Flannery, Kevin. 2003. "Logic and Ontology in Alexander of Aphrodisias Commentary on Metaphysics IV." In Alessandro di Afrodisia e la 'Metaflsica' di Aristotele', edited by Movia, Giancarlo, 117-134. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

"What, therefore, can we say after this fairly detailed analysis of some passages in Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics? Three things. I affirm the first two with some confidence; the third is an hypothesis. I believe that I have demonstrated that, when he wrote in Metaph., Alexander was under the influence of a certain model of the proper method of doing philosophy, including first philosophy - that is, he was much attached to the demonstrative method found in the Posterior Analytics. On account of this attachment, he had an antipathy for going below the logical and linguistic level of analysis, to the level of signification. I believe that I have also demonstrated that, being so inclined, Alexander in in Metaph. also occasionally forces the reading a text. Often he offers us a series of possible interpretations of a text, thereby giving the appearance of objectivity; but, in fact, as we have seen in one such passage, even while doing so, he is capable of succumbing to this most common of academic temptations.

This brings me to the hypothesis. Of course, we cannot assume that mature scholars are never tempted to force a text, but there are also other factors that suggest that in Metaph. (or, at least, in Metaph. IV) is less mature than some other works of Alexander’s. We have seen that, in in APr., Alexander seems to adopt a more balanced approach: i.e., he seems to have a more exact understanding of the relationship between the logical and the non-logical. We have also seen that in in Metaph. he demonstrates a certain ignorance regarding the way in which the game of dialectics is played - an ignorance (I might add) that he does not demonstrate in his comment on the Topics.(57) Since there are references in in Top. to in APr. but not in in APr. to in Top.,(58) the order of composition that I would suggest is the following: in Metaph., in APr., in Top. This is, however, only an hypothesis; such issues demand a more thorough study than I can perform here." (p. 134)

(57) See, e.g., in Top. 577.5-15. It is noteworthy also that at in Metaph. 204.13-14, Alexander says that something in fact found in Top. is found in APo., suggesting with this that, at the time he was writing this section of in Metaph., he did not know Top. especially well.

(58) in Top. 7.11, 166.21.
Flannery, Kevin L. 2019. "Analogy in Alexander of Aphrodisias." In La dottrina dell’analogia dell’essere nella « MetaFisica » di Aristotele e i suoi sviluppi nel pensiero tardo-antico e medievale, edited by Salis, Rita, 119-142. Padova: Il Poligrafo.

Abstract: "The author examines the interpretation by Alexander of Aphrodisias of an argument in Metaphysics Δ 6 where Aristotle speaks of things that are one ‘by analogy’ (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν). He argues that Alexander’s commentary on that passage allows us to conclude that he understands analogy quite broadly so as to include not only four-term proportional relationships but also the two relationships spoken of in Metaph. Γ 2: the πρὸς ἕν (‘in relation to one’) relationship, expounded earlier in that chapter, and the τῷ ἐφεξῆς (‘numerical succession’) relationship, mentioned later (1004 a 9, 1005 a 11). The author then examines how Alexander, in his Commentary on metaph. Γ 2, ultimately distinguishes the πρὸς ἕν relationship from the τῷ ἐφεξῆς relationship. The essay concludes with two arguments aimed at resolving problems related to Alexander’s reading of Metaph. Δ 6 and Γ 2. One of the problems concerns the opening lines of Metaph. Λ;; the other concerns the final remarks in metaph. α 1."
Frede, Dorothea. 1982. "The Dramatization of Determinism: Alexander of Aphrodisias' De Fato." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 27:276-298.

"As we know from other sources,(3) there raged a never ending battle about the notion of fate among the schools, a battle in which the various opponents seem to have relied on the same kind of arguments, counterarguments and examples time and again. Alexander himself does not claim originality; he professes to give only an account of the Aristotelian position (cf. 164, 13; 212,5) which he compares with and defends against the more rigid determinism of a rival school. All commentators agree that the target of Alexander's criticism must be the Stoa. Opinions differ on the question why Alexander does not mention the Stoa or any of its members. The ancient habit of not citing the name of a living person in criticism would suggest that Alexander is dealing with the position of a contemporary, a contemporary as it seems who maintained a stronger determinism than, e.g., Chrysippus himself as witnessed in Cicero's De Fato, and who does not always understand the refinements of the earlier Stoic compatibilism.

There is, of course, the problem of our sources' historical accuracy and fairness. The openly polemical tone and arguments in Alexander make it difficult to assess what, precisely, the Stoic position was and whether Alexander in his reductio arguments (his favourite method of criticism) does not distort the Peripatetic position sometimes too. I will try to present a 'reasonable' Stoic position and work out what the main points of disagreement are(4)." (pp. 276-277)

(3) Cicero De fato; Ps-Plutarch De fato; Albinus Didasc. XXVI; Apuleius De dogm. Platonis; Ammonius Comm. in de int. 9; Plotinus III, 1; Proclus De providentia; St. Augustine De libero arbitrio; Boethius De consolatione philosophiae V ; Nemesius, De nat. homin. XXXVIII; Calcidius In Tim. For a comprehensive discussion cfr. W. Theiler, 'Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre', in his Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (Berlin, 1966), pp. 46-103.

(4) For a more detailed discussion cf. R. Sharples, Stoic Conceptions of Necessity in the De Fato of Alexander of Aphrodisias', Phronesis 20, 1975, 247-274 id. 'Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato: Some Parallels', Classical Quarterly 28, 1978, 243-66; A. Long, 'Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action', in Problems of Stoicism, London, 1971; id. '''Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias' De Fato ; Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 52, 1970, 247-268.
———. 1984. "Could Paris (son of Priam) have chosen otherwise? A discussion of R. Sharples, Sharpies , Alexander of Aphrodisias: De fato." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 2:279-292.
Frohn-Villeneuve, W. 1980. "Space, time, and change. Alexander's interpretation of Melissus " In Mélanges d'études anciennes offerts à Maurice Lebel,, edited by J. B. Caron, Michel Fortin and Gilles Maloney, 173-186. Québec: Éditions du Sphinx.
Ganson, Todd Stuart. 2003. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the role of color appearances." Ancient Philosophy no. 23:383-393.

"Aristotle has very little to say about how we visually discriminate spatial properties of ohjects like distance from the perceiver. The task of saying something significant about such cognition was left to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who wished to show that the Aristotelian theory of vision is superior to its competitors.(1) Because rival schools purported to solve difficull problems concerning visual cognition of spatial properties, Alexander wanted lo show that one could satisfactorily address these problems within an Aristotelian framework." (p. 383)

(1) In the Mantissa there is a valuable discus.sion of allernative approaches to spatial cognition in the sections which come before the one titled 'How seeing comes about according to Aristotle'

(141.30-147.25). See especially the section devoted to 'those who say that seeing comes about through the impact of images' (134.30-136.28). ln what follows I do not assume that all of these sections

were written by Alexander, though I will take for granted that 'How seeing comes ahout accordling to Aristotle' is by Alexander. For discussion of the title and contents of the Mantissa, sec Sharples

1998.

References

Sharples, Robert W., 'Alexander and pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scripta minima. Questions and Problems, makeweights and prospects', in Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike, ScriptOralia 95, ed. W. Kullmann, J. Althoff, M. Asper (Tiibingen 1998) 383-408.
Gaskin, Richard. 1993. "Alexander's Sea Battle: a discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato 10." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 38:75-94.

"The tenth chapter of Alexander of Aphrodisias' De Fato(1) contains a treatment of fatalism and future truth which clearly harks back to Aristotle's famous 'Sea Battle' discussion in De Interpretatione (DI) 9.2 Alexander's discussion has not yet been satisfatorily interpreted: this paper is intended to help remedy this lack." (p. 75)

(...)

