. Wilson, Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica. A More Disorderly Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013.
Mittelmann, Jorge. 2013. "Neoplatonic Sailors and Peripatetic Ships: Aristotle, Alexander, and Philoponus." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 51:545-566.

"in order to harmonize the conflicting views that impair the Aristotelian definiens of the soul, at least two paths suggest themselves. the first is to recast the ὄργανον of the soul so as to “soften” its separation from its immaterial user. To such effect, a suitably redefined notion of ὀρανικόν may prove useful. the second way is toendorse the instrumental characterization of the body, but understanding the soul in such a way that it can do duty as “first actuality,” despite being separated from its instrument. the first line of argument was supported by Alexander of Aphrodisias, who sought to release the adjective ‘ὀργανικόν’ from the dualist overtones it usually evokes. even today the Alexandrian reinterpretation is held to be the most natural reading of that qualification in the definiens.(12) the second line, which focuses on the ontology of the user rather than that of the instrument, flourished in Neoplatonic quarters. Although Philoponus willingly accepted the lexical innovation introduced by Alexander,(13) his efforts (as well as those of the Ps. Simplicius) were aimed at reinterpreting the Aristotelian notion of “first actuality” (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη), that constitutes the other pole of the definiens. Within the Neoplatonic conceptual framework, Philoponus was able to show that in spite of its separation and ontological subsistence, the soul behaves as the true entelechy of the ship, steering it all along its journey. in the following pages, our goal will be confined to reconstructing the chief features of both exegetical proposals, in order to assess their strengths and weaknesses." (p. 548)

(12) 12 Bos (“Psychology”) has rightly stressed the “Alexandrian” tenor of this dominant interpretation.

(13) In De An. 217.12–15.

References

Bos, Abraham P. “Aristotle’s Psychology: the traditional (Hylomorphistic) interpretation refuted.” Accessed June 12, 2013. http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciBos.htm. [“Psychology”]
Modrak, Deborah. 1993. "Alexander on Phantasia: A Hopeless Muddle or a Better Account." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 31:173-194.

"Alexander is in an excellent posit.ion to give a rich and compelling account of phantasia (φᾰντᾰσῐ́ᾱ). As the leading exponent of Peripatetic philosophy in the second century, he is heir to Aristotle's perceptive insights and systematic analysis of psychological phenomena. Aristotle makes phantasia the faculty for sensory representation, which is requjred for memory and other higher cognitive processes. In the Hellenistic era, the moderate empiricism of the Peripatetics was eclipsed by the empiricist epistemologies developed by the Epicureans and the Stoics; their theories were more radical, clearer, and arguably more defensible. As the immediate stamp of experience upon the senses and intellect, phantasia assumed a critical importance in their attempts to define knowledge and to defend their epistemological positions against sceptical attacks. There is abundant evidence in Alexander's writings that he is sensitive to these debates. His lengthiest treatment of phantasia explores both the psychological and epistemological dimensions.

This analysis, found in the de Anima, is detailed and largely satisfactory. All would be well were this the only discussion of phantasia in the extant corpus. But it is not, and what emerges from an examination of Alexander's various treatments of this subject is a chameleon concept that seems to change with each new context." (p. 173, notes omitted)
Mouzala, Melina. 2022. "Proclus on the Forms as Paradigms in Plato’s Parmenides. The Neoplatonic Response to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Criticisms." Journal of Ancient Philosophy no. 16:115-163.

Abstract: "This paper sets out to analyze Proclus’ exegesis of Socrates’ suggestion in Parmenides 132d1-3 that Forms stand fixed as patterns (παραδείγματα), as it were, in the nature, with the other things being images and likenesses of them. Proclus’ analysis of the notion of being pattern reveals the impact of the Aristotelian conception of the form as paradigm on his views, as we can infer from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Simplicius’ explanation of the paradigmatic character of the Aristotelian form. Whereas Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias refute the efficient causality of the Platonic Forms and support that μέθεξις is just a metaphor, Syrianus, Proclus and Asclepius defend the Platonic theory, and specifically Proclus, who brings to the fore the multilateral role of the Forms as patterns with regard to the secondary things of this realm."(1)

(1) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Symposium Platonicum XII: Plato’s Parmenides, organized by the International Plato Society, Paris, 15-19 July 2019.
Mueller, Ian. 2016. "Aristotle’s doctrine of abstraction in the commentators." In Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, edited by Sorabji, Richard, 501-520. New York: Bloomsbury.

Second revised edition. First edition London: Duckworth 1990, pp. 463-480.

"Summary.

In this paper I have argued for the following account of the treatment of abstractionism in later antiquity:

(1) Alexander established abstractionism as an interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics. Alexander’s account was accepted, with insignificant variations, as an interpretation by all subsequent philosophers.

(2) The doctrine of abstractionism was accepted as a true account of ordinary mathematics by Porphyry, Ammonius, and Philoponus, who saw ordinary mathematics as a Platonic bridge from the sensible to the intelligible world.

(3) Iamblichus put forward the doctrine of projectionism as an account of Pythagorean mathematics, which he glorified at the expense of ordinary mathematics; he was followed by Syrianus, but Proclus transformed projectionism into an account of ordinary mathematics to which he restored its Platonic role.

(4) Simplicius accepted the ‘Porphyrean’ position on ordinary mathematics, but elevated Pythagorean mathematics, of which he thinks projectionism provides the correct account, to the level of philosophy." (pp. 519-520, a note omitted)
Natali, Carlo. 2020. "Determinism and Deliberation in Alexander of Aphrodisias." In Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age, edited by Brouwer, René and Vimercati, Emmanuele, 137-151. Leiden: Brill.

"In this paper I defend a minority position in contemporary scholarship on Alexander of Aphrodisias with regard to the theme of determinism and his theory of what is up to us. Many modern scholars agree about the following basic points. The first point is that Aristotle did not develop a specific stance on the problem of determinism, given the fact that at the time this problem was not considered a central theme in the philosophical debate. Second, Alexander’s position on indeterminism was influenced by the debate in the imperial period and was not merely a precise account of what Aristotle had maintained.

In the third place, indeterminism is a slightly embarrassing position to hold; therefore, it is better to liberate the ancient philosophers from it, as far as possible.

What is more, a strong tendency can be discerned to attribute some form of compatibilism to most of the ancient philosophical schools – which cannot be easily reconciled with the polemics that existed between the schools.

As for me, I think that already in Plato’s Academy philosophers began to reflect upon the problem of determinism, freedom and human responsibility, starting out from certain statements in Plato’s Republic and in book 10 of the Laws.(1) As far as Alexander is concerned, I think that his position can be characterised as a kind of “creative orthodoxy”, which consists in trying to show the vitality of the Aristotelian viewpoint in the debate in imperial times. In order to make this clear, I will concentrate on the problem of deliberation and the Peripatetic notion of causality, particularly in relation to chapters 11–15 in Alexander’s On Fate." (p. 137)

(1) See further Natali 2014. [“Aristotele e il determinismo.” In: Libero arbitrio. Storia di una controversia filosofica, edited by Mario De Caro, Massimo Mori, and Emidio Spinelli, 39–57. Rome: Carocci.]
Nortmann, Ulrich. 2000. "Deduction by « metalēpsis »: a critical examination of Alexander's understanding of a proof method of Aristotle's." In Beiträge zum Satz vom Widerspruch und zur Aristotelischen Prädikationstheorie, edited by Niels, Offenbergerm and Skarica, Mirko. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Opsomer, Jan, and Sharples, Robert W. 2000. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, "De Intellectu" 110.4: 'I Heard This from Aristotle'. A Modest Proposal." The Classical Quarterly no. 50:252-256.
Pack, Roger. 1937. "A passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias relating to the theory of tragedy." American Journal of Philology no. 58:418-436.

"In his treatise On Destiny Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most illustrious of the Aristotelian commentators,(1) has left us an interpretation of the tragedy of Laius, the father of Oedipus.(2) I shall try to evaluate this neglected passage(3) for the theory of tragedy by considering, first, its place in the treatise as a whole, secondly, its broad relation to the philosophy of Aristotle, and thirdly, its interest for the criticism of the Poetics."

(1) See Gercke in Pauly-Wissowa, RE, I, 1453-5. For a bibliography ofAlexander to 1926, see Ueberweg-Praechter, Die Philosophie des Altertums (1926), p. 179 of the "Verzeichnis der Arbeiten."