"If my interpretation of ch.10 is correct, it follows that Alexander must have read Aristotle as accepting the fatalist's inference from the truth of a FCS [= future contingent statement] to its (real) necessity. How Alexander responded to fatalism - whether in accordance with the traditional interpretation of Aristotle or that favoured by the commentators - cannot, as I have mentioned, be extracted from De Fato itself; but it is an implication of my construal of 177 .15-177 .27 that some sort of restriction or adaptation of PB [ = principle of bivalence] would have been accepted by Alexander, and hence that he must have understood Aristotle in DI 9 to be announcing such a restriction or adaptation(51)" (p. 94)

(1) The text of the De Fato is available in Supplementum Aristotelicum II.ii. 164-212, ed. I. Bruns, Berlin, 1892. Bruns' text is reproduced in the commentary of R. Sharples: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate (London, Duckworth, 1983).
Genequand, Charles. 2019. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and Arabic Aristotelianism." In Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500. Second Edition, edited by Lagerluns, Henrik, 60-62. Dordrecht: Springer.

Abstract: "Alexander of Aphrodisias, commentator par excellence of Aristotle, lived about 200 CE. A fairly important part of his works was translated into Arabic during the ninth century and greatly influenced the reception and interpretation of the Stagirite’s thought in the East. Important fragments of his commentary on the Metaphysics have been preserved in Ibn Rushd’s own Great Commentary on that work. Among the independent treatises preserved in Arabic, the most important are On the Principles of the Universe, On Providence, and On the Intellect."
Gili, Luca, and Podolak, Pietro. 2018. "Hugh Eterianus, Alexander of Aphrodisias and syllogistic demonstrations a newly discovered fragment of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ « Commentary » on Aristotle’s « Posterior analytics »." Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale no. 29:137-154.

Abstract: "Hugh Eterianus (ca. 1110/1120-1182), an Italian theologian who worked in Byzantium as an advisor to Manuel I Comnenos, is the author of the treatise De sancto et immortali deo, where he argues against the Orthodox denial of the filioque. In this treatise, Hugh quotes from the works of Plato, Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. In chapterI, 4, Hugh includes a short passage from a certain ‘Alexander’ who commented on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. We show that this passage is a fragment from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on the Posterior Analytics. This article includes a new edition of the fragment with an English translation and a philosophical commentary."
Golitsis, Pantelis. 2016. "Who were the real authors of the « Metaphysics » commentary ascribed to Alexander and Ps.-Alexander?" In Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators, edited by Sorabji, Richard, 565-587. New York: Bloomsbury.

"I should like to revisit the so-called recensio altera of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Commentary on the Metaphysics, part of which was published by Hayduck in the apparatus featured at the bottom of the page of his edition under the title ‘the more serious discrepancy of the alternative recension’ ( alterius recensionis gravior discrepantia ). To do this, I shall structure my thought around three questions which unfold in a decreasing chronological order, and which will all admit a negative answer: a) did the person who produced the so-called recensio want to produce an ‘interpretation’ of Alexander’s commentary, in other words a text which, by means of its author’s intention, maintains its relation to Alexander’s commentary?(9) b) did the persons who thereafter reproduced and studied this text, i.e. Byzantine copyists or scholars, consider that they had before them a text by Alexander (whether it be a ‘kind’ of Alexander’s text or not)? c) were the philologists of the modern era, who believed that they had detected a recensio altera of Alexander’s commentary, judiciously helped in their critical work by an outlook which can be called alexandro-centric? At the end of this investigation, it will become apparent, I hope, that many elements of the exegetical history of the Metaphysics have disappeared because of a misapplication of the concept of recensio." (pp. 566-567)

(9) Such texts are, e.g., the recensiones pachymerianae of Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and of Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals; see P. Golitsis, ‘ Copistes,

élèves et érudits: la production de manuscrits philosophiques autour de Georges Pachymère ’, in A. Bravo García and I. Pérez Martín, eds, The Legacy of Bernard de Montfaucon: Three Hundred Years of Studies on Greek Handwriting (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), pp. 157–70.
———. 2016. "The manuscript tradition of Alexander of Aphrodisias Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics: Towards a New Critical Edition." Revue d’histoire des textes no. 11:55-94.

"Alexander of Aphrodisias’ ( fl. 200 A.D.) commentary on the Metaphysics is among the first commentaries on Aristotle to be printed in Latin and among the last to be printed in Greek. It might seem as a paradox that the Latin version of the commentary by the Spanish humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490-1573) was quite a philological achievement in its time and can still be admired today, whereas the two editions of the Greek text made by Hermann Bonitz and by Michael Hayduck in the nineteenth century are defective in some important respects. The present article aims at laying the basis for a new critical edition of Alexander’s commentary on books Α-Δ of the Metaphysics, which I have recently undertaken thanks to a generous funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)." (p. 55)

(...)

"The most important finding, however, of our own recensio is the discovery of the lost hyparchetype β, a copy of which is the Par. gr. 1878 [P], made by an anonymous scribe and Andronicus Callistus.

I provide in Appendix I two specimens which illustrate the textual improvements that P enables us to make. The number and type of variant readings attested in P, as well as the mere fact that this is not a manuscript exclusively copied by Callistus, who is otherwise known for his good conjectures, suffice to establish that the two copyists had access to a nowadays lost manuscript of Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics A-Δ." (p. 72)
———, ed. 2022. Alexander of Aphrodisias: Commentary on Aristotle, Metaphysics (Books I–III). Berlin: de Gruyter.

Critical edition with Introduction and Notes.

"Editing Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (fl. 200 AD) commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is a complicated task for both historical and scholarly reasons. To begin with, there is some doubt whether Alexander, whose full name was Τίτος Αὐρήλιος Ἀλέξανδρος,(1)

commented on the entire treatise or only on some of its books. At any rate, the direct Greek tradition of the text delivers no commentary beyond book Delta. Nevertheless, Averroes has preserved some thirty fragments of Alexander’s commentary on book Lambda(2) and Syrianus refers to some of Alexander’s comments in his own commentary on books Mu and Nu.(3) Taken together with three mentions of Alexander in Asclepius’ commentary on book Zeta,(4) these references suggest that Alexander composed a commentary on the entire Metaphysics." (Introduction, p. XXIII)

"The edition consists of Alexander’s reconstructed text with three apparatuses: (a) apparatus fontium et locorum aristotelicorum, (b) apparatus criticus et historicus, (c) apparatus lectionum aristotelicarum. These have been put into this order in accordance

with the relevance that they may have for the potential (Hellenist) reader of the edition: (a) historians of philosophy interested in Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, who would like to know his references to Aristotle’s text(s) and other sources; (b) historians of philosophy and philologists, who may have a different (and possibly better than the present editor’s) understanding of Alexander’s commentary and may prefer a reading rejected by the present editor; (c) historians of the text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, who wish to readily know what was Alexander’s reading each time there is a divergence in our textual tradition of the Metaphysics. I take it that (a) concerns more people than (b) and (b) more people than (c)." (Introduction, p. CLIII)

(1) According to the epigraphic evidence from Aphrodisias discussed by Chaniotis 2004: 388–389.

Alexander had a homonymous father, who was awarded Roman citizenship by the governor of Asia (135/136 AD) Titus Aurelius Fulvus Antoninus (the later emperor Antoninus Pius), as the pronomina Titus Aurelius imply.

(2) See Freudenthal 1885; Genequand 1986. Di Giovanni – Primavesi 2016 raise some issues as to whether Averroes had access to Alexander’s genuine commentary.

(3) Syrianus, In Metaph. [= Kroll 1902] 96.18, 111.34, 122.12 and 18, 160.8, 166.27, 186.16, 195.12. In 186.16,

Alexander is quoted by Syrianus as an authority for the traditional division between books Mu and Nu.

Alexander’s commentary on Nu is mentioned in the Kitāb al-Fihrist of the tenth century; see below, p. xlviii, n. 3.

(4) Asclepius, In Metaph. [= Hayduck 1888] 408.5 and 20, 428.13.