(2) De Fato, 31. This work is cited according to sections, the other minor works of Alexander according to page and line in the edition of Ivo Bruns (Vol. II, parts I and II of the Supplementum Aristotelicum). There is a separate edition of the De Fato, with a translation, by Augustine FitzGerald (London, The Scholartis Press, 1931).

(3) It is not discussed in Robert's Oidipus or elsewhere so far as I know.
Pfeiffer, Christian. 2023. "De mixtione VII–VIII: on the Possibility of a Stoic Blend." In Studies on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Mixture and Growth, edited by Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz and de Haas, Frans A.J., 100-121. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "The paper discusses chapters VII–VIII of De mixtione, where Alexander argues against the possibility of a Stoic blend. I will show that Alexander offers good reasons in chapter VII to think that the Stoics were committed to co-extension and the preservation of surfaces in a mixture and that these constraints are indeed incompatible.

I will argue further that chapter VIII continues the argument of chapter VII by offering a response on behalf of the Stoics and that the two chapters are a unity. Building on my argument that Alexander’s criticism is neither polemical nor confused, I argue that chapters VII–VIII, although employing a different terminology than chapters III–IV, provide an accurate picture of the Stoic theory and that Alexander’s criticism is very

much to the point."
Pines, Shlomo. 1961. "Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquo moveri: A Refutation of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Theory of Motion." Isis no. 51:21-54.

"IN 1952 Professor Franz Rosenthal discovered in the course of a sojourn instanbul that the MS. 127-9 of the Carullah Collection in the Millet Library was a collection of philosophical texts, most of which he obtained on micro-film. He described these texts in an article which appeared in the Journal of the American Oriental Society (1955, 75: 14-23) under the title "From Arabic books and manuscripts, V: a one-volume library of Arabic philosophical and scientific texts in Istanbul.". As Rosenthal observes, the scribe was named Muhammad b. Hasan b. 'All b. Mu'taql al-Nihmi, was born and brought up and probably also resided in Sa'dah in the Yemen and copied out most of thetexts in 1477-1478, but made additions to the manuscript at least up to 1480. Though the name and the pedigree of the scribe are purely Arabic, the fact that some of the texts included in the manuscript are of Jewish provenience suggests, Rosenthal points out, that he may have been of Jewish origin, a circumstance which he may have tried to conceal. He certainly knew the Hebrew script. Certain of the texts found in the manuscript purport to be translations of treatises composed by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Some of these were unknown up to now either in Greek or in Arabic. I intend to study this group of writings. The first part of this article deals with Galen's critique of the Aristotelian thesis "omne quod movetur necesse est ab alique moveri." The second part discusses some relevant opinions of certain commentators and philosophers. I should like to express my gratitude to Professor Rosenthal for having put at my disposal his microfilms of these and other texts contained in the manuscript." (p. 21, two notes omitted)
Ramelli, Ilaria. 2014. "Alexander of Aphrodisias: a source of Origen’s philosophy?" Philosophie Antique:237-289.

Reprinted in I. Ramelli, Origen, the Philosophical Theologian: Trinity, Christology, and Philosophy-Theology Relation. Selected Studies/Kleine Schriften, Berlin: de Gruyter 2025, pp. 237-284.

Summary: "Alexander of Aphrodisias and Origen are two semi-contemporary philosophers and teachers of philosophy who composed the same kinds of works. Origen was a Christian philosopher, a disciple of Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus’ teacher. It is

very probable that Origen knew Alexander of Aphrodisias’ works, which were read at the school of Plotinus, and drew inspiration from them. Many clues support my hypothesis.

For instance, Origen’s Περὶ ᾽Ἀρχῶν in its structure was probably inspired by Alexander’s homonymous work. The expression ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, very interestingly, was used for the first time exactly by Alexander and Origen; the latter very probably imported it from the philosophical debate on the eternity of the world into Christian Trinitarian theology. The notion of hypostasis as «individual substance», which becomes technical in Origen and will exert an enormous influence on Christian Trinitarian theology, was present in Middle Platonists and medical theorists of the early imperial age who are very likely to have inspired Origen, and possibly also in Alexander.

Also, Origen seems to have modified the Stoic doctrine of mixture in a way that comes closer to Alexander and his criticism of that doctrine. The concepts of ὕλη/ὑποκείμενον and εἶδος in Origen are clearly influenced by Aristotle and probably by Alexander too. Both the presentation and the refutation of Stoic determinism are very similar in Alexander and Origen. The doctrine of God as Intellect and the whole characterisation of God in Alexander is remarkably similar to that which is found in Origen and is almost sure to have exerted some influence on him. The doctrine of the soul and its existence in a body and the doctrine of the Ideas also reveal impressive parallels in our two philosophers. The contribution of the present research to (hopefully) advancing scholarship also helps to cast light on Origen’s relation to Greek philosophy, which is the object of critical debate."
———. 2021. "Bardaisan of Edessa on Free Will, Fate, and Nature: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Origen, and Diodore of Tarsus." In Women’s Perspectives on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, edited by Chouinard, Isabelle, McConaughey, Zoe, Medeiros Ramos, Aline and Noël, Roxane, 169-176. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "Against the backdrop of the relations between Alexander of Aphrodisias and Bardaisan and Origen, and of Diodore of Tarsus’ reading of Bardaisan, this article reflects on Bardaisan’s ideas towards free will, fate, and nature in the so-called Book of the Laws of Countries, based on Bardaisan’s Against Fate. With reference to the article by Izabela Jurasz on the comparison between Alexander and Bardaisan, I present the main topics that scholarship debates regarding Bardaisan and argue that Eusebius had already found important parallels between Alexander, Barsaisan, and Origen. Attention is paid to the strong affinities on crucial questions (including free will and eschatology) between Bardaisan and Origen, as established by recent research. These two comparisons—between Alexander and Bardaisan and between Origen and Bardaisan—reinforce one another. Bardaisan’s knowledge of parts of Philo’s oeuvre is also brought to the fore as an issue recently explored and in need of further investigation. Lastly, the article focuses on Diodore of Tarsus’ Against Fate, its indebtedness to Bardaisan’s Against Fate and generally his anti-astrological, anti-fatalistic arguments (indebtedness represented by arguments and rather unequivocal details), and its reproach to Bardaisan for maintaining the category of “fate,” albeit Christianized."
Rashed, Marwan. 1997. "A « new » text of Alexander on the soul's motion." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement no. 68:181-195.

"To conclude, then, the historical evolution of the polemics may be summarised as follows:

1. 'Aristotelian' claim of the intellect from without;

2. Atticus attacks the intellect from without because of its inability to move;

3. Aristoteles of Mytilene (as reported by Alexander in C1 [in Sharples]) defends the intellect from without by claiming its ubiquity;

4. Alexander (C2) criticises Aristoteles' solution to Atticus' criticisms and gives an alternative reply to Atticus by accounting for separation in terms of thought processes;

5. Alexander (In Phys.) attacks Atticus' vehicle-theory on the grounds that it does not resolve the question at all and alludes indirectly to his previous solution.

Thus, we may conclude that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander, but an earlier one than the commentary on the Physics." (pp.1 94-195)

Referencesù

R. W. Sharples' survey in 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation', ANRW II, 36,1 (Berlin 1987) 1176-1243, p. 1211ff.
———. 2010. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Particulars and the Stoic Criterion of Identity." In Particulars in Greek Philosophy: The seventh S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Sharples, Robert, 157-179. Leiden: Brill.

Reprinted in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators, New York: Bloosbury 2016, pp. 161-177.

"One could claim that for an Aristotelian philosopher, particulars are not a philosophical problem – at least not an epistemological one. For an Aristotelian philosopher daily confronted with Stoic theories of Providence and individuation, however, this was a haunting question. After all, what did Aristotle have to say on the status of the particulars not qua belonging to a species, but qua pure singularities taking place

within the world? I would like to show that even if Alexander is too much of an Aristotelian to have a real theory of the particular, his reaction to his historical context leads him to new insights on this topic. These insights, in turn, constitute a starting point out of which Avicenna and Leibniz developed their ideas about how fatalism could be avoided without giving up the principle that the entire effect corresponds to its full cause. I will try to sketch, in the following pages, the main phases of this long and intricate story." (p. 157)
Rist, John M. 1966. "On Tracking Alexander of Aphrodisias." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 48:82-90.

"We are then back to Alexander, and what we have seen in this study, when combined with such analyses äs that of Schwyzer in his article on Plotinus in Pauly [RE 21 (1951) cols. 573-574], must lead to the conclusion that Plotinus' attitude to Alexander is much like his attitude to most other writers.