References

Chaniotis 2004 A. Chaniotis, “New inscriptions from Aphrodisias (1995–2001)”. American Journal of Archaeology 108 (2004), 377–416.

Freudenthal 1885 J. Freudenthal, Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles, untersucht und übersetzt von J. Freudenthal. Mit Beiträgen zur Erläuterung des arabischen Textes von S. Fränkel. Berlin: Abhandlungen der Königlichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1885.

Di Giovanni – Primavesi 2016 M. di Giovanni and O. Primavesi, “Who wrote Alexander’s Commentary on Metaphysics Λ? New light on the Syro-Arabic tradition”. In: C. Horn (ed.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda – New Essays. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2016, 11–66

Genequand 1986 C. Genequand, Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s Commnentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lām. Leiden: Brill, 1986..
Gottschalk, Hans B. 1987. "Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD." In Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, vol. 36.2: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. II. Teilband: Philosophie (Platonismus, [Forts.]; Aristotelismus), edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 1079-1174. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Revised reprint in: R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, London: Duckworth, 1990, pp. 55-81.

"A particular difficulty for our study is the almost complete loss of the relevant literature. This is in large measure due to the character of that literature, much of which consisted of commentaries on Aristotle's works or discussions of problems arising out of them. Such writings were by their very nature liable to be superseded as each generation reread Aristotle in the light of its own needs and preoccupations. The only writings by professed Aristotelians of this era to have survived in their original form are a commentary on pans of the 'Nicomachean Ethics' by Aspasius (second century AD) and the 'De mundo' wrongly attributed to Aristotle himself, to which one can doubtfully add the pseudo-Aristotelian 'De virtutibus et vitiis' with its doublet, falsely ascribed to Andronicus of Rhodes. In addition two treatises by Nicolaus of Damascus, originally perhaps pans of the same work, have survived through being translated into Syriac or Arabic.(1) Besides these we only have fragments quoted by later writers; the chief sources are the commentaries on Aristotle's works written by Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century and by Ammonius (the son of Hermeias), Philoponus and Simplicius in the fifth and sixth.(2) The last-named is especially generous with quotations and sometimes gives a synopsis of the views of earlier interpreters on particular problems;(3) the introduction of his commentary on the 'Categories' (pp. 1-2) includes a survey of the work of earlier commentators. The information they provide is sufficient to give us an idea of the problems which interested the earlier Aristotelians and the kind of answer they gave, but usually not to reconstruct their arguments in full." (p. 1080)

(1) All these works will be discussed below.

(2) This and the other ancient Greek commentaries on Aristotle have been excellently edited in the series 'Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca' (CAG), published under the auspices of the Prussian Academy (Berlin 1883-1909); other relevant works, notably the treatises and essays of Alexander of Aphrodisias, have been published in the same format in the 'Supplemenrum Aristotelicum' (Berlin 1885—1903). They will be quoted by page and line of these editions.

(3) E.g. In Cat. 62-7, on whether Aristotle was right to posit ten and only ten categories.
Granieri, Roberto. 2023. "Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato’s Conception of Not-Being." Méthexis no. 35:185-200.

Abstract: "In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato’s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander’s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato’s project in the Sophist and of Simplicius’ own philosophical background, notably in Damascius’ De principiis."
Gregoric, Pavel. 2017. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Common Sense." Filozofski vestnik no. 38:47-64.

"Introduction.

The primary aim of this paper is to present Alexander’s understanding of the common sense and its functions. In doing so, I will keep an eye on Alexander’s agreement with or departure from Aristotle and indicate his contributions to the subject matter. The secondary aim of this paper is to discuss one particular point of departure which came to dominate later reception of Aristotle’s notion of the common sense." (p. 47)
———. 2018. "Aristotle’s Transparency: Comments on Ierodiakonou, “Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Colour”." In The Parva naturalia in Greek, Arabic and Latin Aristotelianism: Supplementing the Science of the Soul, edited by Bydén, Börje and Radovic, Filip, 91-98. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "In my comment on Katerina Ierodiakonou’s paper, I outline my understanding of the programme of De anima and how it bears on Aristotle’s discussion of the transparent in De anima 2.7, in contrast with his discussion of the transparent in De sensu 3. I then explore Aristotle’s notion of transparency and sketch an alternative to Ierodiakonou’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views as to how colours are generated in physical objects. At the end, I raise two objections to Alexander’s interpretation of the transparent as discussed by Ierodiakonou."
Gregoric, Pavel, and Lautner, Péter. 2023. "De mixtione XVI: on Growth." In Studies on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Mixture and Growth, edited by Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz and de Haas, Frans A.J., 231-262. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "In Chapter XVI Alexander investigates whether the Stoic notion of body going through body is applicable to the phenomenon of biological growth. If anything, growth through nutrition seems to recommend this Stoic notion. However, in Chapter XVI Alexander develops an Aristotelian explanation of growth, which is more convincing and does not rely on the Stoic notion. Since the Stoic notion of body going through body has been shown to be problematic in the earlier chapters of De mixtione, and the final chapter discards its utility even for an explanation of growth, we argue that the outcome of the treatise is that the Stoic notion should be abandoned. In this contribution we divide Alexander’s text in 9 sections and analyse it section by section, availing ourselves of other relevant texts, such as Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione I 5, Quaestio I 5 attributed to Alexander, and his Commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology IV. In the Appendix we discuss four points: (1) it is the nutritive capacity of the soul that is the efficient, formal and final cause of nourishment, (2) diminution in old age is due to the decreasing rate of absorption of digested nutriment, (3) for any episode of growth, some bit of matter needs to remain through it, which makes replacement of bodily ingredients a gradual process, (4) Chapter XVI is not extraneous to De mixtione or tucked at the end of it for want of a better place, as some scholars have suggested, but an integral part of the treatise at its right place."
Groisard, Jocelyn. 2023. "Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De mixtione: Text, Tradition, Reception." In Studies on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Mixture and Growth, edited by Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz and de Haas, Frans A.J., 1-27. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De mixtione did not share the fame of its author: it may have been read by Plotinus and its existence was known, probably through Alexander’s own commentaries on Aristotle, by Themistius and Simplicius, but it does not seem to have been quoted, discussed or translated until the 16th century after its first edition was printed in 1527 by the Aldine Press in Venice. The manuscript tradition is very scarce with most witnesses copied after the editio princeps; our knowledge of the text relies on two medieval manuscripts of the late 13th or early 14th century, one of them incomplete and giving less than half of the text. This more than modest reception and textual tradition of Alexander’s treatise contrasts with the intellectual fortune the issues it deals with had in Late Ancient, medieval and early modern philosophy: mixture models analysed and discussed by Alexander continued to be used and continually refined in a great range of intellectual fields, such as theories of soul, Neoplatonic metaphysics, Christian theology, pharmacology, as well as theories of hylomorphism in the Peripatetic tradition until the 17th century. For modern scholars, it is a precious document not only as a source on previous theories of mixture in Ancient philosophy but also as an entry point into the later developments of mixture theories from Late Ancient to early modern philosophy."
Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz. 2021. "Dividing an Apple: The Nutritive Soul and Soul Parts in Alexander of Aphrodisias." In Nutrition and Nutritive Soul in Aristotle and Aristotelianism, edited by Korobili, Giouli and Lo Presti, Roberto, 197-219. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "The nutritive soul provides a relevant test case to examine Alexander of Aphrodisias’ conception of the parts of the soul, since it appears in Alexander’s De anima along with methodological considerations, especially an analogy with the division of an apple. I examine here the unity of the powers of the soul, focusing especially on the case of the vegetative soul. If the division of soul parts and soul powers is neither local, nor numerical, what is it? I put forward three correlated hypotheses: 1) Even if there is no lexical distinction in Alexander between “powers of the soul” and “parts of the soul”, Alexander nonetheless comes up with criteria which distinguish a soul power from a soul part, or from a soul of its own. The difference between his position and Aristotle’s is found chiefly in Alexander’s effort to clarify these criteria. 2) As will become clear in the case of the vegetative soul, even the powers that do constitute a soul or a soul part (vegetative/animal/human) are objectively distinct (in a sense that remains to be clarified) and are not simply the result of a change in perspective. 3) The main criterion by which one can account for the organization and the unification of soul parts is the teleological criterion."
———. 2023. "The Services of Dialectic: Dialectic as an Instrument for Metaphysics in Alexander of Aphrodisias." In Ancient Greek Dialectic and Its Reception, edited by Mouzala, Melina G., 249-276. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"It is commonplace to think that ancient commentators aimed to systematize Aristotle." (p. 249)

(...)