Not only does he not follow him closely, but even where he is criticizing certain theories which occur in Alexander he only rarely refers cleärly enough to the original text to make it certain that he is in fact using

that particular text at all. Plotinus' interest throughout the Enneads is almost always constructive. He is not greatly interested in the detailed refutation of the specific theories of particular opponents. He

undertakes such refutations, äs with the Aristotelian and Stoic categories in 6.1, to clear the ground. In such examinations — and this applies perhaps particularly to his treatment of the Stoic views of the soul in the fourth Ennead — he is often not concerned to destroy a particular view but a particular kind of view." (p. 89)
Robert, Aurélien. 2020. "John of Jandun on Sense Perception and Instantaneous Change." In Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception: Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism, edited by Bennett, David and Tohivanen, Juhana, 193-212. Cham [Switzeland): Springer.

Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to show that John of Jandun, a French philosopher active in the first decades of the fourteenth century, defended an interesting interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of sense perception. His view on this topic could help us clarify some aspects of the contemporary debate among specialists of the Aristotelian tradition about the dependence of sense perception on physical changes in the medium and the organs. John of Jandun made use, much more than his contemporaries, of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the De sensu, and Averroes’ commentaries on the De anima and the Physics. But his solution seems nonetheless original. This paper will focus on the nature of the changes involved in sense perception. I will try to show (1) that for Jandun sense perception is a kind of relational and qualitative change in the soul, which is not a mere Cambridge change; and (2) that for him sense perception is an activity of the soul, which is not reducible to the reception of a form in the organs."
Roreitner, Robert. 2023. "Nous thurathen: between Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias." British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-22.

Abstract: "The idea that nous comes from without, deriving from Aristotle’s Generation of Animals II.3, became a key element in late ancient and Medieval accounts of human rationality drawing on Aristotle’s De Anima. But two very different understandings of the concept were around (often occurring next to each other): either it was taken to refer to the human capacity for thought and its origin outside the natural ontogenetic process; or it was taken to stand for the most perfect act of thought, existing separately as the supreme divinity, and becoming, hopefully, ours at the very climax of human development. This paper shows how these two influential conceptions derive from the work of the two greatest scholars of Aristotle’s school, Theophrastus and Alexander of

Aphrodisias, respectively. More to the point: it shows that (i) there is an intriguing philosophical story to be told of how the notion developed from one understanding to the other, this being the core of a larger story of nous from without in Western thought; and that (ii) this story sheds new light on what was at stake in the early – genuinely Peripatetic – reception of Aristotle’s account of nous (as contrasted with later, heavily Platonized, interpretations)."

Correction: "When the above article was first published online the Commentary on Generation of Animals traditionally attributed to Philoponus was mentioned among Philoponus’ genuine works. That mention has now been removed to reflect scholarly consensus that the work was in fact written by Michael of Ephesus."
———. 2025. "Thought 'From Without' The Role of the Agent Intellect in Alexander's 'De intellectu'." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 64:1-81.

Preprint to be published in January 2025.

"Interpreters used to understand Alexander’s account along the traditional compatibilist (abstractionist) lines. But since the pioneering doctoral dissertation of Paul Moraux on Alexander’s noetic, the attention of scholars has been captured by Alexander’s circumspection in describing the role of the agent intellect in his De Anima. He analyzes here the development of the ‘potential’ or ‘material’ intellect from the state of a pure potentiality to the acquisition of universal concepts, and apparently also of scientific definitions, without any reference to the agent intellect whatsoever (80. 16–86. 6). Such a reference is only made much later at 88. 24–89. 11, where Alexander, in contrast to compatibilist interpreters, seems to ascribe only an indirect role to the agent intellect." (p. 3, a note omitted)

References

Moraux, P., Alexandre d’Aphrodise: exégète de la noétique d’Aristote (Liège, 1942).
Ross, Alberto. 2016. "Causality, Nature and Fate in Alexander of Aphrodisias." Acta Philosophica no. 25:319-332.

"The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between “causality”, “nature”, and “fate” in the De Fato of Alexander of Aphrodisias. The Greek commentator follows the Aristotelian doctrine on this matter, but it is worth noting that Alexander diverges from the letter of the master on more than one occasion. It is well known that the most important Aristotelian commentators in late Antiquity offer us a detailed reconstruction of the Aristotelian arguments, but also the development of new positions in the framework of very different traditions. The works of Alexander of Aphrodisias in general and his book De fato (“On Fate”) in particular are one of the best examples of this practice." (p. 319)
Rossi, Pietro B., Di Giovanni, Matteo, and Robiglio, Andrea A., eds. 2021. Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Turnhout: Brepols.

Contents: Pietro B. Rossi – Matteo Di Giovanni – Andrea A. Robiglio Foreword 9; Lucio Bertelli 11: Paolo Accattino lettore della Politica di Aristotele; Pier Luigi Donini: Paolo Accattino interprete del De intellectu di Alessandro di Afrodisia 23; Amos Bertolacci: “The Excellent among the Earlier Scholars”. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Avicenna’s Metaphysics 33; Matteo Di Giovanni: New Wine in Old Vessels. Alexander of Aphrodisias as a Source for Averroes’ Metaphysics 59; Joël Biard: L’Alexandrisme comme rationalité philosophique 77; Amos Corbini: “Alexander of Aphrodisias” in the Medieval Latin Tradition of the Posterior Analytics. Some Remarks 95; Elisa Rubino: Alberto il Grande e il commento ai Meteorologica di Alessandro di Afrodisia 109; Luigi Silvano: (Pseudo-)Alexander of Aphrodisias between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Notes on the Afterlife of the Medical Puzzles and Natural Problems 117; Barbara Bartocci: Topics and Syllogistic. Agostino Nifo Reading Alexander of Aphrodisias 145; Pietro Daniel Omodeo: Presence/Absence of Alexander of Aphrodisias in Renaissance Cosmo-Psychology 173; Francesca Iurlaro: Hugo Grotius’ Translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De fato in His Philosophorum sententiae de Fato (1648) 193; Abstracts 211; Indices 215-223.
Salis, Rita. 2018. "The accident and its causes: pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle, Metaphysics Ε 3." In Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, edited by Boudouris, Kostantinos, 297-302. Charlottesville: Philoosphy Documentation Center.

Abstract: "Pseudo-Alexander’s commentary in Metaphysics Ε3 is one of the three ancient commentaries which came down to us together with Ascepius’s commentary and Pseudo-Philoponus’s one, in Latin. Pseudo-Alexander’s work, in particular, constitutes the source of interpretation of the Aristotelian text for many modern scholars. In chapter 3 Aristotle shows that there are causes of accidental being, which are generable and destructible without ever being in course of being generated or destroyed. This problem is one of the most difficult and controversial for Aristotle. The thesis is explained by Aristotle with examples concerning past and future events. Pseudo-Alexander considers them as referring to accidental causes. The exegete’s explanation of both cases introduces some elements which are totally extraneous to the Aristotelian text, but nevertheless it could be helpful to cast some light on the understanding of the most controversial passages. In the final passage, Aristotle raises the question of what kind of cause the accident leads to, whether to the material or to the final or to the efficient cause. It is apparently left without an answer. Pseudo-Alexander gives a plausible solution, which is nonetheless probably only partial. The chapter was also examined with reference to the problem of determinism in Aristotle."
———. 2024. "The identification of wisdom with the science of being as being. Unity and universality of Aristotle’s Metaphysics according to Alexander of Aphrodisias." Acta Philosophica no. 33:11-30.

Abstract: "The entire ancient and late antique commentary tradition tends to read Aristotle’s Metaphysics as a unitary work. According to this reading, one and the same science is developed, culminating in book Λ, containing the famous doctrine of the unmoved mover. The systematic intent of the reading of the Metaphysics, which extends to the entire corpus aristotelicum, begins with Aristotle’s greatest ancient commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Through an analysis of key passages in Alexander’s commentary on books Α and Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, this paper aims to show that the thesis according to which the exegete considered wisdom and science of being as being to be independent is not in fact borne out in Alexander’s texts. The connection between the books Α and Γ is shown by Alexander through the identification of wisdom with the science of being as being. This, in turn, constitutes the fundamental step for the demonstration of the existence of the science of being as being, which, according to Alexander, is initially only assumed by Aristotle."
Salles, Ricardo. 1998. "Categorical possibility and incompatibilism in Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of responsibility." Méthexis no. 11:65-83.