"To put it plainly—I think this is painting too unilateral and simple a picture, and I would like to contribute, here, following others,(6) to enrich and detail it. To do so, I will look into Alexander’s usage of dialectical method in metaphysics, with particular interest for his exegesis of book Beta of the Metaphysics and his use of the aporetic method. Alexander’s aporetic method in the Quaestiones(7) as well as the one he puts to use in his commentary on Metaphysics Beta has led to the same diagnosis. In both cases, no “honest perplexity”(8) is displayed, and the Beta aporiae are not treated like genuine puzzles but rather as simple exposition devices.(9) In contrast to this view, I would like to show two things: first, that aporia retains an authentically exploratory function for Alexander; and, second, that Alexander’s use of aporia in metaphysics does not originate in systematization, but rather in the fulfillment of dialectic’s status as an organon within Aristotelian tradition.

(...)

But I would like to pursue another path in this paper and examine the role of dialectic in metaphysics. I will claim that dialectic allows Alexander to retain the exploratory aspect of aporiae within a scientific investigation. If we show that the heuristic role proper to dialectic is an integral part of science, we will be better able to support the idea that Alexander retains the exploratory aspect of aporiae." (pp. 249-250)

(6) In particular Kupreeva (2017), with whom I am in complete agreement.

(7) Fazzo (2002), pp. 17–18. For a more nuanced view, see Rashed (2007), pp. 3–4.

(8) Cf. Madigan in Madigan and Dooley (1992), p. 79.

(9) The expression is in Aubenque (1961).

References

Aubenque, Pierre (1961): “Sur la notion aristotélicienne d’aporie”. In: Mansion, Suzanne (Ed.): Aristote et les problèmes de méthode. Communications présentées au Symposium Aristotelicum tenu à Louvain du 24 août au 1er septembre 1960. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, pp. 3–19.

Fazzo, Silvia (2002): Aporia e sistema: la materia, la forma, il divino nelle “Quaestiones” di Alessandro di Afrodisia, Pisa: Edizioni Ets.

Kupreeva, Inna (2017): “Aporia and Exegesis: Alexander of Aphrodisias”. In: Karamanolis, George and Politis, Vasilis (Eds.): The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 228–247.

Madigan, Arthur, and Dooley, William E. (Trans.) (1992): Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 2 and 3. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Rashed, Marwan (2007): Essentialisme: Alexandre d’Aphrodise entre logique, physique et cosmologie. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
———. 2023. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Active Intellect as Final Cause." Elenchos no. 44:93-117.

Abstract: "In his own De anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias famously identifies the “active” (poietikon) intellect with the prime mover in Metaphysics Λ. However, Alexander’s claim raises an issue: why would this divine intellect come in the middle of a study of soul in general and of human intellection in particular? As Paul Moraux [*] asks in his pioneering work on Alexander’s conception of the intellect, is the active intellect a “useless addition”? In this paper, I try to answer this question by challenging a solution according to which the active intellect would intervene directly with the material intellect to trigger its ordinary working. I argue that the active intellect acts as a final cause, both for human intellect and for its ordinary objects of thought. The active intellect is twice “cause of the intellection”, i.e. cause of the actualization of human thought: once (i) when it offers thought occasions for thinking through objects, and again (ii) when it actualizes mediately the human intellect itself in its development. This reading agrees with Alexander’s usual position about the prime mover’s causality. It accounts for the multiplicity of expressions with which Alexander describes the causality of the active intellect in his De anima. It also explains why the development of human intellect has been described without direct reference to active intellect, since substances do not aim directly at the First cause, but their aiming at it is mediated by their desire for their own good."

[*] Moraux, P. 1942. Alexandre d’Aphrodise. Exégète de la noétique d’Aristote (Bibliothèque de la faculté de philosophie et lettre de l’universit´e de Liège, 99). Liège & Paris: Droz.
———. 2023. "De mixtione XI–XII: the Encounter of Two Ontologies." In Studies on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Mixture and Growth, edited by Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz and de Haas, Frans A.J., 144-167. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "Chapters XI and XII of De mixtione have been read as a digression from the main argument of the treatise. In the following, I will show that what takes place in IX–XII is not secondary regarding the issue of blending, or, more generally, regarding Alexander’s opposition to Stoic philosophy. In my view, chapters IX–XII aim to produce a more fine-grained account of blending. They set the stage for the first requirement of blending in chapter XIII: that there is blending only of corporeal substances, i.e. of independently subsisting entities. To accomplish this, chapters XI–XII must bring their investigation up to the nature of the Stoic principles and criticize the Stoic notion of body. This is why Alexander must examine the fundamentals of Stoic ontology.

It also explains why these chapters, despite being essentially refutative, make explicit some of the main claims of Alexander’s own ontology. In these chapters, Alexander makes us pivot smoothly from a Stoic ontology to an Aristotelian one."
Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz, and de Haas, Frans A.J., eds. 2024. Studies on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Mixture and Growth. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Abbreviations VIII; Contributors IX; 1. Jocelyn Groisard: Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De mixtione: Text, Tradition, Reception 1; 2. Gábor Betegh: De mixtione I–II: Alexander’s Dialectical Method 28; 3 Vladimír Mikeš: De mixtione III–IV: the Stoics on Blending—Arguments, Proofs, Examples 58; 4. Frans A.J. de Haas: De mixtione V–VI: Common Notions and Bodies Receiving Bodies 83; 5. Christian Pfeiffer: De mixtione VII–VIII: on the Possibility of a Stoic Blend 100; 6. Fabienne Baghdassarian: De mixtione IX–X: Promoting the Aristotelian Causal System 122; 7. Gweltaz Guyomarc’h: De mixtione XI–XII: the Encounter of Two Ontologies 144; 8. Klaus Corcilius: De mixtione XIII: Finally, the Truth about Mixture 168; 9. Orna Harari: De mixtione XIV: the Ingredients’ Preservation in the Blend 192; 10. István Bodnár: De mixtione XV: the Aristotelian Account Vindicated 212; 11. Pavel Gregorić and Péter Lautner: De mixtione XVI: on Growth 231; Bibliography 263; Index of Ancient and Medieval Authors 273; Index of Renaissance and Modern Authors 274; Index of Topics 275-276.
Hackforth, R. 1946. "Notes on some passages of Alexander Aphrodisiensis De fato." The Classical Quarterly no. 40:37-44.

"The treatise of Alexander of Aphrodisias Περὶ Εἱμαρμένης [de Fato] is probably the most interesting of his independent works to the general reader. Not only is it one of our chief sources for the Stoic doctrine of Destiny, as a glance at the relevant pages of Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta will show, but it also contains a closely reasoned and exhaustive (if somewhat prolix) criticism of that doctrine from the Peripatetic standpoint. I therefore hope that an attempt to deal with some of the numerous corruptions and difficulties in the text may not be wholly useless." (p. 37)
Hangai, Attila. 2020. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Simultaneous Perception." In Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception: Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism, edited by Bennett, David and Tohivanen, Juhana, 91-124. Cham [Switzeland): Springer.

Abstract: "Alexander of Aphrodisias picks up Aristotle’s insufficient treatment of simultaneous perception and develops an adequate solution for the problem, thereby offering an account of the unity of perceptual consciousness—the single mental activity of a single subject with complex content. I show the adequacy of the solution by using as criteria the requirements that have been identified by Aristotle and approved (and explained) by Alexander. I analyze Alexander’s solution in two turns.

First, with respect to heterogeneous perceptibles, Alexander adopts and reformulates Aristotle’s metaphorical account invoking the analogy with a point. Second, with respect to homogeneous opposites, accordingly, perception is judgement, but it involves physical changes in diverse parts of the primary sense-organ. By this account Alexander resolves the issue of the unity of the subject on the level of the capacity of the soul, and coordinates the complexity of content with the complexity on the physical level. In addition to being adequate, the solution is faithful to Aristotle. I suggest that the interpretative decisions Alexander makes (the clarification of the analogy; the reference he finds to the analogy; the two components of the solution, judgement and parts of the organ) form an ingenious extension of Aristotle’s treatment. Interestingly, even though many elements in Alexander’s interpretation are taken up by modern commentators, no one has followed it in its entirety, nor even treated it in its own right."
———. 2023. "Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Criticism of the Stoic Theory of Perception: typos and typōsis." Elenchos no. 34:319-362.

Abstract: "The Stoics identified the phantasia with the impression (typos) in the soul, or the impressing process (typōsis). Alexander of Aphrodisias engages directly with this account at De anima 68.10–21, and argues against the applicability of the impression in a theory of perception in Mantissa 10, especially 133.25–134.23. I analyse Alexander’s polemic account at De anima 68.10–21, I demonstrate that it differs from Chrysippus’ criticism of Cleanthes (contrary to some commentators), and I show how it fits in the context of his argument.

From this analysis it will emerge how Alexander uses Stoic ideas to form his Aristotelian account. Then, I show that Alexander, by taking ‘typos’ metaphorically, not only prefers the term ‘enkataleimma’ over ‘typos’ in his theory of phantasia, but he keeps the ‘typos’ terminology only to remain faithful to Aristotle’s use (contrary to some commentators)."
Hankinson, Robert James. 2002-2003. "Xenarchus, Alexander, and Simplicius on simple motions, bodies and magnitudes." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies no. 46:19-42.

Abstract: "Aristotle accounted for the fundamental dynamics of the cosmos in terms of the tendencies of the various elements to distinct types of natural motions, and (in the case of the sublunary elements) to rest in their natural places. In so doing, he introduced a fifth element, the ether, with a natural and unceasing tendency to revolve, as the matter for the heavenly bodies. This paper deals with some of the objections raised to this model, and to its conceptual underpinnings, raised by Xenarchus of Seleuceia, an unorthodox Peripatetic of the 1st century BC, and of the attempts of later philosophers to rebut them. In so doing it casts light on a little-known, but historically important and interesting, episode in the development of physical dynamics."
Harari, Orna. 2016. "Alexander against Galen on motion: a mere logical debate?" Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 50:201-236.

"Since Shlomo Pines’s pioneering study of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Refutation of Galen, the understanding of this treatise has significantly changed.(1)" (p. 201)

(...)

Admittedly, the Refutation of Galen is dedicated to a presentation and refutation of Galen’s claim that Aristotle’s argument in Physics 7.1 is invalid, but it is not obvious that the treatise is restricted to this logical point. As Pines pointed out, Alexander reports here that Galen based his criticism on substantive assumptions which suggest that in Galen’s view certain things are not moved by something. In spite of Pines’s observation, no one has examined in detail how these assumptions are related to Galen’s criticism of Aristotle’s argument. The following study is devoted to an examination of this question.£ (pp. 2301-202, anote omitted)

(1) This treatise is extant in an Arabic translation that has come down to us in two partially overlapping manuscripts, Carullah 1279 and Escorial 978. These manuscripts are respectively entitled The Treatise of Alexander of Aphrodisias Answering Galen’s Attack on Aristotle’s View that Everything that Moves is Moved by Something and Alexander’s Treatise in Reply to Galen concerning the First Mover. For brevity, I use here the title Refutation of Galen. It is not clear whether this work is a part of Alexander’s lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics or an independent treatise.

For the former view see S. Pines, ‘Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquo moveri: A Refutation of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Theory of Motion’ [‘Omne quod movetur’], Isis, 52 (1961) 21-54 at 22; for the latter view see N. Rescher and M. E. Marmura (ed., trans., comm.), The Refutation by Alexander of Aphrodisias of Galen’s Treatise on the Theory of Motion [Refutation by Alexander] (Islamabad, (1971) 60-2.
———. 2023. " Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of action and the capacity of doing otherwise." Apeiron no. 56:693-721.

Abstract: "I examine Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of action, addressing the question how his view that human actions are determined by reason accounts for the capacity of doing otherwise. Calling into question the standard view that Alexander frees agents from internal determination, I argue that (1) the capacity of doing otherwise is a consequence of determination by reason, since it enables agents to do something different from what they would have done had they followed external circumstances; and (2) this capacity is compatible with causal determination by reason because as a case of potentiality for opposites, it grants agents the qualified possibility of doing otherwise insofar as their nature as human beings is concerned – a possibility which remains also when their actions are causally determined by reason and by their internal disposition. I show further that these elements of Alexander’s theory of action are ultimately based on his conception of the soul, specifically on his commitment to Aristotle’s view that the human soul is not purely rational, as the Stoics hold, but has nonrational and rational parts."
———. 2023. "De mixtione XIV: the Ingredients’ Preservation in the Blend." In Studies on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Mixture and Growth, edited by Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz and de Haas, Frans A.J., 192-211. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "I argue that in De mixtione XIV Alexander addresses the question of the ingredients’ preservation in the blend from the viewpoint of the distinction between their substrates and their qualities. Through this interpretation I show that the discrepant claims regarding the ingredients’ preservation found in De mixtione XIII–XV are compatible because they hold for different aspects of the ingredients: the claim that they perish holds for their substrates, whereas the claim that they are preserved holds for their qualities. In so doing, I clarify Alexander’s stance in his debate with the Stoics as well as his contribution to the Peripatetic tradition. I show that in holding that blending is a real unification of the ingredients, he argues against the Stoics that the ingredients are not preserved as distinct individual bodies but their qualities are preserved in a diminished mode, and also departs from the earlier Peripatetic tradition, by stressing that blending does not result in a juxtaposition that appears unified due to the imperceptibility of its different ingredients. This interpretation helps place Alexander’s account of blending in the broader context of his metaphysics, by indicating that his view of the preservation of the ingredients underpins his anti-reductionist conception of substantial forms."
Hasnawi, Ahmad. 2016. "Alexander of Aphrodisias versus John Philoponus in Arabic: A Case of Mistaken Identity." In Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators, edited by Sorabji, Richard, 477-502. New York: Bloomsbury.

"One could claim that for an Aristotelian philosopher, particulars are not a philosophical problem – at least not an epistemological one. For an Aristotelian philosopher daily confronted with Stoic theories of Providence and individuation, however, this was a haunting question. After all, what did Aristotle have to say on the status of the particulars not qua belonging to a species, but qua pure singularities taking place within the world? I would like to show that even if Alexander is too much of an Aristotelian to have a real theory of the particular, his reaction to his historical context leads him to new insights on this topic. These insights, in turn, constitute a starting point out of which Avicenna and Leibniz developed their ideas about how fatalism could be avoided without giving up the principle that the entire effect corresponds to its full cause. I will try to sketch, in the following pages, the main phases of this long and intricate story." (p. 161)
Havrda, Matyáš. 2021. "Five Views of definienda in Alexander’s Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14." Elechos no. 42:351-374.