"Alexander of Aphrodisias' animosity against Stoic philosophy is well attested in his extant writings. One of his preferred targets is Stoic compatibilism - thesis that there are things which "depend on us", and for which we are morally responsible, despite the fact that everything that happens has a necessitating cause, or set of causes. In recent times, it has been argued that many of Alexander's objections are unfounded inasmuch as they stem from a misunderstanding and distortion of the Stoic position2 This thesis has been sometimes complemented with the further claim that the disagreement between the two parties is less substantial than is contended by Alexander. This deflationary interpretation is defended by Dorothea Frede in an important article published in 1982."

(...)

(3) "The Dramatization of Determinism: Alexander of Aphrodisias' de fato'' Phronesis (1982), 276-98.
Santi, Raffaella. 2020. "Plato Revealed: Alexander of Aphrodisias and His Philosophical Historiography." Philosophy Study no. 10:177-186.

Abstract: "Alexander of Aphrodisias’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is an important testimony to understand Plato’s philosophy. In fact, Alexander uses some lost Aristotelian books, especially a work On the Good, from which we learn that Plato’s metaphysics is a dialectical metaphysics, founded on an original opposition of two principles that shapes the whole reality—these principles being the One and the indefinite Dyad. Sensible things participate in ideas (they receive their being from ideas) and the intermediate mathematical entities lie between these two realities. However, ideas can be traced back to ideal numbers and the principles of ideal numbers are the One and the indefinite Dyad. Thus, these principles constitute their metaphysical foundation of ideas and, through the ideas, of the whole reality."
Schroeder, Frederic. 1981. "The Analogy of the Active Intellect to Light in the "De Anima" of Alexander of Aphrodisias." Hermes no. 109:215-225.

"The Active Intellect by the fact of being supremely intelligible is cause of being and intelligibility to other intelligibles and is thus indirectly the cause of human intellection. At the same time the second order of intelligibles make their own contribution toward intelligibility (and toward intellection) when they are abstracted by the human mind from their material substrate and brought into that relation with the Active Intellect which will allow intellectual illumination to take place. The human mind progresses through a natural evolution to the abstraction of form from matter. In this moment of illumination, the natural and metaphysical orders meet in the philosophy of Alexander." (p. 225, a note omitted)
———. 1982. "The potential or material intellect and the authorship of the De Intellectu: A reply to B.C. Bazán." Symbolae Osloenses no. 57:115-125.
———. 1984. "Light and the active intellect in Alexander and Plotinus." Hermes no. 112:2539-248.

"Plotinus indeed takes issue with Alexander's explanation of sensible light in stressing the unique role of the source and the effect of its withdrawal. The inspiration of this critique of Alexander's theory of sensible light may lie elsewhere. For Plotinus metaphysical illumination is an effect uniquely of the source. His orientation toward the other world may be more firm. In 4,5 [29],- 7, the chapter concerning sensible light which we discuss above, Plotinus illustrates his point that light is an effect of the source alone. He observes (lines 49- 51): "So it is in the case of the soul, considered as the act of a prior soul, that as long as the prior soul abides, so does the subsequent act. It may seem extraordinary that he would illustrate the nature of sensible light with such an example, as if the intelligible world were somehow more familiar. It is the same Plotinus, however, who says of sensible fire (1,6 [1],3,26) that "it shines and glitters as if it was a form''(36)." (p. 248)

(36) Tr. A. H. Armtrong, Plotinus, London and Cambridge, Mass. 1966, vol. 1, 241.(...)
———. 1997. "The provenance of the « De intellectu » attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 8:105-120.
Schroeder, Frederic, and Todd, Robert B. 2008. "The De Intellectu Revisited." Laval théologique et philosophique no. 64:663-680.

Abstract: "The author of the De Intellectu is acquainted with the De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias and offers a Neoplatonic interpretation of that document in its consideration of the noetic doctrine at Aristotle, De Anima 3.5. That interpretation reveals that philosophical independence from a purely philological examination of Aristotelian texts which the present volume is exploring. The De Intellectu, because of its Neoplatonic character, is to be dated some two to four centuries after Alexander. There is no reference to an Aristotle of Mytilene, teacher of Alexander, as has been supposed."

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