Abstract: "In Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14, Alexander presents a distinctly realist or essentialist view of the objects of definition, distinguished, on the one hand, from two types of realism rejected by Aristotle (definienda as separate forms and as particulars), and, on the other, from two types of conceptualism (non-essentialist and essentialist abstractivism) that probably belong within the Peripatetic tradition. The difference between Alexander’s view and essentialist abstractivism lies in his understanding of definienda not as the common concepts of things existing in the particulars, but as the common things conceived of as existing in the particulars. This paper offers a close reading of Quaest. 1.3, whose aim is to flesh out Alexander’s position vis-à-vis the objects of definition against the backdrop of the four rejected alternatives. The distinction between Alexander’s essentialism and the essentialist abstractivist notion of definienda is further explained in light of Quaest. 2.14. The amended Greek text of Quaest. 1.3 is appended with an English translation."
Helle, Reier. 2023. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Stoics: Blending, Forms, and the Upwards Story." In The History of Hylomorphism: From Aristotle to Descartes, edited by Charles, David, 106-132. New York: Oxford University Press.

"The Stoics hold that animals, plants, and inanimate natural bodies are composites of pneuma (‘breath’) and matter.(1) The composition relation in question is ‘blending’ (krasis). And by blending with the relevant matter, pneuma causes the animal, plant, or inanimate natural body to be what it is.(2) In his work on material composition, De Mixtione, Alexander of Aphrodisias discusses the Stoic theory of blending and the specific case of pneuma and matter at length. His aim is to refute the Stoic view, and in so doing to clear the ground for his own Aristotelian theory of blending, for the development and defence of which

he relies on Stoicism as a foil.(3)"

(1) I am grateful to Brad Inwood, Alexander Bown, Victor Caston, and especially to David Charles for helpful discussions, comments, and questions.

(2) For references and details, see section 1 below.

(3) Alexander, De Mix. is our most important source of evidence for Stoic thinking about blending.

Remarkably, out of the forty-seven total pages of Groisard’s edition of the text, Alexander’s discussion of the Stoic position takes up twenty-one; by comparison, the presentation and defence of his own

theory of blending is ten pages long.

Referencesù

Groisard, J. (2013), Alexandre D’Aphrodise: Sur La Mixtion et La Croissance (De Mixtione) (Les Belles Lettres).
Hendrix, John Shannon. 2010. "Philosophy of Intellect and Vision in the De anima and De intellectu of Alexander of Aphrodisias." School of Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation Faculty Papers:1-29.

"There are thus three intellects: material, in habitus, and productive. Matter is defined as the substrate which can become a particular being through the presence of a form, as potential intellect can become actual intellect through the presence of an intelligible. According to Aristotle in the Metaphysica, the substratum of matter “is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else” (7.3.1028b36),(9) meaning that matter can be seen as participating in anything which can be affirmed as a quality, but matter itself cannot be affirmed as a quality. Matter can be seen as neither a quality nor a particular (7.3.1029a20–21); it is a vocabulary element of neither the apprehension of the intelligible nor discursive thought. Matter can only be seen as a potentiality, and anything which can be described as material is so only as potentiality. Material intellect is thus potential intellect, and not an actual intellect. The material intellect has the potential to become actual intellect to the extent to which “existents are

possible objects of knowledge” (De anima 106), according to Alexander.

The faculty in material intellect which can apprehend an intelligible cannot be an intelligible itself, because then its own intelligible form would appear and interfere with the grasping of the intelligible. The faculty of intellect to know intelligibles can only be a potentiality, able to conform to the intelligible from without, in the same way that matter can only be a potentiality able to conform to the form of an object as it is perceived." (pp. 12-13)

(9) Aristotle, Metaphysics (Metaphysica), trans. W. D. Ross, in The Works of Aristotle (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952).
Hesamifar, Abdurrazzaq, and Baqershahi, Ali Naqi. 2018. "Intellect in Alexander of Aphrodisias and Its Impact upon Muslim Philosophers." Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts no. 5:447-468.

Abstract: "In his treatise "On the Intellect," Alexander of Aphrodisias paraphrases Aristotleʼs views on the intellect. He refers to four kinds of intellect. The first three include: the potential intellect which resides potentially in manʼs soul and will be actualized through perceiving the intelligible; the habitual intellect which has perceived certain intelligibles and can perceive some others as well; the Active Intellect which can change the first kind of intellect into the second one. This intellect can perceive its essence. And since its essence is intelligible so it can perceive it through perceiving the intelligibles. The fourth is the acquired intellect and it is a part of the Active Intellect and comes to soul from outside and enables it to perceive the intelligibles. The main objective of this article is to treat Alexanderʼs idea of the intellect and to explore its impact upon Islamic philosophy which can be traced in the similarities between their debates on the issue and the allusions to Alexanderʼs view in the works about intellect written by Muslim philosophers."
Ierodiakonou, Katerina. 1995. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on medicine as a stochastic art." In Ancient Medicine in Its Socio-Cultural Context: Volume 2, edited by Horstmanshoff, H. F. J., van der Eijk, Philip J. and Schrijvers, P. H. , 473-485. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Summary: "Medical practice in antiqwuity was conspicuous for its failures, which sertously challenged medicine's status as an art. Ancient philosophers and doctors tried to explain how a whole group of arts including medicine, the so-called stochastic arts, was characterised by rhe fact that even the most competent exercise of the art cou!d not guarantee a successful outcome. This paper focuses on Alexander of Aphrodisias' (second century AD) explanation and compares it to some other ancient views, in particu!ar to Gelen. The central feature at Alexander's suggestion is a distinction between the end of an art and its function. In the case of medicine end and function do not coincide; for the end is to heal the patient, whereas the function consists solely in doing artfully

what is possible to attain the end."
———. 2018. "Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Colour." In The Parva naturalia in Greek, Arabic and Latin Aristotelianism: Supplementing the Science of the Soul, edited by Bydén, Börje and Radovic, Filip, 77-90. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to unravel Aristotle’s reasoning with regard to the ontological status of colours; also, to get a better understanding of his views on the production of the whole spectrum of colours; and finally, to evaluate the explanatory power of his theory of colours. The texts I mainly draw my evidence from is Aristotle’s De sensu 3 and the relevant passages from the De anima as well as from other Aristotelian treatises; in addition, I use for my interpretation remarks made by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on the De sensu, in his Quaestiones and in the dubious treatise Mantissa."
———. 2021. "Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Sight as a Relative." In Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind, edited by Gregoric, Pavel and Fink, Jakob Leth, 99-118.

"Introduction

Most contemporary scholars who have tried to reconstruct Aristotle’s perceptual theory have bypassed his remarks on the relational character of perception without taking them into serious consideration. This is perhaps justifable, since there are very few and scattered passages in the Aristotelian corpus that present perception as a relative. On the other hand, the Aristotelian commentators of late antiquity, and especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, often refer to this fact in their attempt to explain how, according to Aristotle, perception, in general, and sight, in particular, function. Does Alexander simply unravel Aristotle’s thought, or does he develop the Aristotelian doctrine in innovative ways? Before I look into Alexander’s more detailed account of sight as a relative, let me begin with the scarce relevant evidence found in Aristotle’s own works." (p. 99)
———. 2022. "Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Individuation and Hierarchy of the Senses." In Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition. Volume One: Sense Perception, edited by Toivanen, Juhana, 40-65. Leiden: Brill.

"Conclusion

To conclude, both Aristotle and Alexander are well aware of the fact that their aim to individuate and classify the senses is a complicated affair. Indeed, in their attempt to come up with plausible ways of differentiating the senses, they are often faced with difficulties that undermine the intuitive idea that the senses are easily distinguished from one another. To deal with such difficulties, Aristotle suggests a multiplicity of demarcating criteria as well as a multiplicity of hierarchies, which are later further developed more systematically by Alexander. As we have seen, the role of the criteria for individuating the senses other than the criterion of proper objects proves to be significant, especially in the case of touch, but also in the cases of smell and taste; that is, criteria other than proper objects are significant for individuating three out of the five standard Aristotelian senses. This should be a good enough reason, I think, for reassessing the established view, according to which the one essential Aristotelian criterion for defining and distinguishing the senses is their proper objects. After all, Aristotle and his followers seem to have considered multiple criteria, which allowed them to classify the senses in a complex and rather sophisticated way." (p. 64)
Jackson, J. D. 1999. "From Alexander of Aphrodisias to Young and Airy." Physics Reports no. 320:27-36.

Abstract: "A didactic discussion of the physics of rainbows is presented, with some emphasis on the history, especially the contributions of Thomas Young nearly 200 years ago. We begin with the simple geometrical optics of Descartes and Newton, including the reasons for Alexander's dark band between the main and secondary bows. We then show how dispersion produces the familiar colorful spectacle. Interference between waves emerging at the same angle, but traveling di!erent optical paths within the water drops, accounts for the existence of distinct supernumerary rainbows under the right conditions (small drops, uniform in size). Young's and Airy's contributions are given their due."
Johnstone, Mark A. 2015. "Aristotle and Alexander on perceptual error." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 60:310-338.

Abstract: "Aristotle sometimes claims that (i) the perception of special perceptibles by their proper sense is unerring. This claim is striking, since it might seem that we quite often misperceive things like colours, sounds and smells. Aristotle also claims that (ii) the perception of common perceptibles (e.g. shape, number, movement) is more prone to error than the perception of special perceptibles. This is puzzling in its own right, and also places constraints on the interpretation of (i). I argue that reading Alexander of Aphrodisias on perceptual error offers an understanding of Aristotle that can help us to make good sense of both of Aristotle’s claims."
Jurasz, Isabela. 2021. "Destiny, Nature and Freedom According to Bardaisan and Alexander of Aphrodisias: An Unknown Aspect of the Controversy Against Determinism." In Women’s Perspectives on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, edited by Chouinard, Isabelle, McConaughey, Zoe, Medeiros Ramos, Aline and Noël, Roxane, 133-159. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "The relationship between Bardaisan the Syriac (150–221) and Greek philosophy remains the object of several hypotheses. In the past, Bardaisan’s teaching has already been compared with Stoicism and Platonism. Some points in common with Aristotelianism have only been recently suggested by scholars. The present article provides an in-depth analysis of a doctrinal theme for which Bardaisan was well known in the Greek-speaking world: his anti-fatalist polemic deployed in the Book of the Laws of Countries. In this dialogue, in the course of which his disciples put forward various questions, Bardaisan’s answers show a certain resemblance to the theses of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise On Fate, written against the determinism supported by the Stoics. A detailed analysis of the two texts reveals the extent of the similarities (and differences) between them, particularly in the approach to the notions of nature, freedom, and destiny or fate."
Kapetanaki, Sophia, and Sharples, Robert W. 2000. "A glossary attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies no. 44:103-143.

"MS Ambrosianus Q74 sup. is a codex in minuscules from the tenth century, containing miscellany of extracts mainly taken from patristic sources and with questions relating soul as its dominant theme." (p. 103)

(...)

"There remains the first and longest text attributed to Alexander (fols 167v-172r), the subject of the present article. It is headed 'Alexander of Aphrodisias's selections from the definitions given in Aristotle' .6 It does indeed take the form of a series of definitions, in what at first seems, apart from some clustering of terms in related areas, a random sequence.

Closer inspection however shows that the sequence reflects the manner of composition. The compiler has apparently gone through the Corpus Aristotelicum, work by work, extracting from Aristotle's text definitions of terms mentioned there. With a few m inor exceptions the sequence of terms defined simply reflects the sequence in which they appear in Aristotle's own text. This explains the occurrence of several definitions of the same term. It also explains why the definitions of virtuous and vicious moral states come in two separate sequences." (p. 104, notes omitted)
Kessler, Eckhard. 2011. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and his Doctrine of the Soul: 1400 Years of Lasting Significance." Early Science and Medicine no. 16:1-93.

Abstract: "This piece of work intends to shed light on Alexander of Aphrodisias from the second-century Aristotle commentator through the history of Aristotelian psychology up to the sixteenth century's clandestine prompter of the new philosophy of nature. In the millennium after his death the head of the Peripatetic school in Athens served as the authority on Aristotle in the Neo-Platonic school, survived the Arabic centuries of philosophy as Averroes' exemplary exponent of the mortality of the soul and as such was not considered worthy of translation by the Latin Scholastics. This attitude changed only in the Late Middle Ages, when the resistance against Averroes grew fierce and Alexander emerged as the only Aristotelian alternative to him. In 1495 his account of Aristotle's psychology was translated and published and the underlying principles of a natural philosophy, based on sense perception and exempt from metaphysics, became accessible. The prompt reception and widespread endorsement of Alexander's teaching testify to his impact throughout the sixteenth century."
King, Daniel. 2010. "Alexander of Aphrodisias' 'On the Principles of the Universe' in a syriac adaptation." Lè Muséon no. 123:159-191.

"The seventh century Syriac manuscript BL Add.14658 is a wide-ranging collection of texts of mostly non-Christian origin(1)." (p. 159)

(...)

"The present study concerns another of the texts in this important collection, namely that which is entitled A treatise concerning the causes of the universe, written by Mar Sargis, priest of Rish Ayna, according to the view of Aristotle the Philosopher, that it is a sphere(5).

Earlier work on the manuscript and on Sergius assumed that this was an original work of the Syrian’s(6). Only in 1994 was the text correctly identified by Dana Miller as an adapted version of a work by Alexander of Aphrodisias(7), otherwise known only in an Arabic version entitled Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise on the theory concerning the Principles of the Universe according to the philosopher Aristotle’s opinion (more generally referred to as the Mabadi’(8). This Arabic text was edited originally by Badawi(9), and more recently in a much improved edition in 2001 by Charles Genequand(10), following closely on the heels of an important study of this and related texts by Prof. Endress(11).

The present offering seeks to complement the critical Syriac text published in the present volume by indicating the characteristics of the adaptation and by locating Sergius’ treatment of it within the broader currents of cosmological and theological concern among educated Greeks and Syrians of his era." (p. 160, a note in Arabic omitted)

(1) W. Wright, Catalogue of Syriac manuscripts in the British Museum acquired since the year 1838. 3 vols. London, 1870-2, p. 1154-60.

(5) See the edition and translation of our text in the current issue by E. Fiori, which replaces the less accurate Italian translation, G. Furlani, Il trattato di Sergio di Res’ayna sull’ universo, in Rivista trimestrale di studi filosofica e religiosi, 4 (1923), p. 1-22 (= Furlani, Il trattato di Sergio). The item is no. 7 in Wright’s Catalogue (p. 1156).

(6) E.g. Renan, Lettre à M. Reinaud, p. 320; Furlani, Il trattato di Sergio.

(7) D.R. Miller, Sargis of Res’ayna: On what celestial bodies know, in R. Lavenant (ed.), VI Symposium Syriacum (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 247), Rome, 1994, p. 221-233 (= Miller, Sargis).

(9 A. Badawi, Aristu ‘inda al-‘Arab, Cairo, 1947, p. 253-277.

10 C. Genequand (ed.), Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos. Arabic text with English Translation, Introduction and Commentary (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 44), Leiden, 2001 (= Genequand, On the Cosmos).

11 G. Endress, Alexander Arabus on the First Cause. Aristotle’s First Mover in an Arabic Treatise attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, in C. D’Ancona Costa . G. Serra (ed.), Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba, Padua, 2002, p. 19-61 (= Endress, Alexander Arabus on the First Cause).
King, R, A. H. . 2021. "Alexander’s De Sensu – and Aristotle’s." In Aristoteles, « Parva naturalia »: Akten der 18. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 30. September bis 2. Oktober 2015 in Mainz, edited by Althff, Jochen, 135-153. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"In this paper, I argue that Alexander, while he knows the Parv. nat. as we know it, has no very good solution to the problems of demarking Parv. nat. from De an., on the contrary, his concern is the integration of Parv. nat. into physikê, and, to boot, a fairly rigid view of the structure of what is happening in Parv. nat., which undersells the flexibility and breadth of the work. However, what Alexander does bring to the table is a consuming interest in anathymiasis, which, while not prominent on the surface of Parv. nat.,

is certainly to be found there. Given Alexander’s interest in the Meteor., where Aristotle does make extensive use of anathymiasis to explain everything from lightening to the eructations of the earth, this emphasis in his commentary is hardly surprising. This emphasis is Alexander’s own take on the way sensation is treated in the Parv. nat. as opposed to in De an., and puts a process in the centre of his interpretation which is at once material, but also formal. Not only that, it is a process that happens both in living

things, and outside, that is to say, both serving the ends of living things, and as a blind natural phenomenon. Anathymiasis achieves two noteworthy aims in terms of its explanatory power: it anchors life in the material world, and, as the change of state of food, is the formation of the living thing itself. This paper concentrates on anathymiasis in Alexander’s reading of De sens., and investigates the extent to which he is being faithful to Aristotle." (p. 135)
Koch, Isabelle. 2021. "How to Limit Fatalism? A Comparison Between Alexander of Aphrodisias and Bardaisan." In Women’s Perspectives on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, edited by Chouinard, Isabelle, McConaughey, Zoe, Medeiros Ramos, Aline and Noël, Roxane, 161-167. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "Alexander of Aphrodisias and Bardaisan, at the end of the second/beginning of the third century CE, are part of a cultural context where astrology, beyond popular or civic beliefs, is integrated into a cosmological reflection on the principles of reality. In such a context, they analyse the concepts of nature and free choice with the project of limiting the influence of fate, in the face of adversaries who submit everything to destiny (the Chaldeans for Bardaisan, the Stoics—and perhaps other deterministic currents—for Alexander). In both cases, the aim is not to deny but torecognise the causal power of fate, while nonetheless assigning it to a particular sphere of reality rather than the whole. In both cases, too, it is mainly through the relations between nature, fate and free choice that this restrictive assignment takes place. Here we will study, regarding a few points, the different strategies by which these two authors fit into the ancient anti-fatalist tradition and contribute to the emergence of the idea of free will in late antiquity."
Kotwick, Mirjam. 2016. Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Berkeley: California Classical Studies.

"Aristotle’s Metaphysics was written in the fourth century BC. But our testimonies about the transmission of Aristotle’s writings suggest that the earliest date of an edition containing the 14 books known to us, in the order known to us, is the first century BC. Worse still, our manuscript tradition containing Aristotle’s Metaphysics begins with the transliteration process in the ninth century AD: Metaphysics manuscripts of an earlier date did not survive. This means that our direct access to the Metaphysics begins about 1200 years after it was written." (Introduction, p. 11)

(...)

"The present study analyzes Alexander’s commentary as a textual witness to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. It thereby pursues two main objectives, which correspond to two different ways in which Alexander’s commentary provides information on the Metaphysics text. The first objective is to analyze how the Metaphysics text Alexander used when composing his commentary relates to the versions of the direct transmission, α and β, and to their common ancestor ω^αβ. A clear picture of how these versions interrelate will enable us to use the readings we can extract from Alexander’s commentary more effectively. The second objective is to investigate the effects that Alexander’s commentary had on the transmission of the Metaphysics text. Alexander’s impact on the Metaphysics text can be identified through words or phrases present in the

Metaphysics text that were not actually written by Aristotle but were adopted into the text from Alexander’s commentary. Such traces of contamination reveal to us the dynamics that shaped the text we read today, and hence can improve our understanding of the textual history of the Metaphysics." (p. 12)
———. 2021. "Aristotle, Metaphysics A -10, 993a13-15. A new reading and its implication for the unity of book Alpha." The Classical Quarterly no. 71:183-188.

Abstract: "This article argues for an emendation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics A 10, 993a13–15. Theemendation is based on a hitherto overlooked reading preserved in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on A 7. First, the article problematizes the reading of the

Metaphysics manuscripts in terms of syntax, diction and content. Second, it shows that Alexander’s reading is free of all three problems. Third, it argues for the originality of Alexander’s reading according to the principle utrum in alterum abiturum erat? and

based on the fact that the new reading reveals a subtle didactic link between A 7 and A 10 that sheds new light on the argumentative architecture of Metaphysics Book A."
Krause, Katja. 2015. "Transforming Aristotelian Philosophy: Alexander of Aphrodisias in Aquinas' early anthropology and eschatology." Przeglad Tornistyczny no. 21:175-217.

"As is well known, almost all ancient Greek and Arabic Peripatetic works following the footsteps of Aristotle's psychology and ethics were opposed to some aspects of traditional Christian doctrines of the human soul, intellect, and ultimate happiness. Alexander of Aphrodisias - the most influential Hellenistic commentator on the corpus Aristotelicum, who flourished around 200 AD - presents no exception to this picture."

(...)

"In fact, Aquinas' treatment of Alexander's thought will no longer seem paradoxical if examined in light of the two kinds of transformation just outlined.

For, as will emerge, whenever Aquinas implements an anchored transformation of Alexander's thought, he disapproves of it on the grounds of its irreconcilability with Christian doctrine. In contrast, whenever Aquinas implements a dissociated transformation of his thought, he approves of it on the grounds of usefulness for Christian doctrine, since the formal-structural elements from Alexander's conception of ultimate happiness serve in allowing him to conceive of the face-to-face beatific vision by way of ultimate conjunction. To the best of my knowledge, the particular nature of Aquinas' transformations of Alexander of Aphrodisias' thought have not yet been the subject of a detailed study.

1he purpose of my paper is thus to provide such a study and to show how and why Aquinas treats Alexander's conceptions of the human soul, intellect, and ultimate happiness in such a twofold way." (pp. 178-179, two notes omitted)
Kraye, Jill. 1991. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, Gianfrancesco Beati and the Problem of Metaphysics α." In Renaissance Society and Culture. Essays in Honor of Eugene F. Rice, Jr., edited by Monfasani, John and Nusto, Ronald G., 137-160. New York: Italica Press.

"Book α of Aristotle's Metaphysics has troubled scholars since Alexander of Aphrodisias composed his commentary in the second century A.D. Doubts as to the authenticity of this unusually short book (less than four columns in the Bekker edition), whose numbering seems to classify it as an afterthought to the far more substantial Book Α, must have been circulating even earlier: Alexander felt it necessary to argue that a was indeed written by Aristotle, on grounds of both style and content." (p. 137)

(...)

"The situation changed in 1527 when Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the Metaphysics became generally available in the Latin translation of Juan Gines de Sepulveda.(18)" (p. 141)

(...)

"More interesting is the case of Gianfrancesco Beati, who used Alexander's comments, or at any rate some of them, as the basis for a new theory of a. In 1543, Beati, a Dominican professor at the University of Padua, published a treatise in which he attempted to demonstrate that Metaphysics a was in reality the preface to Physics II.(26)" (p. 143)

(18) Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaria in duodecim Aristotelis libros De prima philosophia (Rome: Marcellus Silber, 1527). The translation was reprinted in Paris in 1536 and in Venice in 1544, 1551 and 1561: see F. E. Cranz, "Alexander of Aphrodisias," in Catalogus translationum et commentariorum (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, I960-), 1:77-135 at 93-5. On Sepulveda see C. Lohr, Latin Aristotle Commentaries (Florence: Olschki, 1988-), 2:419-20.

(26) G. F. Beati, In librum secundum Metaphysicae interpretatio, in qua... ostenditur eum librum ad Metaphysicam omnino non pertinere, sed esse prooemium secundi libri De auscultatione physica (Venice: Bernardinus Bindonius, 1543). The treatise was originally delivered as a lecture in Padua in 1542: see sig. 1 3r. On Beati, see Lohr, Aristotle Commentaries (note 18 above), 2:36. Beati was at Padua from 1531 to 1543, when he moved to Pisa, where he continued to teach metaphysics with considerable success until his death in 1546: see A. Fabroni, Historia Academiae Pisanae, 3 vols. (Pisa: Cajetanus Mugnainius, 1791-95; reprinted Bologna: Forni, 1971), 2:128.

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